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Abstract 
Much academic literature exists surrounding the relationship between 
government size and economic output at the federal level, yet only a few studies 
investigate such a relationship at the sub-federal level. This work concentrates on the 
relationship between the public sector and economic performance using data from 
state and local governments within the US states over the 1976-2005 period. Thus, 
the purpose of this quantitative study is to investigate the effects of public 
expenditure on the economic output of the states. This investigation seeks a unique 
government spending optimal for each of the 50 US states by applying methodology 
developed for the federal level by Richard Vedder and Lowell Gallaway. Therefore, a 
secondary purpose of this study is to test the applicability of their model for the state 
and local level. The findings do not confirm the existence of state-specific spending 
optimums in a consistent manner, suggesting the model is not transferable to the sub-
federal level. Using a modified time setting and aggregate state and local spending 
data, regression results provide confirmation of an Armey Curve and a spending 
optimal that is several percentage points higher than the Vedder and Gallaway 
conclusion. This finding strengthens the argument that the relationship between the 
public sector and economic growth depends on elements that change with time. Since 
theoretically there should exist an optimal level of spending for each state and 
expenditure category, further study is warranted.
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Chapter I 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
Problem Statement 
 Much research concludes that two fiscal variables weaken economic 
performance through their negative effects on work, income, savings, and profit. 
Those two variables are excessive public spending and a demotivating tax structure 
(Vreyman and Verhulst, 2005). This study focuses on the former. While there is much 
academic literature surrounding the relationship between government size and 
economic output at the federal level, only a few studies investigate such a relationship 
at the state and local level. This work concentrates on the relationship between the 
public sector and economic performance using data from state and local governments 
within the US states over the 1976-2005 period. Thus, the purpose of this quantitative 
study is to investigate the effects of public expenditure on the economic output of the 
states. This investigation seeks a unique government spending optimal for each of the 
50 US states by applying methodology developed for the federal level by Richard 
Vedder and Lowell Gallaway. Therefore, a secondary purpose of this study is to test 
the applicability of their model for the state and local level. 
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Analyzing the effect of state and local government spending on the economic 
output of the United States is worthy of study for several reasons. There are vast 
amounts of political rhetoric on both sides of the “size matters” debate, yet there is a 
lack of state-specific investigation. Where there has been investigation (Vedder and 
Galloway, 1998), there was a one-size-fits-all conclusion: no state-specific 
recommendations were made about the level of government spending necessary to 
maximize economic prosperity. However, because the US states have different 
maturities, incomes, populations, sizes, and locales, the optimums may differ across 
states according to their social and economic structures. This researcher is interested 
in an optimal range of government sizes across the states and a unique mix of 
spending for each of them. 
Such a study is reasonable because the states within the United States enjoy 
considerable autonomy, especially for tax and expenditure policy. The states act 
independently to set tax rates, exemptions, deductions, credits, and to borrow and 
spend. Thus, the states have the tools necessary to conduct economic policy. Where 
there is not autonomy, such as with interest rates and federal taxes, all states are under 
the same umbrella. Also, the states share harmonious accounting standards so it is 
straightforward to separate the effects of different types of government spending and 
to draw comparisons across states. Furthermore, the data is readily available from 
various government entities. 
Background of the Problem 
Industrialized countries across the globe increasingly share many 
commonalities because of converging cultures, languages, and even currencies. 
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Another such likeness is the expansion of government. Measuring government size by 
the share of GDP going to government spending, Gwartney et al. found that 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries 
expanded their public sectors by an average of 21 percentage points between 1960 
and 1996 (Gwartney, Halcombe and Lawson, 1998). More recently, an OECD 
publication reports that after several decades of marked growth, government 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP has moderated slightly to stand at approximately 
41 percent in 2003, but expects upward pressure on public spending due to ageing 
populations (Joumard et al., 2004). This trend toward bigger government has attracted 
many criticisms including that of hampering economic growth. Most notable is the 
leading work by Barro (1990, 1991) which supported the criticism that a large public 
sector hinders economic prosperity. Engen and Skinner (1992), Hansson and 
Henrekson (1994), Grier (1997), and Fölster and Henrekson (1999, 2001), offered 
further evidence validating the negative correlation between government size on 
economic growth. Conversely, there are researchers who remain skeptical about the 
validity of the Barro conclusion on government size. Atkinson (1995), Slemrod 
(1995, 1998) and Agell et al. (1997, 1999) found no conclusive association between 
the government size and economic prosperity. 
The ongoing debate in the academic community is predictable as government 
size and economic output is expected to have at least some association. Although 
public spending can displace private investment, it can also promote productivity in 
the private sector. Some public investment (to develop infrastructure, establish a 
stable monetary system, and institute a legal system to protect property rights and 
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enforce contracts) provides the foundation for a functioning market economy and is 
an absolute necessity for private sector productivity. Thus, both the positive and 
negative effects of public spending must be considered (Vreyman and Verhulst, 
2004). Slemrod (1995) suggests the negative impact of government size on economic 
output exists only if the size exceeds some upper limit. Given the aforementioned 
trade-off between positive externalities associated with government spending and 
negative externalities related to the crowding-out of private investment, it is expected 
that the relationship between government spending and economic output should 
follow an “inverted U” shape. This is discussed in further detail in the following 
section. 
Theoretical Framework  
The “inverted U” shaped relationship between government size and economic 
output is called the “Armey Curve” after Dr. Richard Armey, an economist and 
former Member of the United States House of Representatives (a similar version of 
the curve is known as the Rahn Curve). This argument posits that in those countries 
with a large role for government, the share of public spending designed to stimulate 
private sector productivity is usually less than in countries with a small role for 
government (Fölster and Henrekson, 2001). In developing economies, public 
spending may show the private sector will be supported, thus an increase in the size 
of government would likely stimulate economic growth. It should be noted, however, 
that a small government is not a sufficient condition for increases in government 
spending to have positive effects on output. When government is not big enough it 
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cannot provide basic enforcement of property rights or contracts, which are necessary 
conditions for economic growth (Gwartney, et al., 1998). 
On the other hand, a government so large that it excessively engages in wealth 
transfers and regulations would not be likely to promote prosperity. Former Senator 
Barry Goldwater framed well the government size predicament by stating “a 
government that is big enough to give you all you want is big enough to take it all 
away” (1964). Political economist Barry R. Weingast (1995) refined the statement by 
saying “the fundamental political dilemma of an economic system is this: a 
government strong enough to protect property rights and enforce contracts is also 
strong enough to confiscate the wealth of its citizens” (p. 1). Both Goldwater and 
Weingast caution against excessive government spending. 
Modeled after the work of Author Laffer who sought optimal tax rates as a 
function of maximal tax receipts, Armey (1995) and Barro (1990) are interested in 
finding the optimal government spending level as a function of maximizing wealth 
creation. Armey suggests that without government there is anarchy and little 
economic growth because there is no rule of law or secure property rights. He argues 
that in anarchical societies, there exists little incentive to work, save and invest, due 
to the fear of expropriation. Additionally, the lack of investment in critical 
infrastructure, like transportation and technology, leads to poor levels of productivity 
and wealth. Likewise, when all economic decisions are made by the public sector, 
wealth creation is lacking because citizens have little incentive to produce when tax 
rates must be high in order to finance the excessive government spending. However, 
when there is a combination of private and public decisions on the distribution of 
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productive factors, economic output should be greater (Armey, 1995, Vreyman and 
Verhulst, 2004). 
As the public sector is initially established, production grows. Law and order 
is instituted, critical infrastructure is built and productivity is increased. Also, 
educational and social institutions are implemented to further aid economic 
development. In the initial development stages, often the productivity of sound public 
expenditure policy yields a higher return than the productivity of private investment, 
so government outlays actually encourage economic growth. Yet, additional public 
projects are subject to diminishing returns and will increasingly lose their productive 
advantage over private investment. Also, the growing tax burdens needed to finance 
government spending will progressively be a disincentive to produce.  Eventually, the 
growth producing elements of public spending will decrease and further expansion of 
the public sector will no longer lead to increases in output. Thus, the shape of the 
Armey Curve is an “inverted U”, similar to the Laffer Curve. (Armey, 1995, 
Vreyman and Verhulst, 2004) 
Significance of the Problem 
Vedder and Gallaway (1998) verified the existence of the Armey Curve in the 
US and other OECD countries using multiple linear regression. Their results suggest 
many Western economies, including the US, are in the downward-sloping section of 
the Armey Curve where a decrease in the size of the public sector would be expected 
to produce economic growth. Other literature examining the relationship between 
government size and economic growth for developed countries is consistent with the 
Vedder and Gallaway study (Pevcin, 2004, Vreyman and Verhulst, 2004). Bleaney et 
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al. (2001) tested a Barro-style endogenous growth model for OECD countries over 
the period 1970-1995. The cross-country study focused on government taxing and 
spending and isolated the differences in “productive” and “nonproductive” public 
expenditures. Their results confirm the endogenous growth model, showing taxes to 
impede steady-state growth rates while some “productive” public expenditures 
increase these rates (Bleaney, et al., 2001). 
From an economic growth perspective, these investigations suggest that the 
level of government spending is above the optimal level throughout the world and in 
the US. This non-optimal size of government is costly. Indeed, Vedder and Gallaway 
(1998) have estimated that a reduction in the federal government spending level to 
their estimated optimum (at 17.45% of GDP) would be associated with an increase in 
national GDP of $30 billion per year. According to Vedder and Gallaway, “This is a 
permanent increase. The present value of that increase over, say, the next generation 
reaches into several hundred billion dollars. It is certainly worth doing.” (p. 7) 
According to this researcher’s knowledge, only a few authors have 
investigated these growth effects on the sub-federal level. Exceptions are Schaltegger 
and Torgler (2006), with evidence from the Swiss cantons, Holcombe and Lacombe 
(2004), Mark et al. (2000), Vedder and Gallaway (1998), Modfidi and Stone (1990), 
and Helms (1985) with evidence from the US state level. Helms and Modfidi-Stone 
found that some productive tax expenditures can enhance growth. Holcombe-
Lacombe and Mark, et al. found that tax increases in general usually impede growth. 
Many other studies have undertaken the question of “motivating” versus 
“demotivating” tax structures to find the optimal mix of taxation. The questions of 
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productive versus nonproductive government expenditures and motivating versus 
demotivating tax structures are all relevant, but secondary to the question of optimal 
size of government. Only when an output maximizing size of government is 
determined, can types of spending and tax structures be of relevance. Before one 
knows how much government expenditure is desirable, one cannot determine the 
right mix of spending. Before one knows how much tax should be collected, one 
cannot know the correct mix of taxation. 
Growth differences among the US states are significant. Despite having 
similar macro conditions, large growth differentials among the states are observed. 
For example, in the ten year period from 1995-2005, Mississippi gross state product 
(GSP) grew at a 4.1% annual growth rate, while Nevada grew at 7.9% annual growth 
rate during the same period. This observation raises the question as to what causes 
these remarkable growth differences and if other states could achieve a higher level of 
economic performance. Results from the present study could help set benchmarks to 
target an economic output-maximizing spending level. The present study is desirable 
as conclusions could help policymakers maximize economic output and enhance the 
quality of life of the citizenry. 
Overview of Methodology 
This study assesses the relationship between government spending and 
economic output at the state and local government level. Data on these variables is 
obtained from public-domain sources such as the Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and Bureau of the Census. Data from years 1976 through 
2005 is utilized for the analysis. 
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Following the procedure outlined in Vedder and Gallaway (1998), the 
relationship between government spending and real economic output is assessed with 
multiple linear regression analysis, in which yearly economic output is set to be the 
dependent variable and state and local government spending is set to be one of the 
independent variables. Other independent variables include a time trend and the 
unemployment rate to control for the effect of the business cycle on economic output. 
More importantly, following Vedder and Gallaway’s methodology, a squared term for 
state and local government spending is included as an independent variable. This term 
permits testing for the existence of an Army Curve as it allows the nonlinear 
relationship between government spending and economic output. Alternative 
definitions of “government spending” are used in the individual regression models. 
Thus, in addition to testing the relationship between total state and local government 
spending and economic output, the effects of several components of government 
spending on economic output are tested.  
Separate regression analyses are performed for each of the 50 US states and 
for the US in aggregate. This is of utmost importance as separate regression estimates 
for each state are needed to test state-specific, output-maximizing government 
spending levels. The specific regression model used to estimate for each of the states 
is the following one: 
2O a bG cG dT eU= + − + −  
where O is total real output, G is government spending (as a percentage of economic 
output), T is the time trend and U is the unemployment level. The relationship 
between government spending and output is given by coefficients b and c. If b is 
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positive and c is negative and statistically significant, then this would suggest the 
existence of an Armey Curve (as the relationship between government spending and 
economic output would resemble a concave parabola). In the cases were an Armey 
Curve is found, the output-maximizing government spending rate is simply defined as 
–b/2c. 
Limitations and Delimitations 
The present study is limited to the analysis of government spending and 
economic output in the US states during the period of 1976-2005. The effects of other 
variables on economic output (other than unemployment and time) are not considered 
in this study. Given one underlying assumption in the present analysis is that each 
state has an associated specific government spending rate, results from the present 
study are not suitable for other countries. 
Because multiple linear regression is used to assess the relationship between 
government spending and output, another limitation of the present study is it is only 
possible to draw an association between the variables and not a relationship of 
causality. The regression coefficients could be biased since other factors that might 
influence economic growth, such as countercyclical macro policies, innovation or 
institutions, are not included. 
Finally, it must be noted that the “optimal” government spending rate sought 
is one which maximizes economic output. This definition does not take into account 
matters of social consciousness and politics. For instance, there is no guarantee of 
correlation between the maximization of economic output and the maximization of 
social welfare. 
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Summary 
The purpose of this quantitative study is to (a) assess the relationship between 
state and local government spending and state level economic output, and (b) assess 
(if it exists) the economic output-maximizing government spending level for each 
state. To address these objectives, data on the US states from 1976 through 2005 is 
utilized. Multiple linear regression following the methodology outlined by Vedder 
and Gallway (1998) is used to assess the relationship between government spending 
and economic output, and to assess whether an Armey Curve exists individually for 
each state. If it exists, the output-maximizing government spending rate is computed 
based on the regression coefficients. 
Chapter two presents a review of the literature on the impact of government 
spending on economic growth. Next, chapter three details the methodology used in 
the present study. Chapter four provides a description of the results of the regressions. 
Lastly, chapter five presents a discussion of the results, implications and limitations 
of the study as well as suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter II 
 
Literature Review 
 
In this chapter, a review of the literature related to the relationship between 
government size and economic growth is presented. First, a brief discussion of the 
Armey Curve, an “inverted U” shape depicting the relationship between government 
spending and economic growth such that the effect of an increase in government 
spending is positive for low levels of spending and negative for higher ones. 
Following that, investigations related to the impact of government spending and 
taxation on economic growth at the national level are presented, showing there are 
opposing views on this issue. For example, some authors suggest a negative impact of 
government spending on economic growth (such as Vreyman and Verhulst, 2005 and 
Fölster and Henrekson, 2001); while others suggest a positive impact (such as Ram, 
1986) or no impact at all (such as Agell, et al., 1999 and Mendoza, et al., 1997). The 
next section presents a review of the findings related to the effects of government 
spending at the state and local level. Next, a review of literature related to the effect 
of different components of government spending on economic growth is presented. 
Finally, a discussion of commonly accepted growth determinants and economic 
convergence is offered. 
Growth Theory 
Models based on the neoclassical growth theory predict that government 
spending cannot affect the steady-state growth rate of countries. In these models, 
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government spending may have an effect on the transition to the steady-state; 
however, steady-state growth depends primarily on technological change, which is 
taken to be an exogenous variable. Therefore, there is no place in such models to 
examine the role of government spending on the long-term growth of economic 
output (Solow, 1956). 
By contrast, models developed more recently, such as that from Barro (1990), 
in which steady-state growth is considered to be endogenous rather than exogenous, 
leave room for government spending to have an impact on the long-term growth of 
economic output. In these models, steady-state growth does not necessarily depend on 
an exogenous technological change, but can also be related to endogenous 
government spending. In particular, although the steady-state growth rate may still be 
tied to technology in these models, technological change and government spending in 
certain areas can be related, thus representing an association between government 
spending and long-term growth. 
The present analysis is grounded on the main idea behind endogenous growth 
models; namely, that government spending may have an impact on long-term 
economic growth. As was discussed in the previous section, the relationship between 
these two variables may not be monotonic yielding the possibility of an optimal level 
of government spending that maximizes steady-state growth. 
The Armey Curve 
The Armey Curve depicts the nature of the relationship between government 
spending and economic growth. It is argued that the relationship between government 
spending and economic growth has an “inverted U” shape. This relationship suggests 
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that “very low” levels of government spending can be detrimental to economic 
growth, but so can be “very high” levels of government spending (Armey, 1995). 
Given this relationship, there theoretically exists an optimal level of government 
spending, in the sense that it is related to the maximum possible economic growth 
(measured by change in GDP). 
The rationale behind the shape of the Armey Curve depends on the 
productivity of government spending. If there is no government presence in a country, 
it is likely that there will be no rule of law and no protection of property rights. 
Without protection of property rights, there exists little incentive for private 
investment as there is great risk that any investment will be stolen or destroyed. 
Moreover, with no private sector initiatives there are few incentives for government 
to undertake public investments, such as the development of infrastructure and human 
capital. Given that such public investment reduces transaction costs, it is 
understandable that without any government spending the rate of economic growth 
would be greatly reduced (Vedder and Gallaway, 1998). 
However, “too much” government spending can also be harmful to economic 
growth. Vedder and Gallaway (1998) argue: “As governments grow, the law of 
diminishing returns begins operating. While the construction of roads initially assists 
output expansion, the construction of secondary roads and upgrading primary roads 
start to have less added positive impact per dollar spent. Moreover, the taxes and /or 
borrowing levied to finance government impose increasing burdens” (p. 2). 
The rationale behind the Armey Curve is similar to that of the Laffer Curve. 
The Laffer Curve depicts the nature of the relationship between tax rates and 
15 
 
revenues, and suggests this relationship also has an “inverted U” shape. This is 
because, beyond a certain point, increases in the tax rate are associated with a 
decrease in economic output, causing the tax base to be reduced. Therefore, increases 
in the tax rate could yield a reduction in tax revenues.  
Based on these considerations, there should exist an “optimal” government 
spending level where economic growth is maximized. This would happen at the point 
where the marginal benefits of government spending begin to outweigh its marginal 
costs. There has been extensive research aimed at estimating this optimal government 
spending level for the US and other developed countries, and comparing that level to 
the actual level of government spending. In most cases, it has been shown that 
government spending is excessive. The following sections present a review of the 
literature related to the relationship between government spending and economic 
growth. 
Relationship between Government Spending and Economic Growth at the National 
Level 
The analysis presented in this study is based mainly on the work of Vedder 
and Gallaway (1998). In their article, the researchers tested Friedman’s (1997) claim: 
“Government has an essential role to play in free and open society. Its average 
contribution is positive; but I believe that the marginal contribution of going from 
15% of the national income to 50% has been negative” (p. 14). Thus, Friedman 
claimed the optimal level of government spending would be between 15% and 50% 
of gross domestic product. 
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In order to test whether the relationship between government spending and 
economic growth indeed follow an “inverted U” shape and to find the optimal level of 
government spending, Vedder and Gallaway (1998) used multiple linear regression 
analysis. They used yearly US data at the national level from 1947 through 1997. The 
specific model tested in their work was as follows: 
2O a bG cG dT eU= + − + −  
where O is total output, G is government spending (as a percentage of national 
income), T is a time trend and U is the unemployment level. Variables T and U were 
included to control for the upward trend in output (due to changes in technology, 
human capital, etc.) and to variations due to the business cycle. The relationship 
between government spending would be given by coefficients b and c. 
Vedder and Gallaway (1998) found a negative and significant coefficient for 
c, which confirmed the existence of the Armey Curve at the national level. Using this 
equation, they estimated output to be maximized at the point where government 
spending equals 17.45% of GDP. Other specifications of the model (with data from as 
far back as 1799 and using five and ten-year averages to smooth the variables) show 
an optimal government spending level of 11-13% of GDP. Moreover, when using 
state and local government spending (instead of national spending) as independent 
variable, they found the optimal state and local government spending rate to be 
11.42% for all states. Vedder and Gallaway concluded that current government 
spending in the US (at the national, state and local level) is higher than the optimal 
one. Therefore, reducing government spending would be beneficial to the economy.  
17 
 
Vedder and Gallaway (1998) repeated the analysis for other countries 
(Canada, Denmark, Italy and Sweden), again at the national level. In each case, 
evidence towards the existence of an Armey Curve was found. Moreover, they found 
that government spending in each country is “excessive” in the sense that it was 
higher than the optimal level as given by the Armey Curve equation. 
There is a fairly large volume of research in which a significant negative 
relationship between government size and economic growth is found. Probably the 
most well-known research carried out in this field is that of Robert Barro. In his 
influential paper (which spurred much research based on the methodology of “Barro-
type regressions”), Barro (1991) examined the determinants of economic growth 
using a sample of 98 countries and data aggregated by five-year periods from 1960 
through 1985. Among other conclusions, Barro found government consumption as a 
proportion of GDP is negatively related to economic growth. On the other hand, no 
significant relationship was found between public investment and economic growth. 
Different effects on economic growth depending on the type of government spending 
(in this case, consumption or investment) were found in other analyses and are 
discussed in the next section. 
The “inverted U” shape of the relationship between government size and 
economic growth was also examined by Slemrod (2002). While this study mostly 
focused on the impact of “trustworthiness,” tax cheating and government size, a 
regression was performed to assess the impact of government spending on economic 
prosperity. Slemrod found some evidence of the existence of an Armey Curve in the 
US, suggesting the marginal effect of increases in public sector size is positive for 
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smaller governments, and became negative when government size grew to between 
31% and 38% of GDP. However, these findings were not conclusive because the 
regression coefficients associated to government spending were not significant. It is 
possible this non-significant result is due to the relatively small sample size that was 
used in Slemrod’s analysis. 
Vreyman and Verhulst (2005) found similar results in terms of the impact of 
government spending on economic growth in an analysis of growth differentials 
among European countries. Their analysis involved a panel regression with data for 
17 European countries (including the 12 Euro countries, three non-Euro EU members 
and two non-EU members) from 1985 through 2002. Several factors were considered 
as potential determinants of growth differentials among the countries in the sample. 
One of these factors was government spending. Based on the work of Prevcin (2004), 
Vreyman and Verhulst assumed that these European countries were on the “bad” side 
of the Armey Curve and excluded a squared term for government spending in the 
regression analysis.  The results found in this study provide evidence that European 
governments are oversized as highly significant negative relationships were found 
between government spending and economic growth. Therefore, Vreyman and 
Verhulst’s results were consistent with those of Vedder and Gallaway (1998) in 
finding a negative relationship between government spending and growth at the 
observed levels of government spending. 
Grier and Tullock (1989) used a similar panel regression methodology in a 
study on economic growth across 113 countries (including both OECD and non-
OECD member countries). Findings from this study showed there is a fairly robust 
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negative correlation between government consumption and economic growth. These 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that most developed countries are in the 
“bad” side of the Armey Curve, such that lowering government spending would help 
increase economic growth rates. Another important contribution from Grier and 
Tullock is that their study countries did not share a common set of coefficients for the 
independent variables, suggesting it would be incorrect to pool them. This finding 
helped motivate the hypothesis from the present study, which posits there is not a 
universal optimal level of government spending; rather the optimal point would 
depend on the individual characteristics of each state. 
Fölster and Henrekson (1999, 2001) used a similar approach to estimate the 
effect of government spending and taxation across several countries. They performed 
the analysis using yearly data (from 1970 through 1975), from a sample of 23 OECD 
countries. Fölster and Henrekson considered separate models including either total 
government expenditure as a proportion of GDP or total tax revenue as a proportion 
of GDP, to explain economic growth. Control variables included investment share of 
GDP, the growth rate of labor force, growth of human capital, initial income (to 
account for convergence effects), and country-specific variables. Time period dummy 
variables were included to avoid spurious correlations given that all countries 
experienced slower growth rates during the 1970s and 1980s; while the country 
specific variables were included to account for effects such as culture and social 
norms. 
In order to account for possible heteroscedasticity issues present in their data, 
Fölster and Henrekson (1999, 2001) used weighted least squares in addition to 
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ordinary least squares to estimate the regressions on economic growth. Their findings 
show no significant relationship between tax revenues and economic growth and a 
significant negative association between government expenditure and economic 
growth. In particular, they found that increasing the expenditure ratio by ten percent 
of national income is related to an annual growth rate that was 0.7 to 0.8 percentage 
points lower. The regression coefficient associated to government expenditure is 
negative and significant when using either ordinary least squares or weighted least 
squares regressions. Moreover, their results are robust to the inclusion of 
unemployment as an independent variable used to account for business cycle 
fluctuations. 
Fölster and Henrekson (1999, 2001) further extended their analysis by 
including a robustness test for the coefficients which determined the relationship 
between economic growth and government spending and tax revenues. The rationale 
for conducting this test was because other studies (such as Easterly and Rebelo, 1993) 
found the relationship between government expenditure and economic growth 
became non-significant when a particular set of control variables was included in the 
regression. The robustness test involved computing a large number of regressions, 
including the variables of interest (government expenditure and tax revenue) and all 
possible combinations of control variables, and then verifying the estimated 
coefficients for the variables of interest. The researchers concluded the observed 
negative relationship between government expenditure and economic growth was 
indeed robust for their sample of 23 OECD countries. Their findings are consistent 
with the hypothesis that most developed countries have levels of government 
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spending which are above the optimal one. The robustness test performed in the study 
provided evidence that this relationship is not just an artifact of the data (Fölster and 
Henrekson 1999, 2001). 
More evidence regarding the negative relationship between government size 
and economic growth is provided by Peden and Bradley (1989). In that study, it is 
argued a substantial proportion of the slowdown in productivity and economic growth 
during the 1970s and 1980s was due to the increase in government size during these 
years. Peden and Bradley used a regression which controlled for the business cycle to 
estimate the relationship between government size and economic growth. They found 
the effect of government size on economic growth is negative and statistically 
significant. Moreover, they concluded the reason economic growth is slowed by 
larger governments is due to a negative effect on productivity rather than on the 
employment of productive factors. 
A significant negative relationship between government spending and 
economic growth was also found by Engen and Skinner (1992). In order to assert this 
relationship, the authors first developed a general model for the relationship between 
fiscal policy and economic growth. Their model included the following elements: 
1. Effect of public spending on private productivity, 
2. Returns to scale, 
3. A transition from equilibrium growth, and; 
4. Tax distortions. 
Regression models were estimated using annual data from 107 countries for 
the period 1970-1985. Moreover, the regression model was corrected to take into 
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account endogeneity in fiscal policy (i.e. economic growth could have an impact on 
government expenditure and thus the error terms could be correlated with the 
independent variables). Findings from this model suggest balanced-budget increases 
in government spending and tax revenues would be correlated to a decrease in 
economic growth. These findings are consistent with other literature in which a 
significant negative relationship between government spending and economic growth 
is observed. Furthermore, the fact that endogeneity was taken in account in the 
estimation of the model provides further evidence that the observed relationship is not 
an artifact due to model misspecifications (Engen and Skinner, 1992). 
Mitchell (2005) argued that high government spending is detrimental for 
economic growth. In order to show this, a comparison between the US and the 15 EU 
nations was performed. Mitchell showed the US outperformed the EU in terms of per 
capita economic output (by 40% in 2003 with respect to the average for the 15 EU 
nations), real economic growth (by over 50% in the years 1995-2005), unemployment 
levels and living standards. Moreover, government spending, tax revenues and 
government debt were significantly higher for the 15 EU nations. Based on this 
evidence, Mitchell concluded that government spending is negatively related to 
economic growth. 
Although results from Mitchell (2005) seem to be consistent with the findings 
regarding the negative relationship between government spending and economic 
growth, it should be noted that the analysis did not appear to be statistically rigorous. 
A comparison between the EU nations and the U.S. in terms of government spending 
and economic growth is not enough to conclude that it is government spending that 
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causes variations in economic growth, as there are other factors which may affect 
both variables.  
The view that there is a negative relationship between government size and 
economic growth is not shared by all researchers in the field. For example, the results 
from Fölster and Henrekson (1999) are challenged by Agell, et al. (1999) on the basis 
their methodology is theoretically flawed. Agell, et al. argue that when theoretically 
valid instruments are used to account for endogeneity in the estimation of the 
economic growth equation, the relationship between growth of the public sector and 
economic growth become statistically non-significant. Moreover, they suggest that 
cross-country growth regressions (as those estimated by Fölster and Henrekson) 
cannot provide reliable estimates about the impact of the public sector on economic 
growth. 
A non-significant relationship between tax policy and economic growth is also 
reported by Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti and Asea (1997). In their study, the hypothesis 
that tax policy is in practice an ineffective instrument to influence economic growth 
(“Harberger’s superneutrality conjecture”) is tested. A theoretical framework was 
developed to support this hypothesis and cross-country regressions were performed in 
order to test them. Mendoza, et al. found the negative effects of taxes are consistent 
with negligible effects on economic growth. Moreover, they showed these results 
were robust to the introduction of independent variables representing other possible 
factors which could influence economic growth. Atkinson (1995) argues that findings 
regarding the relationship between government size and economic growth are 
inconsistent. For example, he suggests research in this area is riddled with the 
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problem of causality. “It may be poor economic performance that leads to high 
welfare state spending, rather than vice versa. Slow growth, or output below trend, 
may cause reduced employment and hence higher spending on unemployment benefit 
and other transfers. Alternatively, it may be high income countries can ‘afford’ a 
more generous social security system. Or it may be that industrialization of the 
economy leads both to higher living standard and the need for social security” 
(p.179).  
Relationship between Government Spending and Economic Growth at the State and 
Local Level 
Only a few authors have investigated the relationship between government 
spending and economic growth at the sub-national level. This section presents a 
review of the literature concerned with that area of research. 
Schaltegger and Torgler (2004) evaluated the effect of government spending 
on economic growth using a sample of state and local governments (cantons) within 
Switzerland from 1981 through 2001. Their analysis involved using regressions to 
account for other possible determinants of growth, such as initial GDP (to account for 
convergence effects), human capital and unemployment (to account for business 
cycles effects). Canton dummies were also included to account for other differences 
among the units in the analysis. Results of these regressions show a fairly robust 
negative impact of government spending on economic growth.  
Mofidi and Stone (1990) examined the effect of spending at the state and local 
level in the US in the 1962-1982 period. They found state and local taxes had a 
negative effect on economic growth when the revenues from those taxes were spent 
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on transfer payment programs. They also found, holding taxes constant, government 
expenditures in infrastructure, health and education have a positive relationship with 
economic growth. In this sense, their results are similar to the ones obtained by 
Vedder and Gallaway (1998), who found negative effects of federal government 
expenditure in transfer payments and no negative effects of expenditure in public 
health services. Moreover, their finding that infrastructure spending results in positive 
growth effects appears to be in agreement with Cashin’s (1994) conclusions regarding 
the positive impact of government investment in areas that have positive externalities 
to the private sector production function. This suggests the fundamentals that govern 
the relationship between government expenditure and economic growth could be 
similar as there does not appear to be important differences in the direction of these 
relationships; generally positive associations for investment spending and negative 
association for consumption spending. 
A similar analysis was carried out in Helms (1985). This study involved panel 
data at the state and local level and analyzed the effects of tax revenues and different 
types of government expenditures on economic growth. The findings from this 
analysis are consistent with those of Mofidi and Stone (1990). First, they found when 
state and local tax increases are used to fund transfer payments there is a significant 
negative effect on economic growth. Moreover, Helms showed when increased tax 
revenues are used to increase government investment in public services, such as 
transportation infrastructure, education and public health services, a positive effect on 
economic growth results. Helms suggest this effect might be due to these spending 
components having a favorable impact on production and location decisions 
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outweighing the negative effect produced by state and local tax increases. The 
findings from this study provide further evidence the relationships between different 
types of government spending and economic growth are similar at the state and local 
level when compared to the national level. 
Holcombe and Lacombe (2004) performed a comparison among several 
counties in the US, using annual data from 1960 through 1990, to assess the impact of 
tax rates on economic growth. In order to control for other factors affecting economic 
growth, such as climate, culture and proximity to markets, they performed a matching 
procedure for counties based on geographical location. Findings from the study 
suggest states which increase their income tax rates more than their neighbors 
experience slower economic growth. Holcombe and Lacombe estimated an average 
reduction of 3.4% in per capita income in states which increased income taxes. This 
finding also appears to be consistent with other research at the national level (such as 
Fölster and Henrekson, 2001) in that an increase in tax revenues is negatively 
associated with economic growth. It should be noted the study by Holcombe and 
Lacombe did not take into account the specific government expenditure items in 
which the increased tax revenues were spent. Therefore, their findings are not 
necessarily in conflict with the conclusion that some items are positively associated 
with economic growth. Their findings might be explained by the decisions of 
policymakers to spend the higher tax revenues on non-productive government items. 
Vedder (1993) compared government growth with economic growth at the 
state level for all 50 US states. In this analysis, it is argued that government spending 
grew much faster than personal income from 1980 through 1990. He attributed most 
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of this increase in government spending to excess compensation of public employees 
(with important differences across states). Vedder argues that from 1980 through 
1990, state and local employees received compensation that was $47.3 billion more 
than if they had performed similar jobs in the private sector. Moreover, this 
phenomenon was widespread as excess compensation to state and local employees 
was observed in all but two of the analyzed states. 
A regression analysis performed in Vedder (1993) using data for those 50 
states revealed, all else held constant, a one percentage point increase in the 
proportion of a state’s per capita income going to public employee compensation was 
associated with a decrease of six percentage points in per capita income of that state. 
Vedder concluded that excess compensation to public employees during the 1980-
1990 period had reduced personal income by $280 billion in 1990. 
The relationship between different types of government spending and 
economic growth at the state level was further assessed by Vedder (1993). In this 
analysis, some findings are in contrast with those obtained by Mofidi and Stone 
(1990) and Helms (1985). Specifically, results from one regression analysis showed 
no significant relationship between spending in education and economic growth. On 
the other hand, government spending in public assistance (transfer payments) was 
found to have a negative relationship with economic growth, which is indeed 
consistent with the findings from those studies. 
Relationship between Spending Mix and Economic Growth 
Although most of the prior research about the relationship between 
government spending and economic growth focused on aggregate government 
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spending, there has been some research specific to the effects of different components 
of government spending (health, defense, etc.) on economic growth. This section 
presents literature in which these relationships have been assessed. 
Vedder and Gallaway (1998) conducted an analysis related to the existence of 
an Armey Curve for individual components of federal spending in the US. This 
estimation was completed using the same procedure as the one used for total 
government spending (described in the previous section). The only difference was the 
inclusion of individual components of government spending as the independent 
variables in the linear regression model rather than the measure of total government 
spending. Results of their analysis show the existence of an Armey Curve is not 
stable across all government spending items. The following table shows a summary 
of their findings: 
Exhibit 1 
    
Category of Spending 
Persistent Negative Spending-Growth 
Relationship 
Armey Curve 
All Entitlements (Income Security 
+ Health + Social Sec. + 
Medicare) 
Yes Yes 
Income Security No Yes 
Health No No 
Defense No No 
Net Interest Payments Yes Yes 
Other Federal Spending No No 
[For a more detailed discussion on these findings, see Vedder and Gallaway (1998), p. 10] 
 
Vedder and Gallaway (1998) also found, for the items which exhibited an 
Armey Curve in their relationship with economic growth, government spending to be 
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above its optimal level in the US. As a result, they recommended stopping the growth 
of transfer payments relative to income and output. Moreover, they recommended 
maintaining a balanced budget to help reduce net interest payments (which exhibit an 
Armey Curve) and thus boost economic growth. 
The relationship between different types of government expenditure and 
economic growth was also investigated in Cashin (1994). In this study, the author 
began by defining an endogenous growth model which took into account the stock of 
public and private capital in order to model the production function. This approach is 
slightly different from the one used in other articles shown in this review of literature 
because the stock of public capital, rather than the flow of government expenditure, 
was assumed as one of the determinants of economic growth. 
The implications from the Cashin (1994) model were tested among a sample 
of 23 developed countries using annual data from 1971 through 1988. As in Engen 
and Skinner (1992), the potential endogeneity between the economic growth variable 
and government expenditure and taxation was properly accounted for through the use 
of instrumental variables. Findings from this study suggest increased government 
spending on items which contribute to the private production functions (such as 
public investment) have a positive impact on economic growth. Cashin argued this is 
due to the positive externalities generated by this type of expenditure increasing 
private investment and stimulating economic growth. However, findings from that 
study also suggest this increase would be limited by the need to levy distortionary 
taxes which were shown to have a negative impact on economic growth. According to 
the model, the increase in private investment is limited due to a reduction in the 
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marginal return to private capital caused by the distortionary taxes. With low tax 
rates, the positive effects of government spending on economic growth outweigh the 
negative effects of levying distortionary taxes. Therefore, an important conclusion 
from Cashin’s work is that there is a trade-off involved in choosing the level of 
government expenditure for any spending component. This trade-off underscores the 
assumption of an Armey Curve for government expenditure items which can have a 
positive effect on economic growth. 
Hansson and Henrekson (1994) also investigated the relationship between 
different types of government spending and economic growth. Specifically, they used 
regression models with disaggregated data to estimate the relationship between 
different kinds of government expenditure and productivity in the private sector 
(rather than its relationship with economic growth). Findings from this study suggest 
government transfers, consumption and total expenditure have consistently negative 
effects, but that education spending has positive effects on private sector productivity. 
Moreover, they found government investment (such as spending in infrastructure) is 
not significantly related to private productivity growth. The observation that 
government transfers were found to have a negative effect on productivity growth is 
consistent with that of Vedder and Gallaway (1998), who showed this kind of 
government expenditure is above its optimal level and that spending reductions in this 
item would be associated to higher economic growth. 
Findings from Hansson and Henrekson (1994) suggest the impact of 
government spending is through changes in total factor productivity. Their results are 
consistent with those of Peden and Bradley (1989) who suggest the slowdown in 
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economic growth associated with increased government spending is due to reductions 
in productivity. It is also worthwhile noting that Hansson and Henrekson’s results 
regarding the impact of government investment appear to be somewhat in 
disagreement with those of Cashin (1994), as the latter found a positive impact of 
government investment on economic growth. This difference might be due to the 
different methodologies employed in these two analyses. 
Generally Accepted Growth Determinants and Convergence 
While much of the discussion thus far has focused on government spending as 
a detriment to economic growth, it must be acknowledged that government spending 
can also have positive effects on economic development. Academic literature points 
to many commonly accepted “growth determinants” or components of spending that 
stimulate growth. Some of these factors are more institutional in nature, such as 
government stability, maintenance of the rule of law, increases in political rights, 
openness to trade and maintenance of infrastructure. Other factors involve more 
human elements, such as health and longer life expectancy, lower fertility rates and 
skill development. Researchers have reached somewhat of a consensus on the 
economic benefits of two broadly defined categories, human capital and physical 
capital. 
Many scholars, including the much cited Robert Barro, conclude that growth 
is negatively associated to the government share of consumption in GDP, but 
positively related to some level of educational attainment - often that of males in 
secondary education (Barro, 1998). This finding suggests that initial dollars spent on 
human capital development can have a positive effect on economic growth up to 
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some level, but are then subject to diminishing returns. An OECD (2002) publication 
contends there is sufficient evidence expenditures on education pay off due to gains 
in economic as well as non-economic benefits. The report states that, “It has become 
clear that educational attainment is not only vital to the economic well-being of 
individuals but also for that of nations. Access to and completion of education is a 
key determinant in the accumulation of human capital and economic growth” (p.5). 
Data from the Institute for Higher Education Policy (IHEP) suggests states 
which spend money on programs to send more citizens to college reap many 
economic benefits.  These benefits include increased tax revenues (as college 
educated citizens tend to earn higher wages), increased productivity, work force 
flexibility, lower levels of unemployment and a decreased dependence on government 
financial support.  For example, workers in Arkansas with a bachelor’s degree earn an 
average of 147 percent more ($53,646 versus $21,719) than those with only a high 
school diploma.  Similar results can be found in Pennsylvania (109%), Arizona 
(112%), South Carolina (113%) and New Mexico (132%) (IHEP, 2005). 
Furthermore, it is argued that a better educated populace leads to direct 
societal benefits, including reduced crime rates and increased civic involvement.  The 
study also states indirect benefits, including the claim that healthier constituencies aid 
state economies by reducing healthcare costs and the number of uninsured.  For 
example, 93 percent of those with a college education reported being in “excellent, 
very good or good” health, while only 82 percent of high school diploma holders 
responded that they were in “excellent, very good or good” health (IHEAP 2005). 
Much research asserts that at least some level of educational investment produces 
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direct economic benefits and indirectly creates a number of positive externalities. 
Thus, investment in human capital is a generally accepted determinant of economic 
growth. 
There is also a significant amount of research which supports the idea that 
public investment in “physical capital” (i.e. infrastructure, etc.) has a net positive 
effect on economic development.  In addition to the research mentioned heretofore, 
D.A. Aschauer (1988) demonstrats that there is a positive correlation between public 
physical capital investment and private sector output. He maintains that the decline in 
American productivity during the 1970s was caused by a failure to maintain high 
enough rates of public investment.  Munnell (1990a; 1990b) and others have 
continued Aschauer’s work (1988) and have demonstrated that public capital 
investment significantly influences private sector activity and stimulates economic 
growth.  Together, these articles are known as the “Public Capital Hypothesis”. 
This hypothesis is not without any critics. A study by Bangqiao Jiang (2001) 
on the relationship between transport infrastructure investments and economic growth 
in the United States and Canada questions whether the conclusions reached by 
Aschauer et al. are due to a direct real causation or whether they are the result of a 
spurious correlation.  Jiang (2001) asserts that the Public Capital Hypothesis 
overstated the degree to which public infrastructure investment stimulated the private 
sector and the economy.  In his conclusion, Jiang (2001) admits it is possible that his 
critique could be explained by the difficulty to measure the benefits of infrastructure 
development precisely and calls for more study on the subject. 
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Nonetheless, conventional wisdom is that some level of physical capital 
investment is a necessary condition for development.  Naturally, states which have 
underdeveloped infrastructures would be expected to see a higher return on initial 
physical capital investment.  While this study lends much time to the examination of 
reducing public spending to encourage economic growth, it also acknowledges 
investments in human and physical capital can stimulate the economy in a variety of 
ways and are largely considered critical determinants of growth. 
Many researchers have studied the determinants of growth to gain an 
understanding into the causes of economic output differences across countries and 
even across different locales within a single country. Data in some cases suggests 
these differences in economic output are becoming less distinct. Economic 
convergence, as measured by income differences, is occurring among countries 
throughout the globe - especially between developed countries and select regions. It is 
also occurring among select areas within the US. Convergence data is of relevance to 
this study because it underscores the need to discover a unique state and local 
government spending optimal rather than rely on a less precise aggregate measure. 
A study by Bauer, Schweitzer and Shane (2006) is especially relevant to the 
present study as it examines differences among states within the US. Bauer, et al., 
showed that income differences across states had been narrowing during the period 
from 1939 through 1976; the ratio of income per capita of the richest state to the 
poorest state was 4.5 in 1939 and slightly less than 2 in 1976. However, since 1976 
the ratio has begun growing once again. In order to explain these differences, Bauer, 
et al. developed and tested a growth model based on Solow’s standard model but 
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included other factors which could cause differences in the productivity of labor, such 
as tax burdens and public infrastructure. They found the main factor explaining a 
state’s relative income per capita is its “knowledge stock,” which was defined as its 
stock of patents as well as high school and college attainment rates.  
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) investigated income convergence among states 
in the US from 1880. They examined the dispersion of personal income since 1880 
and related it to the patterns of individual states and to the behaviors of regions as a 
whole. Moreover, the evolution of state level economic output since 1963 was 
examined and related to productivity in eight major sectors. Results of this study 
show there has been convergence for both sector and state aggregates. In particular, 
the convergence rate observed was between 2% to 2.5% per year. 
Convergence across states in the US was also examined by Higgins, Levy and 
Young (2006). In this study, US output data at the county level was examined. 
Higgins, et al. used both ordinary linear regression and three-stage linear regression 
with instrumental variables to assess convergence across states, controlling for a 
number of variables assumed to be determinants of convergence and growth. Analysis 
of this data produced several observations: (a) positive convergence rates between 2% 
and 8% per year (depending on the regression method used); (b) convergence rates 
differed by region (the rate of convergence for Southern states was much higher than 
that of Northeastern states); (c) all levels of government (federal, state and local) were 
negatively correlated with economic growth (in agreement with the findings of other 
studies related to the US being in the “bad” side of the Armey Curve), and; (d) 
development of the finance, insurance, real estate and entertainment sectors were 
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positively correlated with growth, while education employment was negatively 
correlated with growth. 
Caselli and Coleman (2001) conducted a study of the structural transformation 
within the US (such as transitioning from an agrarian society to an industrial one) and 
regional convergence (such as an eroding differential between southern and northern 
average wage). They found that regional convergence is best explained by “structural 
transformation,” which  was defined as the process by which agricultural wages 
converged to nonagricultural wages and also by the rate of transition from agricultural 
to nonagricultural jobs, which was significantly higher within the Southern labor 
force. Caselli and Coleman found the extent to which economic output in states in the 
Midwest converged to those of states in the Northeast could be ascribed to those same 
factors. Caselli and Coleman claim their model accounts for regional convergence as 
well as any other explanation. 
Grier and Grier (2007) made a counterintuitive finding regarding convergence 
in economic output across countries. According to the neoclassical model, divergence 
in economic output levels should only be observed if determinants of steady-state 
output are also divergent. However, Grier and Grier found that accumulation rates of 
capital (both human and physical), openness to trade and institutional quality (each 
steady-state determinants which are policy dependant) are significantly converging 
across time. They conclude that this constitutes an anomaly in the neoclassical growth 
model and casts doubts on its validity to explain economic growth. However, Grier 
and Grier offered some potential explanations for these findings to exist within the 
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neoclassical growth model, such as lengthy time lags required for convergent policies 
to affect steady-state incomes and the existence of scale effects. 
Notwithstanding the literature suggesting economic convergence between the 
US states, substantial differences still exits. As indicated by Grier, much time will be 
required before complete convergence can be realized, if it can be at all. Per capita 
personal income in 2007 ranges from Connecticut’s high of $54,117 to Mississippi’s 
low of $26,845, with a US average of $38,611. Latest Census data shows that in 
2006, the percentage of the population age 25 and older who graduated from high 
school ranges from 93 percent in Minnesota to 79 percent in Texas. Percentages of 
the population age 25 and older with a bachelor’s degree or higher range from a high 
of 49 percent in Massachusetts to a low of 16 percent in West Virginia. These 
disparities are a motivating factor behind the present investigation into a state-specific 
optimal level of public spending. 
Summary 
In this section, prior findings on the relationship between government 
spending and economic growth were presented. Research does not indicate a 
definitive impact of government spending on economic growth. While many 
researchers have found negative correlations (both at the national and state levels), 
other authors have challenged the validity of the methods used in order to arrive at 
those conclusions. Research also indicates that the effect of government spending 
might depend on the type of spending. Findings regarding the impact of transfer 
payments have shown a consistently negative relationship between these expenditures 
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and economic growth; while other types of expenditure, such as public investment, 
have not shown the same negative correlation. 
The following chapter presents the methods used in the present study to assess 
the existence of an Armey Curve at the state and local level in the US. 
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Chapter III 
 
Methodology 
 
In this chapter, the data collection and analysis methods used to address the 
aims of the present study are presented. The objective of this study is to determine (a) 
the relationship between government spending and real economic growth at the state 
and local level and (b) the government spending level for each state which maximizes 
growth in economic output. To address this objective, state and local level data on 
government spending and economic growth is required and multiple linear 
regressions must be computed individually for each state. 
Setting 
The present study is limited to states and locales within the United States 
during the period from 1976 through 2005 due to consistency and attainability of data 
between said period. Study variables which have missing data, namely GSP in years 
2001 and 2003, are interpolated for the analysis. 
Research Questions 
Based on the objectives of the present study, the following research questions 
are defined: 
1. What is the relationship between government spending and economic 
growth at the state level in the United States? 
2. Does the relationship between government spending and economic 
growth follow an Armey Curve for the US states? 
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3. What are the optimal state and local government spending rates (as a 
proportion of the corresponding area’s economic output) for each 
state? 
4. Does the model developed by Vedder and Gallaway for finding public 
spending optimums on the federal level transfer well to the sub-federal 
level? 
Data Collection 
Data is obtained from the following sources: 
• Bureau of the Census 
• Bureau of Labor Statistics 
• Bureau of  Economic Analysis 
• US Department of Education 
• National Center for Educational Statistics 
• National Governor’s Association 
These sources provide cross-sectional and time-series data on sub-federal 
economic output, unemployment and government spending components such as 
education services, social services, income maintenance, health, transportation, public 
safety and net interest payments. The main data set is from the Bureau of the Census. 
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Definition of Independent and Dependent Variables 
This study assesses the relationship between government spending and real 
economic output growth. Following the procedure outlined in Vedder and Gallaway 
(1998), this relationship is controlled for a time trend and the unemployment rate. 
Moreover, following Vedder and Gallaway, “government spending” is defined 
alternatively as total government expenditure and as the following components of 
spending: (a) current expenditure, (b) capital expenditure, (c) total education 
expenditure, (d) secondary education expenditure, (e) higher education expenditure, 
(f) public welfare expenditure, (g)  general finance and administration expenditure, 
(h) public health expenditure, (i) infrastructure expenditure, (j) public safety 
expenditure and (k) net interest expenditure. Therefore, the following variables are 
used in the present study: 
 Dependent Variable: 
• Economic Output Growth. This is defined as the yearly percent change 
in the gross state product (GSP) per capita, adjusted for the effect of 
inflation, for each state under analysis. 
Independent Variables 
 
• Government Spending. This is defined alternatively as: 
o Total state and local government spending as a proportion of 
the corresponding state GSP. 
o State and local current account (consumption) spending as a 
proportion of the corresponding state GSP. 
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o State and local capital account (investment) spending as a 
proportion of the corresponding state GSP. 
o State and local total education spending as a proportion of the 
corresponding state GSP. 
o State and local secondary education spending as a proportion 
of the corresponding state GSP. 
o State and local higher education spending as a proportion of the 
corresponding state GSP. 
o State and local public welfare spending as a proportion of the 
corresponding state GSP. 
o State and local general finance and administrative spending as 
a proportion of the corresponding state GSP. 
o State and local public health spending as a proportion of the 
corresponding state GSP. 
o State and local infrastructure spending as a proportion of the 
corresponding state GSP. 
o State and local public safety (police, fire, corrections) spending 
as a proportion of the corresponding state GSP. 
o State and local net interest spending as a proportion of the 
corresponding state GSP 
• Time trend. This variable takes on the value of one for the first year of 
data for each state and increases by one for each year thereafter. The 
rationale for including this independent variable is to allow economic 
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growth to follow a time trend (i.e. allow for the possibility that state 
economic growth is accelerating or decelerating over time). 
• Unemployment Rate. This variable is defined as the proportion of 
unemployed labor force for the corresponding state. 
Data Analysis 
In order to address Research Questions 1 and 2, multiple linear regression 
analysis is performed. As mentioned previously, the ordinary least squares regression 
model used for the present study is based on that of Vedder and Gallaway (1998). 
Thus, the regression model used for this study is the following: 
2O a bG cG dT eU= + − + −  
where O is total real output per capita, G is government spending (as a percentage of 
economic output), T is the time trend and U is the unemployment level. Variables T 
and U are included to control for the upward trend in output (due to changes in 
technology, human capital, etc.) and for variations due to the business cycle. The 
relationship between government spending and output is given by coefficients b and 
c. 
The reason why a squared term is included in this regression model is to allow 
for the existence of an Armey Curve in the relationship between government 
spending and economic growth. If the squared term were omitted, the model would 
“force” the relationship between government spending and economic output growth 
to be linear, which would imply that economic growth is a strictly increasing or 
strictly decreasing function of government spending. Clearly, this contradicts the idea 
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of the Armey Curve, which suggests the relationship between government spending 
and economic output growth is nonlinear. 
According to Armey Curve arguments, economic growth should be an 
increasing function of government spending for “low” levels of this variable and a 
decreasing function of government spending for “high” levels of this variable. In the 
described regression model, an Armey Curve would be evidenced by a negative and 
significant regression coefficient c. This would imply that economic growth as a 
function of government spending resembles a concave second-degree polynomial, as 
presented in Figure 1. 
Relationship between Government Spending and Economic Growth assuming an 
Armey Curve 
Figure 1 
 
 
Results from this regression model allow for determining the nature of the 
relationship between government spending and economic growth (as given by 
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coefficients b and c) and testing the existence of an Armey Curve, which would be 
confirmed by a negative and significant c coefficient. 
In order to find optimal government spending, which is defined as the 
government spending rate that maximizes economic growth, the following formula is 
used: 
Optimal Spending =
2
b
c
− , 
the standard analytical formula representing the argument that maximizes the value of 
a concave second-degree polynomial (i.e. finds the value of the vertex). 
Given the main objective of the present study is to test the relationship 
between government spending and economic growth for each state (as this may allow 
for different growth-maximizing government spending rates), the aforementioned 
regression model is estimated separately for each state. This requires that multiple 
regressions be estimated. To streamline the estimation of these models, a custom 
application designed for Matlab R14 is utilized. The application is designed where the 
regressions are automatically estimated so that the results include regression 
coefficients for all independent variables, as well as their associated significance 
values, for each state. 
This procedure is repeated using the different aforementioned definitions of 
“government spending,” which results in a total of 12 sets of estimations (one for 
total government spending and one for each of the spending components). 
Summary 
This chapter presented the data collection and analysis methods performed to 
determine: (a) the relationship between government spending and economic growth at 
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the state level (does it follow an Armey Curve?) and (b) the government spending 
level for each state that maximizes economic output growth for that area. In order to 
assess these questions, multiple linear regressions based on the model outlined by 
Vedder and Gallaway (1998) are estimated for each state. 
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Chapter IV 
 
Results 
 
The objective of the present study is to examine the relationship between 
government expenditure and economic growth as measured by real gross state 
product (GSP) per capita. In order to examine this relationship, multiple linear 
regression analyses are conducted. One separate regression is run for each state and 
then for the US as a whole (thus 51 “states”), using data on state and local level 
expenditures from 1976 through 2005. The main aim of this procedure is to determine 
whether there is an Armey Curve for each state (or for the US as a whole). For the 
cases in which there is an Armey Curve, the optimal level of expenditure is computed 
and compared to the level of expenditure as of 2005 to determine whether the state 
government is oversized or undersized. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the regression analyses are modeled after 
Vedder and Gallaway (1998) where each regression includes yearly data of only one 
state (or the US aggregate). The dependent variable is real GSP per capita. The 
independent variables are: 
• State expenditure / GSP ratio (a linear and a quadratic term for this 
variable were included) 
• Unemployment Rate 
• Linear trend or Time 
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Moreover, different measures of state expenditure are used in each regression. 
Therefore, for each state and for the US aggregate, a total of 12 regressions are run. 
The following 12 measures of state expenditure are used: (a) total expenditure, (b) 
current expenditure, (c) capital expenditures, (d) total education expenditure, (e) 
secondary  education expenditure, (f) higher education expenditure, (g) public welfare 
education, (h) financial administration expenditure, (i) public health  expenditure, (j) 
total highway expenditure, (k) public safety  expenditure and (l) interest expenditure. 
Results of all regressions are presented in the Appendix. To prevent potential 
heteroskedasticity problems, robust standard error estimates are computed for all 
regressions. These are computed using White's (1980) formulas for the estimate 
variance-covariance matrix. The results are discussed in the following sections. 
Relationship between State Level Expenditure and Output (1976-2005) 
Results for Total Expenditure 
Table 1 in the Appendix presents the results of regressions conducted using 
total expenditure as the independent variable. Following Vedder and Gallaway 
(1998), an Armey Curve is assumed to exist if the coefficient of the quadratic term for 
total expenditure is negative and significantly different from zero (a .05 significance 
level is used). As discussed in the previous chapter, a negative and significant 
coefficient for this quadratic term would imply the relationship between the 
expenditure and GSP resembles a “concave parabola,” which in turn would suggest 
there is indeed a level of expenditure that maximizes economic output. If the 
quadratic term is not significant, this would imply a linear relationship between the 
expenditure and GSP where the “optimal” expenditure level would be either 0% or 
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100% of GSP (depending on whether the linear term is positive or negative). For 
cases in which an Armey Curve is found, the optimal level of expenditure is 
computed. This is based on the standard formula for the maximum of a concave 
parabola, which is –b/2a, where b is the coefficient for the linear term and a is the 
coefficient for the quadratic term.  
As can be seen from the results in Table 1, only two out of the 51 “states” 
exhibit an Armey Curve based on total expenditure: CT and LA. It is noteworthy the 
level of expenditure in CT as of 2005 is very close to the optimal level of expenditure 
for that state (15.41% optimal vs. 15.32% expenditure in 2005). In contrast, the level 
of expenditure in LA in 2005 (18.06%) is approximately 4 percentage points above 
the estimated optimal level (13.99%). 
None of the other states or the US aggregate shows an Armey Curve for the 
relationship between total state expenditure and real GSP per capita. 
Results for Current Expenditure 
As can be gleaned from the results in Table 2, only three out of the 51 “states” 
exhibit an Armey Curve based on current expenditure: CT, HI and LA. In all three 
cases, the level of expenditure as of 2005 is higher than the estimated optimal level of 
expenditure and ranges from 12.47% to 14.29% among these three states. None of the 
other states or the US aggregate shows an Armey Curve for the relationship between 
current expenditure and real GSP per capita. 
Results for Capital Outlays  
As can be seen from the results in Table 3, none of the 50 states or the US 
aggregate exhibits an Armey Curve based on capital outlays. 
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Results for Total Education Expenditure 
As can be gleaned from the results in Table 4, only two out of the 51 “states” 
exhibit an Armey Curve based on total education expenditure: LA and NV. In both 
cases, the level of expenditure as of 2005 is higher than the estimated optimal level of 
expenditure (in LA, the actual level is 4.98% whereas the optimal level is 3.75%; 
while in NV the actual level is 4.07%, whereas the optimal level is 3.65%). None of 
the other states or the US aggregate shows an Armey Curve for the relationship 
between total education expenditure and real GSP per capita. 
Results for Secondary Education Expenditure 
As can be seen from the results in Table 5, only one out of the 51 “states” 
exhibits an Armey Curve based on secondary education expenditure (LA). The actual 
level of secondary education expenditure in 2005 (3.26%) is higher than the estimated 
optimal level (2.68%). None of the other states or the US aggregate shows an Armey 
Curve for the relationship between secondary education expenditure and real GSP per 
capita. 
Results for Higher Education Expenditure 
As can be gleaned from the results in Table 6, four out of the 51 “states” 
exhibit an Armey Curve based on higher education expenditure (CA, LA, NJ, and 
NV). The actual level of higher education expenditure in 2005 is higher than the 
estimated optimal level for three of these four states (in CA, however, the actual 
expenditure is lower than the estimated optimal expenditure). None of the other states 
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or the US aggregate shows an Armey Curve for the relationship between higher 
education expenditure and real GSP per capita. 
Results for Public Welfare Expenditure 
As can be seen from the results in Table 7, three out of the 51 “states” exhibit 
an Armey Curve based on public welfare (DC, HI, and IL). The actual level of public 
welfare expenditure in 2005 is higher than the estimated optimal level for these three 
states. The state with the largest gap between optimal and actual expenditure is HI 
(1.67% optimal vs. 2.63% actual). None of the other states or the US aggregate shows 
an Armey Curve for the relationship between public welfare expenditure and real 
GSP per capita. 
Results for Financial Administration Expenditure 
As can be gleaned from the results in Table 8, six out of the 51 “states” exhibit 
an Armey Curve based on financial administration expenditure (CO, FL, MN, NC, 
TX and WA). The actual level of financial administration expenditure in 2005 is 
lower than the estimated optimal level for these six states, suggesting an increase in 
this type of expenditure would impact positively the economic output. None of the 
other states or the US aggregate shows an Armey Curve for the relationship between 
financial administration expenditure and real GSP per capita. 
Results for Public Health Expenditure 
As can be seen from the results in Table 9, two out of the 51 “states” exhibit 
an Armey Curve based on health and hospital expenditure (CT and HI). The actual 
level of health and hospital expenditure in 2005 is lower than the estimated optimal 
level for CT (0.91% actual vs. 0.97% optimal), but is higher than the estimated 
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optimal level in HI (1.52% actual vs. 1.25% optimal). None of the other states or the 
US aggregate shows an Armey Curve for the relationship between public health 
expenditure and real GSP per capita. 
Results for Total Highway Expenditure 
As can be gleaned from the results in Table 10, only one out of the 51 “states” 
exhibits an Armey Curve based on total highway expenditure (NV). The actual level 
of total highway expenditure in 2005 is higher than the estimated optimal level 
(1.41% actual vs. 1.36% optimal). None of the other states or the US aggregate shows 
an Armey Curve for the relationship between highway expenditure and real GSP per 
capita. 
Results for Public Safety Expenditure 
As can be seen from the results in Table 11, three out of the 51 “states” exhibit 
an Armey Curve based on police, fire, and corrections expenditure (HI, LA and VA). 
The actual level of public safety expenditure in 2005 is higher than the estimated 
optimal level for all three states. It is noteworthy that the actual level in LA is more 
than twice its optimal level. None of the other states or the US aggregate shows an 
Armey Curve for the relationship between police, fire, and corrections expenditure 
and real GSP per capita. 
Results for Interest Expenditure 
As can be gleaned from the results in Table 12, only one out of the 51 “states” 
exhibits an Armey Curve based on interest expenditure (CA). The actual level of 
interest expenditure in 2005 is higher than the estimated optimal level for this state 
(0.76% actual vs. 0.54% optimal). None of the other states or the US aggregate shows 
53 
 
an Armey Curve for the relationship between interest expenditure and real GSP per 
capita. 
Summary of Regressions Based on 1976-2005 Data 
As can be seen from the previously discussed results, no consistent Armey 
Curves are found for the US in aggregate, individually or for any of the 12 examined 
components of state expenditure. Moreover, a very small percentage of the states are 
found to have significant Armey Curves for this period. However, the results show 
that in most of the cases in which an Armey Curve is indeed found, the actual 
spending level tends to be higher than the estimated optimal level. 
Since these results seem to contradict the findings of Vedder and Gallaway 
(1998), where a significant Armey Curve was found for US aggregate state and local 
level expenditure, it is hypothesized this difference may be due to the use of a 
different time period (Vedder examined the 1952-1993 period, whereas this study 
examines the 1976-2005 period). So, the regressions are re-estimated using shorter 
periods of time (i.e., cutting the sample at 2004, 2003, 2002, etc.) until a significant 
Armey Curve for the US aggregate is found. After considering several sub-samples, a 
significant Armey Curve is found for the US aggregate using data for the 1976-2000 
period. The results of these analyses are presented in the following section. 
Relationship between State Level Expenditure and Output (1976-2000) 
Results for the regressions based on the 1976-2000 period are presented in 
Tables 13 through 24. As can be gleaned from Table 13, a significant Armey Curve 
for total expenditure is found using US aggregate data for this period. Consistent with 
Vedder and Gallaway (1998), it is found that the actual state and local level spending 
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in the US (19.18% as of 2005) is higher than the estimated optimal level (16.74%). 
Therefore, a decrease in total expenditure could potentially result in a higher 
economic output. Similarly, as can be gleaned from Table 14, a significant Armey 
Curve for current expenditure is found for the US. Moreover, the actual spending 
level as of 2005 (16.94%) is higher than the estimated optimal level (14.61%), which 
is consistent with the previous results. However, only one significant Armey Curve is 
found for the US for any of the other expenditure types. As can be seen in Table 19, a 
significant Armey Curve is found for the US based on public welfare. Consistent with 
previous results, the actual spending level in 2005 (2.93%) is higher than the 
estimated optimal (2.05%). 
Another noticeable feature from Tables 13 and 24 is that very few of the 
individual states exhibit an Armey Curve using data from the 1976-2000 period for 
any of the 12 examined expenditure components. However, consistent with the results 
from the 1976-2005 period, the actual spending level tends to be higher than the 
estimated optimal level for the states in which a significant Armey Curve is found. 
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Chapter V 
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
 
 The main purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between 
government spending and economic growth. More specifically, this study examines 
government spending on state and local levels at it relates to gross state product 
(GSP). The analysis determines for each state whether there exists an Armey Curve 
that represents a possible level of optimal spending. Subsequently, if an Armey Curve 
is identified, an optimal level of spending is determined and compared to the current 
level of spending. Additionally, different components of government spending are 
evaluated in a similar manner. The purpose of this chapter is to provide discussion of 
the results within the framework of the literature review.  
 This chapter starts with an overview of the extensive literature that addresses 
the relationship between government spending and economic growth on national 
levels. This helps to establish a framework for the subsequent overview of the more 
scarce literature on the relationship between government spending and economic 
growth at the state level. Second, different types of government spending are 
discussed on a state level to determine the aforementioned relationship. Third, 
conclusions are drawn with respect to whether each state, and specific types of 
government spending within that state, exhibits an Armey Curve. Finally, the 
significance and limitations as well as suggestions for future research are presented.  
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The Effect of Government Spending on Economic Growth 
 As indicated, this section provides an overview of past research addressing the 
relationship between government spending and economic growth on both national 
and state levels. The majority of research concludes there is a negative relationship 
between government spending and economic growth on a national level. However, 
there have been extensive debates with respect to the nature of the different models 
used to evaluate this relationship.  
 Vedder and Gallaway’s research and methodology serves as the model for this 
study. Vedder and Gallaway (1998) found the Armey Curve to exist on both a 
national and state level in the United States and ascertained that government spending 
is higher than the optimal level. From this, they concluded that a decrease in 
government spending would be beneficial in producing economic growth. Vedder and 
Gallaway also confirmed this finding among other industrialized countries. Vreyman 
and Verhulst (2005) found a similar result with respect to the negative influence of 
government spending on economic growth in their analysis of growth differentials in 
European countries. These researchers referred to countries exhibiting this negative 
relationship as being on the “bad” side of the Armey Curve. Barro (1990) also 
observed similar results where government spending as a proportion of GDP is 
negatively related to economic growth. It is important to note that Barro was a 
pioneer in establishing multiple regression methodology as a standard for much of the 
research based on this topic.   
 Grier and Tullock (1989) employed a methodology similar to Barro and 
concluded there is a fairly robust negative correlation between government 
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consumption and economic growth. However, a crucial finding in this research is that 
the data from their study countries did not share a similar set of coefficients for the 
independent variables (i.e. government spending). This helped confirm the theory that 
there is not a single level of government spending in proportion to economic output 
that is optimal for all economies, leaving open the possibility a state could potentially 
benefit from an increase in government spending.  
 This finding introduces the other side of the Armey Curve. Armey (1995) 
suggested governments which do not spend sufficiently can lack the laws, investment 
and infrastructure necessary to foster a high level of productivity in their respective 
countries. In such a case, a country would exhibit a positive relationship between 
government spending and economic growth in that they could benefit from spending 
more on these components. A negative relationship between government spending 
and economic growth has been commonly observed in much of the literature because 
the countries examined had already approached the point of diminishing returns 
beyond the optimal government spending level where marginal benefits equal 
marginal costs.  
This study is more concerned with the relationship between government 
spending on a sub-federal level and economic growth. Having reviewed the 
framework of this concept on the national level, a discussion of the less extensive 
literature on a state and local level provides the foundation for evaluating the results 
of this study. Keep in mind the United States is a country identified as residing on the 
“bad” side of the Armey Curve. Given this identification, and holding all else 
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constant, a reduction in spending should increase economic growth while an increase 
in spending should reduce economic growth 
 Schaltegger and Torgler (2004) examined the effect of government spending 
on economic growth using a sample of state and local governments within 
Switzerland. Their analysis included regressions which took into account other 
possible determinants of growth, namely convergence effects and business cycle 
effects. It is interesting to note the regression model applied in the current study takes 
into account business cycle effects but not possible convergence effects. The results 
of Schaltegger and Torgler’s regressions revealed a fairly robust negative influence of 
government spending on economic growth. 
Mofidi and Stone (1990) studied the effects of government spending at state 
and local levels within the United Sates from 1962 to 1982. These researchers found 
that taxes spent on transfer payments have a negative influence on economic growth. 
They also observed, when holding taxes constant, government expenditures on 
infrastructure, health and education have a positive effect on economic growth. 
Helms (1985) found similar results suggesting that tax increases used to fund transfer 
payments have a significant negative effect on growth. Also, Helms concluded that 
increases in government spending for transportation infrastructure, education and 
public health have positive effects on economic growth.    
Vedder (1993) conducted a study which compared government spending with 
economic growth at the state level for all 50 US states. In Vedder’s analysis, it was 
asserted that government spending grew much faster than personal income during the 
1980s. More specifically, he attributes this increase in government spending to excess 
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compensation of public employees. In the regression analysis performed, Vedder 
observed that a one percentage point increase in the proportion of a state’s per capita 
income going to public employee compensation resulted in a decrease of six 
percentage points in per capital income for that state. This demonstrated another 
instance where increases in government consumption spending had a negative effect 
on economic growth on the state level. 
The current research finds mixed results on this topic in that only two states 
are found to exhibit an Armey Curve using total expenditure data (CT and LA). LA is 
found to be above the optimal level, showing a negative relationship. CT reports a 
spending level just below the optimum, indicating it could benefit from a slight 
increase in government spending. An Armey Curve is not found for the other states, 
indicating either a positive or negative linear relationship (depending on the sign of 
the linear term) between overall government spending and economic growth on the 
state level. These findings are inconclusive and generally do not align with the 
literature in that Armey Curves are not found to model the relationship between 
aggregate government spending and economic growth on the state level. Similar 
findings are found in the present study when current expenditure is evaluated with 
respect to the relationship between government spending and economic growth on the 
state level.  
The time span used in this analysis could be a factor in the determination of an 
Armey Curve. For example, in the original calculations of the present study, an 
Armey Curve for the entire United States is not found when relating aggregate state 
expenditure to economic growth. To achieve an Armey Curve, the time span taken 
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into consideration was shortened until an Armey Curve is found for the United States. 
The modified setting shortened the time span by five years in order to achieve an 
Armey Curve. These re-estimated results are more in line with Vedder and 
Gallaway’s (1998) finding that state government expenditure has a negative 
relationship with economic growth.  In 2005, total US state and local government 
expenditure in proportion to GSP was 19.18% while the optimal level found in this 
analysis is 16.74%. Confirmation of the Armey Curve using the modified time period 
updates the Vedder and Gallaway benchmark and adds validity to the argument that 
the association between government size and economic growth depends on elements 
that change with time. A state and local government expenditure optimum at 16.74% 
of gross state product compared to an optimum of 11.42% found by Vedder and 
Gallaway (1998) is significant to a multi-billion dollar state budget and an important 
contribution of the present study. 
These modified results are more consistent with past findings where a 
negative relationship was observed between state government spending and economic 
growth. However, the current study found few individual states to exhibit an Armey 
Curve that models this relationship between government spending and economic 
growth. This gives credibility to the concept that differing characteristics of a given 
economy may dictate what level and kind of government spending is optimal for 
maximizing economic growth. Throughout this study, where Armey Curves are 
confirmed the associated spending optimal is unique to each state. For example, the 
public welfare spending optimal for the US (2.05%) is lower than the estimated 
optimal for NY (3.27%). 
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Notwithstanding these state-specific outcomes, the research presented shows 
there are similarities between the state and national level when it comes to the 
relationship between government spending and economic growth. As can be gleamed 
from the relatively few spending optimums calculated in the current study, the 
relationship observed between aggregate state government expenditure and economic 
growth is largely consistent with past research. However, given that most individual 
states are not found to exhibit an Armey Curve, results are inconclusive and limit the 
applicability of the model for the state and local level.  
One note of import is that some types of public spending have been found to 
have a growth-enhancing effect when positive externalities related to that spending 
are observed with respect to the private sector production function. In other words, 
while it has been noted in past research that there is a negative relationship between 
aggregate government spending and economic growth on a national and state level, it 
has also been observed that some types of government spending exert a positive 
influence on economic growth. Now that total government spending has been 
discussed in relation to economic growth, a closer look at individual components of 
government spending highlights their specific contribution to state level economic 
growth.  
For this study, the spending components are (a) current expenditures, b) 
capital expenditures, (c) total education expenditure, (d) secondary education 
expenditure, (e) higher education expenditure, (f) public welfare (g) financial 
administration expenditure, (h) public health expenditure, (i) total highway 
expenditure, (j) public safety expenditure and (k) interest expenditure. The results 
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from the current study are now compared to the previously reported public 
expenditure effects.  
The results of this research are mostly inconsistent with past research with 
respect to the exhibition of an Armey Curve for specific areas of expenditure. The 
results show that very few states exhibit an Armey Curve in regard to any of the 
expenditure categories.  
As mentioned earlier, Mofidi and Stone (1990) found state and local taxes had 
a negative effect on economic growth when these revenues were devoted to transfer 
payment programs. Helms (1985) observed similar findings with respect to the 
negative effect of transfer payments. Similar results were found by Vedder and 
Gallaway (1998) for the national level. In the results of the current study, only three 
states exhibit an Armey Curve based on public welfare (DC, HI, and IL). In these 
three states the actual level of spending is higher than the calculated optimal level. 
This indicates there is a negative relationship between public welfare spending and 
economic growth on a state level. These findings are consistent with past research 
when considering only these three states. Overall, the results are not conclusive about 
the relationship between public welfare expenditure and economic growth since only 
three states exhibit an Armey Curve for this category.  
Helms (1985) and Mofidi and Stone (1990) found government expenditures in 
education, infrastructure and health have a positive relationship with economic 
growth. Vedder and Gallaway (1998) found no statistically strong effects, either 
positive or negative, for expenditure in education or public health on economic 
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growth. Study results for each of these categories are now discussed with regard to 
their contribution to economic growth on a state level. 
With respect to total education expenditure, the current study found only two 
states to exhibit an Armey Curve (LA and NV). For both of these states the level of 
expenditure is higher than the estimated optimal level, indicating a negative 
relationship. With respect to secondary education expenditure on a state level, the 
current study found only one state to exhibit an Armey Curve (LA). The level of 
spending found for LA is higher than the estimated optimal level, again indicating a 
negative relationship.  
With respect to higher education expenditure on the state level, the current 
study found four states to exhibit an Armey Curve. Three of these states (LA, NV and 
NJ) have levels of expenditure for higher education which is higher than their 
estimated optimal level. This indicates a negative relationship between government 
expenditure on higher education and economic growth on a state level. However, one 
state that depicts an Armey Curve, CA, has a level of spending which is lower than 
the estimated optimal level. This indicates CA could benefit from more expenditure 
in this area. This is a finding in the current study which is consistent with past 
research in that a positive relationship is found between expenditure on education and 
economic growth. Overall however, the results for education expenditure do not align 
with those of past research that found a positive relationship. In fact, Barro (1990) 
specifically asserts that expenditure in education could enhance economic growth. 
This study depends on highway transportation spending to gauge the 
relationship between state government expenditure in infrastructure and economic 
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growth. With respect to state expenditure on highways, only one state exhibits an 
Armey Curve (NV). The actual level of highway spending in this case is higher than 
the estimated optimal level. This indicates a negative relationship between highway 
expenditure and economic growth on the state level. This finding is not consistent 
with Helms (1985) and Modfidi and Stone (1990) who found state expenditure on 
infrastructure to be positively related to economic growth. 
The current study also evaluates the relationship between state expenditure on 
public health and economic growth. The findings reveal only two states exhibit an 
Armey Curve (CT and HI). For HI, the level of expenditure on health is higher than 
the estimated optimal level, indicating a negative relationship. This finding is not 
consistent with the past research which found a positive relationship. On the other 
hand, CT has a level of expenditure on public health below the optimal level. This 
indicates a positive relationship and a consistency with past research from Helms 
(1985) and Mofidi and Stone (1990). These findings are also consistent with Vedder 
and Gallaway’s (1998) findings that expenditure on health did not exhibit an Armey 
Curve (only two states do in the current study).  
The present study evaluates the relationship between state expenditure on 
financial administration and economic growth. This category contains expenditures 
related to tax assessment and collection, accounting, auditing, budgeting, purchasing, 
custodial funds, judicial and legal services, executive administration and central staff 
services. Six states (CO, FL, MN, NC, TX and WA) are found to exhibit Armey 
Curves and each of these states have levels of spending on financial administration 
that is lower than the estimated optimal levels. This indicates there is a positive 
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relationship between expenditure on financial administration and economic growth. 
This finding is interesting not only because more states are found to have Armey 
Curves than in the other expenditure categories, but also because a positive 
relationship is found for each state. This suggests that not enough money is being 
spent on financial administration at the state level.  
This study also evaluates the effect of state public safety expenditure on 
economic growth. The results show only three states have an Armey Curve (HI, LA 
and VA). Also, the level of expenditure on police, fire and corrections in these states 
is higher than the estimated optimal level, indicating a negative relationship. This 
suggests, from an economic growth perspective, too much is spent on public safety in 
these states.  
The present study evaluates the relationship between state expenditure on 
interest and economic growth. Only one state (CA) is found to exhibit an Armey 
Curve. The actual level of expenditure in this category for CA is higher than the 
estimated optimal level. This finding is consistent with Vedder and Gallway’s (1998) 
research that concluded expenditure on interest exhibited an Armey Curve and had a 
persistent negative relationship with economic growth.  
With respect to current expenditure at the state level, this study finds only 
three out of the 51 “states” exhibit an Armey Curve (CT, HI and LA). In all three 
cases, the level of expenditure as of 2005 is higher than the estimated optimal level of 
expenditure. The last spending category to be discussed is capital outlays. This study 
finds no states exhibiting an Armey Curve for capital outlays. Thus, it is inconclusive 
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as to the relationship between state expenditure on capital outlays and economic 
growth.  
The results for each of the specific spending categories are not helpful in the 
sense that Armey Curves are not found for almost all of the states. However, given 
past research, it is unlikely the states do not have a relationship between these 
spending categories and economic growth that resembles an Armey Curve. In other 
words, it is impossible the optimal level of spending on a state level for any one of the 
given spending categories is either zero or one hundred percent. Theoretically, there 
has to exist an optimal level of spending for each state with respect to overall 
expenditure and to each categorical expenditure. This study failed to consistently 
identify Armey Curves across a spectrum of spending variables suggesting the 
Vedder and Galloway model is not perfectly adaptable to the sub-federal level. 
For the Armey Curves that are found, the results of this study are generally 
consistent with past research where public spending is found to have a negative 
relationship with economic growth. However, some of the spending categories 
previously observed to have positive relationships with economic growth (education, 
health and infrastructure) are found to have negative relationships in this study.  This 
discrepancy may be explained, in part, by state-specific characteristics that dictate 
differing levels of optimal spending among individual economies. For instance, some 
states may spend more dollars on education relative to other states, yet the quality of 
instruction and student competencies gained may be inferior to those states that spend 
fewer dollars, thus the investment does not lead to enhanced economic growth. 
Likewise, a state may spend a proportionate per capita amount of transportation 
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dollars relative to other states, but have a disproportionate amount of road miles to 
maintain such that the infrastructure expenditure is insufficient to expand output. 
Ultimately, the results from this study are largely consistent with past research in that 
negative relationships are found between government expenditure and economic 
growth on a state level. In other words, states within the United States tend to fall on 
the “bad” side of the Armey Curve.  
Implications 
 To date, there has been limited research on the relationship between 
government spending and economic growth on the sub-federal level. The findings 
from this study contribute toward the goal of indentifying an optimal size of state and 
local government for each of the states within the United States. By testing the 
Vedder and Galloway (1998) model and confirming its non-transferability to the 
individual state level, tangible results and valuable information have been gleamed 
placing researchers one step closer to developing a model conducive to a state-
specific optimal. Once a unique optimal level of state and local government spending 
is determined, then the most efficient levels and distributions of taxation can be 
determined. Also, equipped with reliable information regarding optimal levels of 
spending within spending categories, governments could achieve appropriating 
efficiency. Until further research can be completed and a state-specific model 
developed, the findings from this study confirm and update the Vedder and Galloway 
optimal spending benchmark useful to all US states. Guidelines can be established 
and used by state policymakers to target an economic output-maximizing spending 
optimum. The present study contributes to this uncultivated field of study and toward 
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the development of a unique spending optimal for each state. Thus, this study aids 
policymakers in their efforts to maximize economic output and enhance the quality of 
life of the citizenry. 
Limitations 
The present study is limited to the analysis of government spending and 
economic output in the 50 United States during the period of 1976-2005. The effects 
of other variables on economic output (other than unemployment) are not considered 
in this study. Given one underlying assumption of the present analysis is that each 
state has an associated specific government spending rate, results from the present 
study are not suitable for other countries. 
Another limitation of the present study is that multiple linear regression is 
used to assess the relationship between government spending and output. It is only 
possible to draw an association between these variables, but not a relationship of 
causality. The regression coefficients may be biased since other factors which might 
influence economic growth, such as countercyclical macro policies, innovation or 
institutions, are not included. 
Finally, it must be noted the “optimal” government spending rate sought is 
one which maximizes economic output. This definition does not take into account 
matters of social consciousness and politics. For instance, there is no guarantee of 
correlation between the maximization of economic output and the maximization of 
social welfare. 
 
 
69 
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
 There are several suggestions for future research that could enhance the 
validity of the conclusions found. First, a major difference between the federal and 
sub-federal level governments in the US is that all but one state, Vermont, has either a 
statutory or constitutional requirement of a balanced budget. This dictates that when 
contractions produce revenue shortfalls, states must reduce spending. The states are 
unique in that they may actually appropriate fewer dollars from one year to the next.  
This distinguishes state spending from federal spending producing the potential for 
greater spending volatility. Thus, one possibility is to use five-year averages to 
smooth the data. Of concern here is the lack of state-specific unemployment data 
prior to 1976 that limits the number of observations in the current model. Future 
study should consider the use of national unemployment data or total state 
employment numbers as a proxy. Second, there are other relevant growth factors 
which could be incorporated as independent variables and might explain growth 
differentials to a higher degree. Accordingly, another suggestion is to expand the 
regression model to take into account more fully state differences in demographics, 
geography, educational attainment, initial prosperity and taxes. Third, some academic 
literature suggests that “urban clusters” are growth enhancing. Thus, the last 
suggestion which might enhance future study is to group the states by region to 
identify any potential spillover effects neighboring states might have on one another 
when it comes to the relationship between government spending and economic 
growth. 
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Summary 
This chapter provided a discussion of the results within the framework of 
existing academic literature. Specifically, the relationship between government 
spending and economic growth was examined on a state level. Additionally, 
individual spending categories were reviewed as they pertained to the relationship 
between government spending and economic output on a state level. While isolating 
the effects of government spending on economic output is not a precise science, the 
results from this study are generally consistent with past research in showing an 
inverse relationship between excessive government spending and economic 
performance. However, conclusions from this study are limited. The findings do not 
confirm the existence of state-specific spending optimums in a consistent manner, 
suggesting the model is not universally transferable to the sub-federal level. Using a 
modified time setting and aggregate state and local expenditure data, regression 
results provide confirmation of an Armey Curve and a spending optimal that is 
several percentage points higher than the Vedder and Gallaway (1998) conclusion. 
This finding strengthens the argument that the relationship between the public sector 
and economic growth depends on elements that change with time. Since theoretically 
there should exist an optimal level of spending for each state and spending category, 
and given the need for governments to achieve spending efficiency in order to better 
promote economic growth and prosperity, further study is warranted. 
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 Table 1 
Regression Results on Total Expenditure (1976-2005) 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at 
.05 level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? R-Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as of 
2005 
AK -5284.296908 No (0.495) -149391.3656 No (0.382) No 0.61164473 N/A 25.45% 
AL -180217.5507 Yes (0.02) 432564.0264 Yes (0.022) No 0.99307816 N/A 21.96% 
AR -109004.2287 No (0.355) 377725.3283 No (0.31) No 0.99074146 N/A 19.80% 
AZ 117034.7244 No (0.338) -472939.7446 No (0.25) No 0.92747316 N/A 18.51% 
CA -401471.5012 Yes (0.028) 1141930.223 Yes (0.021) No 0.96331162 N/A 21.32% 
CO -268508.7177 No (0.279) 450693.5645 No (0.504) No 0.94399673 N/A 16.36% 
CT 631102.6558 Yes (0.021) -2047263.296 Yes (0.033) Yes 0.98668387 15.41% 15.32% 
DC -1151475.27 Yes (0.015) 3924427.316 Yes (0.001) No 0.96581719 N/A 10.72% 
DE -1553084.032 Yes (0.032) 5263902.192 Yes (0.031) No 0.97888223 N/A 13.39% 
FL 1851.624213 No (0.264) -73086.39768 No (0.292) No 0.97706991 N/A 19.63% 
GA 203015.6237 No (0.133) -934333.9352 No (0.142) No 0.98787825 N/A 16.44% 
HI 351714.41 No (0.194) -787653.2404 No (0.457) No 0.78992906 N/A 19.23% 
IA -927602.235 Yes (0.025) 2340611.438 Yes (0.034) No 0.98105109 N/A 18.27% 
ID -578264.0922 Yes (0.034) 1648275.184 Yes (0.008) No 0.9609544 N/A 19.43% 
IL -304773.1187 No (0.289) 1075074.193 No (0.331) No 0.98858858 N/A 17.59% 
IN -501514.7452 Yes (0.016) 1375072.226 Yes (0.005) No 0.97946146 N/A 17.79% 
KS -1042687.585 Yes (0.003) 2890717.202 Yes (0.005) No 0.98536053 N/A 18.01% 
KY 17422.43413 No (0.311) -94902.94589 No (0.447) No 0.98060711 N/A 19.45% 
LA 185321.9725 Yes (0.029) -662516.9691 Yes (0.017) Yes 0.89378344 13.99% 18.06% 
MA -1024409.143 Yes (0.018) 2908035.808 Yes (0.015) No 0.98395105 N/A 18.53% 
MD -1443575.388 Yes (0.024) 4212021.728 Yes (0.025) No 0.97864561 N/A 16.93% 
ME -229302.9628 No (0.215) 585525.0992 No (0.517) No 0.98291085 N/A 22.73% 
MI -846149.8474 No (0.418) 2138327.163 No (0.266) No 0.94012173 N/A 20.42% 
MN 350810.4861 No (0.519) -1186305.039 No (0.531) No 0.98355262 N/A 18.55% 
MO -239763.3938 No (0.38) 875060.2901 Yes (0.033) No 0.98122589 N/A 17.29% 
MS 60012.28741 No (0.557) -151497.475 No (0.249) No 0.98968575 N/A 25.12% 
77 
 State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at 
.05 level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? R-Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as of 
2005 
MT -134049.1255 No (0.467) 196875.5754 No (0.236) No 0.95924355 N/A 21.43% 
NC -465463.2421 No (0.302) 1474598.352 No (0.501) No 0.98257205 N/A 17.32% 
ND -162526.5492 No (0.248) 208581.7489 No (0.189) No 0.96563032 N/A 19.23% 
NE -1440257.291 No (0.21) 3628104.088 No (0.327) No 0.98124172 N/A 19.84% 
NH -377222.0624 Yes (0.03) 1223838.377 Yes (0.001) No 0.99203569 N/A 16.04% 
NJ 178097.2 No (0.173) -481015.7054 No (0.442) No 0.98647994 N/A 18.67% 
NM -480964.5838 Yes (0.027) 1080978.402 Yes (0.019) No 0.9425626 N/A 22.38% 
NV -545345.6049 No (0.456) 1483088.437 No (0.124) No 0.90379828 N/A 15.80% 
NY -212753.3948 No (0.3) 514551.0608 No (0.321) No 0.97802252 N/A 23.61% 
OH -469968.8989 Yes (0.022) 1158051.596 Yes (0.037) No 0.97837074 N/A 20.79% 
OK -276803.2199 Yes (0.018) 691759.0384 Yes (0.014) No 0.96417355 N/A 18.10% 
OR -1974604.988 Yes (0.02) 4406095.676 Yes (0.004) No 0.92322063 N/A 20.51% 
PA -381406.0583 Yes (0.029) 1193470.335 Yes (0.012) No 0.99111925 N/A 20.88% 
RI -149654.3235 No (0.254) 343022.7252 No (0.184) No 0.9811294 N/A 21.15% 
SC 3876.780106 No (0.286) -11838.22978 No (0.405) No 0.99487543 N/A 23.56% 
SD -4556163.834 Yes (0.014) 13141094.48 Yes (0.027) No 0.96321577 N/A 16.28% 
TN -778625.0304 No (0.31) 2192812.859 No (0.393) No 0.9909926 N/A 18.98% 
TX -297344.7308 No (0.571) 1008628.229 No (0.38) No 0.96681131 N/A 15.36% 
US -544041.3872 No (0.274) 1533207.001 No (0.38) No 0.9837358 N/A 19.18% 
UT -633798.0908 Yes (0.03) 1488070.091 Yes (0.008) No 0.95969455 N/A 19.54% 
VA 815372.3579 No (0.262) -3091874.09 No (0.484) No 0.97894564 N/A 14.69% 
VT -1516110.509 Yes (0.017) 3766292.887 Yes (0.028) No 0.98999979 N/A 22.46% 
WA -336110.5124 No (0.581) 640373.3149 No (0.429) No 0.94907746 N/A 20.56% 
WI -1145435.946 Yes (0.031) 2916080.251 Yes (0.021) No 0.9751248 N/A 19.88% 
WV 12354.86361 No (0.524) -6308.947777 No (0.5) No 0.98615997 N/A 22.83% 
WY -7246.977475 No (0.213) -26464.9749 No (0.246) No 0.9169376 N/A 20.62% 
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 Table 2 
Regression Results on Current Expenditure (1976-2005) 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? R-Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
AK 76549.13241 No (0.309) -362867.8324 No (0.102) No 0.58919843 N/A 21.80% 
AL -235091.8498 Yes (0.019) 607520.4923 Yes (0.02) No 0.99450805 N/A 19.27% 
AR -225727.2292 Yes (0.015) 728945.5819 Yes (0.024) No 0.99116712 N/A 17.86% 
AZ 214423.6105 No (0.415) -1019946.025 No (0.445) No 0.94821693 N/A 15.70% 
CA -439668.48 No (0.132) 1386100.84 No (0.451) No 0.96170934 N/A 18.97% 
CO 309565.6185 No (0.117) -1776585.484 No (0.539) No 0.96361773 N/A 13.94% 
CT 701471.8731 Yes (0.014) -2608638.868 Yes (0.036) Yes 0.98610229 13.45% 14.02% 
DC -4022856.341 Yes (0.021) 18022210.6 Yes (0.008) No 0.9738623 N/A 9.17% 
DE -2032022.882 Yes (0.027) 7860698.147 Yes (0.028) No 0.97930177 N/A 11.54% 
FL 101592.8308 No (0.268) -485342.07 No (0.427) No 0.9803961 N/A 16.86% 
GA 840685.6775 No (0.131) -3595420.609 No (0.11) No 0.99097574 N/A 14.40% 
HI 630327.3981 Yes (0.026) -2205045.773 Yes (0.031) Yes 0.7935928 14.29% 17.45% 
IA -834425.3195 Yes (0.036) 2338898.574 Yes (0.028) No 0.98796722 N/A 15.72% 
ID -636017.5963 Yes (0.024) 2059044.113 Yes (0.012) No 0.96458045 N/A 17.05% 
IL -293888.8086 No (0.587) 1181174.385 No (0.304) No 0.98790271 N/A 15.66% 
IN -563082.7249 Yes (0.013) 1699276.243 Yes (0.022) No 0.98568396 N/A 15.84% 
KS -555363.7827 Yes (0.021) 1587818.633 Yes (0.027) No 0.99203878 N/A 15.77% 
KY -138236.6873 No (0.283) 278423.1744 No (0.282) No 0.98310805 N/A 17.59% 
LA 177281.2173 Yes (0.002) -710869.6764 Yes (0.013) Yes 0.89100016 12.47% 16.13% 
MA -1128793.479 Yes (0.022) 3580457.646 Yes (0.033) No 0.98380367 N/A 16.85% 
MD -695923.8823 No (0.599) 2243132.361 No (0.398) No 0.97847492 N/A 15.17% 
ME -273031.4421 No (0.582) 720925.599 No (0.535) No 0.98441965 N/A 21.09% 
MI -835200.5734 No (0.251) 2132476.382 No (0.422) No 0.95445162 N/A 18.49% 
MN 209509.7365 No (0.366) -1013731.006 No (0.346) No 0.98846843 N/A 16.32% 
MO -261366.7635 No (0.442) 1063520.764 No (0.593) No 0.9804436 N/A 15.43% 
MS -69414.19385 No (0.204) 114786.2261 No (0.337) No 0.99073444 N/A 22.92% 
MT -103725.1774 No (0.312) 105721.3725 No (0.504) No 0.97712356 N/A 18.79% 
NC -600606.6971 No (0.168) 1972232.397 No (0.271) No 0.98648436 N/A 15.25% 
79 
 
 State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? R-Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
ND -170295.153 No (0.372) 241465.5363 No (0.163) No 0.97857507 N/A 16.48% 
NE -56016.14395 No (0.584) -132244.5463 No (0.366) No 0.9944825 N/A 16.83% 
NH -217104.307 Yes (0.013) 690291.3891 No (0.58) No 0.99038907 N/A 14.57% 
NJ -53299.05805 No (0.312) 206640.5364 No (0.59) No 0.98622157 N/A 16.82% 
NM -464899.2959 Yes (0.022) 1191779.126 Yes (0.022) No 0.94200162 N/A 20.04% 
NV -1060536.715 No (0.105) 3576308.482 No (0.561) No 0.92074371 N/A 12.89% 
NY 205791.9672 No (0.101) -562160.076 No (0.378) No 0.97789331 N/A 20.87% 
OH -550231.4041 Yes (0.012) 1414006.676 Yes (0.019) No 0.98605133 N/A 18.52% 
OK -252062.0554 Yes (0.013) 693318.181 Yes (< 0.001) No 0.97044873 N/A 16.15% 
OR -1756641.526 Yes (0.035) 4353604.508 Yes (0.012) No 0.94949782 N/A 18.35% 
PA -400854.1455 Yes (0.02) 1381197.517 Yes (0.028) No 0.98887753 N/A 18.81% 
RI -291791.1146 No (0.359) 725503.7289 No (0.357) No 0.982765 N/A 19.83% 
SC -7050.472269 No (0.318) 3444.70035 No (0.353) No 0.99493654 N/A 20.64% 
SD -1248301.502 No (0.501) 3480387.202 No (0.586) No 0.97467979 N/A 13.67% 
TN -927911.6758 Yes (0.016) 2854098.58 Yes (0.013) No 0.99322692 N/A 17.36% 
TX -95520.19372 No (0.162) 191902.1599 No (0.111) No 0.96841381 N/A 12.97% 
US -549625.5053 No (0.53) 1681371.191 No (0.555) No 0.98439265 N/A 16.94% 
UT -222102.4933 No (0.197) 442742.5241 No (0.25) No 0.9725292 N/A 16.93% 
VA 827054.488 No (0.164) -3798963.921 No (0.529) No 0.98107207 N/A 13.02% 
VT -1461770.489 Yes (0.022) 3977801.532 Yes (0.005) No 0.99085993 N/A 20.79% 
WA -429209.7776 No (0.252) 856027.7579 No (0.307) No 0.98109173 N/A 17.24% 
WI -1578958.034 Yes (0.032) 4449117.613 Yes (0.003) No 0.98123508 N/A 17.90% 
WV -52564.22254 No (0.17) 136904.7268 No (0.517) No 0.98617389 N/A 20.55% 
WY -23230.55656 No (0.563) 40805.64889 No (0.505) No 0.91389802 N/A 17.12% 
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 Table 3 
Regression Results on Capital Outlays (1976-2005) 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? R-Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
AK -3053806.234 Yes (0.011) 32923823.78 Yes (0.021) No 0.64572481 N/A 3.65% 
AL 431700.4894 No (0.245) -8260767.577 No (0.527) No 0.99207707 N/A 2.69% 
AR 16238.7066 No (0.406) 1069702.345 No (0.501) No 0.9907085 N/A 1.94% 
AZ 939796.9822 No (0.31) -12762687.99 No (0.345) No 0.899907 N/A 2.81% 
CA -2173207.024 Yes (< 0.001) 62403623.56 Yes (0.025) No 0.96842424 N/A 2.35% 
CO -764149.5693 No (0.416) 13797564.55 No (0.451) No 0.90353295 N/A 2.42% 
CT -656398.6154 No (0.198) 28051162.97 No (0.427) No 0.98955314 N/A 1.31% 
DC 584407.7531 Yes (0.03) -6587016.368 No (0.597) No 0.97019164 N/A 1.56% 
DE -2219905.616 No (0.131) 62852537.85 No (0.507) No 0.97528036 N/A 1.85% 
FL -14870.28032 No (0.289) 2542424.115 No (0.512) No 0.98103744 N/A 2.77% 
GA 916643.3642 No (0.206) -18961479.79 No (0.127) No 0.97967239 N/A 2.04% 
HI -7339.8818 No (0.425) 2771544.237 No (0.272) No 0.93446708 N/A 1.79% 
IA 1894109.255 No (0.4) -32932448.06 No (0.137) No 0.9546804 N/A 2.54% 
ID -3078514.095 No (0.378) 58337086.9 No (0.527) No 0.9519435 N/A 2.37% 
IL -641791.7358 No (0.452) 18706792.7 No (0.335) No 0.9880386 N/A 1.93% 
IN -3247423.612 No (0.437) 95833591.25 No (0.146) No 0.95670321 N/A 1.95% 
KS -6054.572727 No (0.108) 2084088.291 No (0.23) No 0.96956591 N/A 2.23% 
KY 64653.96411 No (0.506) -694611.204 No (0.264) No 0.98011573 N/A 1.86% 
LA -510188.1198 No (0.558) 11012446.94 No (0.119) No 0.82195349 N/A 1.94% 
MA -3281275.851 No (0.314) 83156024.61 No (0.578) No 0.97974766 N/A 1.68% 
MD 238892.2965 No (0.489) -3158467.769 No (0.483) No 0.9734906 N/A 1.75% 
ME 39810.76697 No (0.285) 1732065.452 No (0.48) No 0.98580715 N/A 1.64% 
MI -1203550.126 No (0.541) 39636297.26 No (0.361) No 0.94819228 N/A 1.92% 
MN -2799260.131 No (0.143) 52690406.44 No (0.494) No 0.96838342 N/A 2.23% 
MO -1397970.139 No (0.284) 40076550.91 No (0.201) No 0.98101671 N/A 1.86% 
MS -362089.8642 No (0.19) 7802745.839 Yes (0.026) No 0.99058622 N/A 2.20% 
MT 604109.3234 No (0.203) -10418851.31 No (0.308) No 0.87065029 N/A 2.64% 
NC -520025.3535 No (0.478) 15333160.14 No (0.134) No 0.98516121 N/A 2.07% 
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 State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? R-Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
ND -230751.596 No (0.432) 4791943.413 No (0.3) No 0.84774952 N/A 2.75% 
NE 163819.6075 No (0.494) -1136140.499 No (0.211) No 0.99054735 N/A 3.01% 
NH -17877.44362 No (0.456) 1993336.843 No (0.446) No 0.98986652 N/A 1.47% 
NJ 1603174.237 No (0.19) -47074398.84 No (0.239) No 0.98743252 N/A 1.85% 
NM 1361649.157 No (0.576) -29365209.79 No (0.184) No 0.91791201 N/A 2.34% 
NV -1155715.484 No (0.338) 21392712.41 No (0.126) No 0.89298281 N/A 2.91% 
NY -498078.6959 No (0.185) 14716723.03 No (0.369) No 0.98630396 N/A 2.73% 
OH -1754416.537 No (0.316) 50715122.6 Yes (0.013) No 0.9780148 N/A 2.27% 
OK 753583.6956 No (0.433) -15378514.59 No (0.397) No 0.89469618 N/A 1.95% 
OR 729371.2997 No (0.148) -7139957.835 No (0.494) No 0.87729428 N/A 2.15% 
PA -262892.0427 No (0.131) 10968328.06 No (0.379) No 0.98889193 N/A 2.07% 
RI 452965.3341 No (0.578) -12294724.17 No (0.371) No 0.98134517 N/A 1.32% 
SC 59215.53971 No (0.379) -944572.0656 No (0.492) No 0.99500771 N/A 2.93% 
SD 982198.2215 No (0.17) -13014659.9 No (0.155) No 0.96097318 N/A 2.61% 
TN -705675.8177 Yes (0.008) 14515844.46 Yes (0.034) No 0.99220861 N/A 1.62% 
TX 1247346.114 No (0.537) -24327207.16 No (0.312) No 0.97073046 N/A 2.38% 
US -2056110.277 No (0.365) 51194632.2 No (0.499) No 0.98786831 N/A 2.24% 
UT 282419.0684 No (0.125) -2783633.631 No (0.422) No 0.92635088 N/A 2.62% 
VA -926128.3405 No (0.483) 24757797.61 No (0.158) No 0.97857958 N/A 1.67% 
VT 402483.8828 No (0.575) -7577001.611 No (0.561) No 0.97650574 N/A 1.67% 
WA -30393.92773 No (0.173) 1124343.972 No (0.22) No 0.93694138 N/A 3.33% 
WI -1427699.524 No (0.147) 36549282.01 No (0.434) No 0.96441492 N/A 1.99% 
WV 74507.05906 No (0.225) -387210.3789 No (0.143) No 0.98907806 N/A 2.28% 
WY -523938.4754 No (0.18) 6238229.278 No (0.483) No 0.92540978 N/A 3.51% 
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 Table 4 
Regression Results on Total Education Expenditure (1976-2005) 
 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
AK -1245506.021 Yes (0.028) 5007017.085 No (0.204) No 0.85 N/A 5.99% 
AL -265078.486 No (0.317) 2400211.79 No (0.462) No 0.99 N/A 6.53% 
AR -578257.2146 Yes (0.016) 5352991.14 Yes (0.026) No 0.99 N/A 6.76% 
AZ -2441742.813 Yes (0.014) 19190339.01 Yes (0.034) No 0.94 N/A 5.12% 
CA -1532586.077 Yes (0.032) 16598241.65 Yes (0.013) No 0.97 N/A 5.48% 
CO -5273039.614 Yes (0.017) 46490870.55 Yes (0.019) No 0.96 N/A 4.72% 
CT 211890.8045 No (0.232) -2589865.204 No (0.561) No 0.98 N/A 4.72% 
DC 4653937.258 Yes (0.02) -95129228.31 No (0.543) No 0.98 N/A 1.70% 
DE -3921323.368 Yes (0.012) 38325662.07 Yes (0.007) No 0.98 N/A 4.29% 
FL -856685.7252 No (0.478) 8599181.241 No (0.178) No 0.98 N/A 4.81% 
GA 295612.3738 No (0.126) -3802518.663 No (0.147) No 0.98 N/A 5.56% 
HI -474090.179 No (0.207) 3979754.708 No (0.248) No 0.75 N/A 4.84% 
IA -3359658.932 Yes (0.013) 25202600.76 Yes (0.023) No 0.97 N/A 6.17% 
ID -1917675.891 Yes (0.02) 15837757.55 Yes (0.032) No 0.96 N/A 6.05% 
IL -901176.2541 No (0.245) 11054088.85 No (0.26) No 0.99 N/A 5.14% 
IN -1581544.485 No (0.258) 12105935.74 No (0.519) No 0.97 N/A 6.18% 
KS -763276.2259 No (0.398) 5100748.331 No (0.209) No 0.98 N/A 5.98% 
KY 245218.1262 No (0.437) -3084889.971 No (0.326) No 0.98 N/A 5.95% 
LA 526946.5878 Yes (0.012) -7027951.148 Yes (0.027) Yes 0.89 3.75% 4.98% 
MA -1491426.393 Yes (0.022) 17086222.88 Yes (0.009) No 0.98 N/A 5.01% 
MD -1698254.336 Yes (0.024) 15101200.17 Yes (0.009) No 0.98 N/A 5.54% 
ME -849042.6287 No (0.541) 7864688.217 No (0.502) No 0.98 N/A 6.38% 
MI -1984312.085 Yes (0.012) 15800346 Yes (0.024) No 0.94 N/A 7.30% 
MN -3942617.905 Yes (0.011) 32442083.08 Yes (0.021) No 0.98 N/A 5.27% 
MO -1157500.324 Yes (0.012) 12939890.44 Yes (0.011) No 0.98 N/A 5.24% 
MS 58195.92855 No (0.408) -816599.1556 No (0.161) No 0.99 N/A 7.35% 
MT -115586.6754 No (0.446) -110726.7924 No (0.559) No 0.95 N/A 6.65% 
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 State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
NC -5112910.602 No (0.252) 50034663.18 No (0.337) No 0.98 N/A 5.33% 
ND 137618.3285 No (0.407) -3047360.468 No (0.478) No 0.98 N/A 6.42% 
NE -2028192.552 No (0.447) 15871355.39 No (0.591) No 0.99 N/A 5.72% 
NH -1182252.314 Yes (0.01) 12683967.86 Yes (0.023) No 0.99 N/A 5.35% 
NJ 181503.0989 No (0.371) -2376170.322 No (0.439) No 0.99 N/A 6.22% 
NM -1290329.188 No (0.505) 9200108.63 No (0.222) No 0.90 N/A 7.00% 
NV 2489304.388 Yes (0.024) -34069083.6 Yes (0.017) Yes 0.93 3.65% 4.07% 
NY -2689083.767 Yes (0.032) 26999042.94 Yes (0.02) No 0.98 N/A 5.60% 
OH -1464623.775 No (0.38) 13803797.26 No (0.334) No 0.97 N/A 6.22% 
OK -1037516.332 Yes (0.026) 8180572.514 Yes (0.019) No 0.95 N/A 6.22% 
OR 512285.6342 No (0.341) -8765810.491 No (0.196) No 0.91 N/A 5.56% 
PA -1193750.195 Yes (0.026) 12407941.79 Yes (0.007) No 0.99 N/A 6.21% 
RI -2719330.43 No (0.521) 24859720.05 No (0.573) No 0.98 N/A 5.77% 
SC 66346.89495 No (0.178) -374891.3279 No (0.163) No 1.00 N/A 6.97% 
SD -2784643.63 No (0.356) 24699816.62 Yes (0.025) No 0.96 N/A 4.98% 
TN -437316.2775 No (0.54) 5310916.643 No (0.209) No 0.99 N/A 4.60% 
TX -1312702.385 Yes (0.037) 14916335.92 Yes (0.024) No 0.97 N/A 5.34% 
US -4195579.3 Yes (0.025) 41915451.01 Yes (0.02) No 0.99 N/A 5.57% 
UT -7714787.424 Yes (0.015) 56393961.2 Yes (0.021) No 0.94 N/A 6.25% 
VA -5609029.564 No (0.125) 57301216.73 No (0.47) No 0.98 N/A 5.01% 
VT -1282881.237 No (0.259) 9711443.909 No (0.554) No 0.98 N/A 8.26% 
WA 4825067.274 No (0.524) -44480419.19 No (0.248) No 0.94 N/A 5.35% 
WI -5303090.729 No (0.439) 40877312.09 No (0.221) No 0.96 N/A 6.36% 
WV -395942.8303 No (0.509) 3055968.617 No (0.42) No 0.99 N/A 7.38% 
WY -99341.86617 No (0.294) 486386.5748 No (0.422) No 0.92 N/A 5.77% 
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 Table 5 
Regression Results on Secondary Education Expenditure (1976-2005) 
 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
AK -1363874.754 No (0.202) 6768656.71 No (0.142) No 0.82 N/A 4.39% 
AL 94824.94733 No (0.379) -1350494.296 No (0.246) No 0.99 N/A 3.84% 
AR -1136425.11 No (0.248) 15968377.98 Yes (0.036) No 0.99 N/A 4.42% 
AZ -4471260.696 Yes (0.017) 54843117.87 Yes (0.015) No 0.95 N/A 3.27% 
CA -2088589.975 Yes (0.02) 33238902.66 Yes (0.013) No 0.98 N/A 3.82% 
CO -8556179.87 Yes (0.01) 112884971.3 Yes (0.019) No 0.96 N/A 3.23% 
CT -173901.7848 No (0.332) 3662975.639 No (0.483) No 0.98 N/A 3.50% 
DC 6916215.99 Yes (0.024) -184188279.6 No (0.197) No 0.98 N/A 1.58% 
DE -5099137.789 Yes (0.035) 86308436.45 Yes (0.017) No 0.98 N/A 2.56% 
FL -74543.26119 No (0.446) 172453.337 No (0.514) No 0.98 N/A 3.50% 
GA 696375.0182 No (0.51) -12258490.49 No (0.39) No 0.98 N/A 3.96% 
HI 238537.9846 No (0.471) -7384015.123 No (0.337) No 0.75 N/A 3.16% 
IA -3107104.25 No (0.319) 37612024.32 No (0.549) No 0.95 N/A 3.72% 
ID -2340751.541 No (0.554) 29089531.98 No (0.163) No 0.95 N/A 3.88% 
IL -2378531.407 Yes (0.016) 39921874.44 Yes (0.021) No 0.99 N/A 3.57% 
IN -2923444.668 No (0.302) 34987143.14 No (0.153) No 0.97 N/A 4.08% 
KS 477528.7221 No (0.256) -10660347.17 No (0.39) No 0.99 N/A 3.61% 
KY 175345.0237 No (0.403) -2961363.143 No (0.137) No 0.98 N/A 3.57% 
LA 1085113.043 Yes (0.011) -20255001.44 Yes (0.006) Yes 0.90 2.68% 3.26% 
MA -1313479.965 Yes (0.017) 19223563.99 Yes (0.005) No 0.98 N/A 3.44% 
MD -1332587.505 No (0.428) 16703768.71 No (0.389) No 0.98 N/A 3.67% 
ME -605467.3755 No (0.308) 7704897.427 No (0.199) No 0.98 N/A 4.57% 
MI -2631973.028 No (0.118) 30874071.73 No (0.143) No 0.94 N/A 4.98% 
MN -2371745.268 No (0.325) 25766270.52 No (0.175) No 0.98 N/A 3.62% 
MO -2135430.686 Yes (0.032) 31623259.62 Yes (0.004) No 0.98 N/A 3.65% 
MS 262658.0747 No (0.438) -4129654.621 No (0.55) No 0.99 N/A 4.44% 
MT -356451.7725 No (0.148) 1587164.332 No (0.588) No 0.97 N/A 4.18% 
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 State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
NC -697826.198 No (0.214) 10822617.63 No (0.495) No 0.98 N/A 3.06% 
ND 121521.6836 No (0.473) -7078180.525 No (0.214) No 0.96 N/A 3.67% 
NE -2966953.029 No (0.196) 36274618.48 No (0.536) No 0.99 N/A 3.60% 
NH -1656125.583 Yes (0.023) 24924107.51 Yes (0.011) No 0.99 N/A 3.94% 
NJ 156487.2624 No (0.438) -3009022.714 No (0.235) No 0.99 N/A 4.90% 
NM -925773.4824 No (0.308) 10796735.38 No (0.571) No 0.89 N/A 4.26% 
NV 1083867.361 No (0.55) -22417959.28 No (0.272) No 0.91 N/A 2.99% 
NY -2435772.818 Yes (0.029) 32449194.87 Yes (0.025) No 0.98 N/A 4.41% 
OH -2513555.438 No (0.469) 33377548.7 No (0.457) No 0.97 N/A 4.32% 
OK -878504.2109 Yes (0.019) 8925286.58 Yes (0.019) No 0.97 N/A 3.87% 
OR 57184.74991 No (0.498) -9367134.85 No (0.299) No 0.95 N/A 3.45% 
PA -766891.3724 No (0.526) 10932888.71 No (0.118) No 0.98 N/A 4.27% 
RI -2374074.951 No (0.453) 31734618.66 No (0.315) No 0.98 N/A 4.22% 
SC 88336.10464 No (0.255) -411123.5723 No (0.371) No 1.00 N/A 4.56% 
SD -6834689.677 Yes (0.027) 85261782.27 Yes (0.014) No 0.98 N/A 3.34% 
TN -958821.2206 No (0.418) 18364919.33 No (0.159) No 0.99 N/A 3.11% 
TX -1382946.869 Yes (0.026) 21790230.28 Yes (0.029) No 0.97 N/A 3.66% 
US -6280910.486 Yes (0.025) 90444256.41 Yes (0.027) No 0.99 N/A 3.83% 
UT -6031018.739 Yes (0.013) 70360723.99 Yes (0.015) No 0.96 N/A 3.52% 
VA -6337359.22 No (0.12) 95336441.19 No (0.223) No 0.98 N/A 3.44% 
VT -874080.0376 No (0.362) 11189234.03 No (0.364) No 0.98 N/A 5.22% 
WA 2762890.749 No (0.394) -39718288.22 No (0.294) No 0.95 N/A 3.33% 
WI -2716564.384 No (0.571) 30156314.92 No (0.438) No 0.96 N/A 4.13% 
WV -1107796.315 No (0.147) 12113092.56 No (0.503) No 0.99 N/A 4.60% 
WY -172654.5075 No (0.249) 1183376.27 No (0.535) No 0.92 N/A 3.76% 
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 Table 6 
Regression Results on Higher Education Expenditure (1976-2005) 
 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
AK -12118278.95 Yes (0.014) 367986647.9 Yes (0.018) No 0.78 N/A 1.39% 
AL -2217474.958 Yes (0.049) 56937651.77 Yes (0.019) No 1.00 N/A 2.31% 
AR -587452.982 No (0.599) 20260048.23 No (0.451) No 0.99 N/A 1.96% 
AZ -1160067.019 No (0.258) 25189283.65 No (0.187) No 0.90 N/A 1.62% 
CA 5138864.078 Yes (0.016) -162784294.6 Yes (0.026) Yes 0.98 1.58% 1.44% 
CO -8015194.72 Yes (0.018) 234117377 Yes (0.025) No 0.92 N/A 1.36% 
CT -2285930.27 No (0.439) 108014763.8 No (0.429) No 0.99 N/A 1.01% 
DC -609131.3101 No (0.512) 1270383075 No (0.498) No 0.98 N/A 0.12% 
DE -3910155.013 No (0.45) 86957857.28 No (0.541) No 0.98 N/A 1.44% 
FL -2254644.667 No (0.221) 112430277 No (0.116) No 0.98 N/A 1.07% 
GA 5590184.657 No (0.376) -247285020.7 No (0.283) No 0.98 N/A 1.24% 
HI -1957916.95 No (0.58) 54343551.53 No (0.204) No 0.74 N/A 1.61% 
IA -4899957.959 Yes (0.026) 104767377 Yes (0.026) No 0.99 N/A 2.15% 
ID -2969373.97 No (0.566) 78564935.05 No (0.25) No 0.95 N/A 1.88% 
IL -2621890.917 No (0.399) 121245272.5 No (0.451) No 0.99 N/A 1.33% 
IN -5927564.393 Yes (0.023) 164736434.3 Yes (0.024) No 0.97 N/A 1.79% 
KS -3403495.184 Yes (0.036) 88353042.9 Yes (0.023) No 0.97 N/A 2.17% 
KY -262861.6093 No (0.397) 3764592.534 No (0.256) No 0.98 N/A 1.85% 
LA 2322818.594 Yes (0.029) -112550010.7 Yes (0.047) Yes 0.89 1.03% 1.32% 
MA 3078259.438 No (0.58) -105369676.9 No (0.355) No 0.99 N/A 0.97% 
MD -7762240.148 Yes (0.028) 264331185.7 Yes (0.029) No 0.98 N/A 1.58% 
ME -842919.9672 No (0.327) 45067786.89 No (0.106) No 0.98 N/A 1.49% 
MI -5648403.969 Yes (0.009) 149483335.5 Yes (0.012) No 0.95 N/A 2.12% 
MN -7764127.607 Yes (0.013) 248521209.3 Yes (0.004) No 0.97 N/A 1.35% 
MO -946017.587 No (0.17) 63205336.52 No (0.452) No 0.99 N/A 1.35% 
MS 283440.2931 No (0.196) -8374759.872 No (0.178) No 0.99 N/A 2.54% 
MT -1102663.876 Yes (0.021) 30337235.53 Yes (0.017) No 0.89 N/A 2.05% 
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 State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
NC -1862327.234 No (0.256) 52566459.51 No (0.295) No 0.98 N/A 2.11% 
ND -652364.852 No (0.295) 1914623.648 No (0.254) No 0.97 N/A 2.54% 
NE -5816368.246 Yes (0.014) 156234578.3 Yes (0.038) No 0.99 N/A 1.91% 
NH -2312026.843 Yes (0.016) 99428530.52 Yes (0.014) No 0.99 N/A 1.24% 
NJ 8626418.964 Yes (0.003) -449212333.1 Yes (0.003) Yes 0.99 0.96% 1.12% 
NM -2596588.229 Yes (0.012) 50260716.07 Yes (0.038) No 0.92 N/A 2.45% 
NV 17466600.09 Yes (0.018) -951825117.1 Yes (0.01) Yes 0.95 0.92% 0.96% 
NY 1829740.423 No (0.103) -80546842.43 No (0.54) No 0.98 N/A 0.98% 
OH -7556731.277 Yes (0.011) 271197346.9 Yes (0.003) No 0.97 N/A 1.53% 
OK -2653903.554 Yes (0.031) 77112130.09 Yes (0.017) No 0.94 N/A 2.06% 
OR -8694629.692 No (0.595) 247763513.9 No (0.464) No 0.86 N/A 1.92% 
PA -1496916.921 Yes (0.029) 76301421.38 Yes (0.035) No 0.99 N/A 1.35% 
RI -4721641.865 No (0.153) 183070952.1 No (0.288) No 0.98 N/A 1.18% 
SC 1263755.974 No (0.287) -43368942.85 No (0.285) No 1.00 N/A 1.86% 
SD 1467792.371 No (0.108) -22386914.61 No (0.372) No 0.98 N/A 1.39% 
TN -249701.3391 No (0.511) -4355090.665 No (0.136) No 0.99 N/A 1.22% 
TX -4917005.639 Yes (0.011) 200755290.2 Yes (0.015) No 0.98 N/A 1.51% 
US -9031493.161 Yes (0.025) 357141201.1 Yes (0.031) No 0.99 N/A 1.47% 
UT -2607459.706 No (0.249) 55761674.87 No (0.342) No 0.93 N/A 2.47% 
VA -7940357.165 No (0.409) 303107626.4 No (0.274) No 0.98 N/A 1.39% 
VT -4281898.427 No (0.199) 102588282 No (0.338) No 0.98 N/A 2.54% 
WA -11487014.86 Yes (0.01) 357749390.5 Yes (0.021) No 0.94 N/A 1.67% 
WI -10629226.13 No (0.442) 284653006.6 No (0.232) No 0.96 N/A 2.02% 
WV -314577.8117 No (0.384) 7197598.307 No (0.564) No 0.99 N/A 2.07% 
WY -596341.7666 No (0.199) 17704967.94 No (0.157) No 0.91 N/A 1.74% 
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 Table 7 
Regression Results on Public Welfare Expenditure (1976-2005) 
 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
AK -3202828.208 Yes (0.019) 33151272.56 Yes (0.029) No 0.84 N/A 3.50% 
AL -228578.5065 Yes (0.016) 5158311.908 Yes (0.022) No 0.99 N/A 3.33% 
AR -251420.7588 Yes (0.04) 5283533.373 Yes (0.016) No 0.99 N/A 3.80% 
AZ -953636.0584 Yes (0.016) 18564243.37 Yes (0.009) No 0.97 N/A 2.78% 
CA -964509.2538 No (0.135) 21606648.66 No (0.276) No 0.95 N/A 2.74% 
CO -189827.5829 No (0.444) -12615863.02 No (0.152) No 0.94 N/A 1.51% 
CT 271518.2119 No (0.514) -10246334.24 No (0.189) No 0.99 N/A 2.25% 
DC 9635566.554 Yes (0.025) -252880235.4 Yes (0.012) Yes 0.97 1.91% 2.13% 
DE -143811.1755 No (0.323) 12412826.13 No (0.131) No 0.97 N/A 1.98% 
FL -709015.9372 Yes (0.024) 15815208.46 Yes (0.008) No 0.99 N/A 2.65% 
GA 114727.7218 No (0.491) -8317948.648 No (0.113) No 0.98 N/A 2.46% 
HI 1721315.616 Yes (0.034) -51470501.38 Yes (0.021) Yes 0.81 1.67% 2.63% 
IA -2487518.473 Yes (0.024) 48295504.08 Yes (0.021) No 0.98 N/A 2.75% 
ID -82593.72728 No (0.186) 8880347.699 No (0.48) No 0.97 N/A 3.06% 
IL 2323584.157 Yes (0.028) -61261562.6 Yes (0.006) Yes 0.99 1.90% 2.37% 
IN -1758993.407 Yes (0.018) 36434748.61 Yes (0.005) No 0.99 N/A 2.54% 
KS -887496.2047 Yes (0.016) 25626633.85 Yes (0.018) No 0.98 N/A 2.63% 
KY 2681.124201 No (0.24) -633880.0079 No (0.577) No 0.98 N/A 3.91% 
LA -212328.9828 No (0.169) 3697462.188 No (0.356) No 0.83 N/A 2.49% 
MA -1620930.345 Yes (0.013) 27889234.5 No (0.138) No 0.98 N/A 3.37% 
MD -3388604.781 Yes (0.011) 80593315.79 Yes (0.015) No 0.99 N/A 2.44% 
ME -385493.8715 Yes (0.01) 3245556.214 Yes (0.023) No 0.99 N/A 5.20% 
MI -2995581.802 No (0.542) 55762717.55 No (0.565) No 0.94 N/A 2.70% 
MN -2009255.778 Yes (0.006) 29618631.58 Yes (0.007) No 0.98 N/A 3.93% 
MO -487938.0053 Yes (0.022) 11204806.2 Yes (0.022) No 0.98 N/A 2.95% 
MS -32940.74684 No (0.509) 44951.84599 No (0.401) No 0.99 N/A 5.10% 
MT -1141343.473 Yes (0.013) 19910337 Yes (0.008) No 0.97 N/A 2.69% 
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 State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
NC -610731.2826 Yes (0.011) 18319808.05 Yes (0.015) No 0.99 N/A 2.75% 
ND -1067905.375 Yes (0.031) 15496724.87 Yes (0.013) No 0.97 N/A 2.86% 
NE -971512.0316 Yes (< 0.001) 21107769.43 Yes (0.03) No 0.99 N/A 2.80% 
NH -221995.646 Yes (0.013) 3099303.094 Yes (0.028) No 0.99 N/A 3.00% 
NJ 327756.4302 No (0.324) -7811726.353 No (0.378) No 0.99 N/A 2.62% 
NM 443568.8328 No (0.214) -2181377.923 No (0.154) No 0.93 N/A 4.53% 
NV -1608554.311 No (0.292) 77146840.76 No (0.522) No 0.90 N/A 1.49% 
NY -250609.1478 No (0.134) 1984751.782 No (0.278) No 0.98 N/A 4.44% 
OH -900993.2716 Yes (0.043) 11781246.86 Yes (0.027) No 0.99 N/A 3.46% 
OK -589026.9105 Yes (0.015) 14042737.63 Yes (0.035) No 0.95 N/A 3.10% 
OR 241979.0497 No (0.425) 2388215.423 No (0.158) No 0.89 N/A 2.68% 
PA 7059.115407 No (0.254) 1374276.693 No (0.306) No 0.99 N/A 4.20% 
RI -1012712.722 Yes (0.034) 14214167.9 Yes (0.021) No 0.99 N/A 4.77% 
SC -36159.58347 No (0.429) 688536.2623 No (0.515) No 0.99 N/A 3.71% 
SD -3870316.869 Yes (0.012) 112330040.2 Yes (0.013) No 0.98 N/A 2.44% 
TN -29591.74702 No (0.32) 2016204.968 No (0.589) No 0.99 N/A 3.84% 
TX -533125.2888 No (0.422) 15920773.83 No (0.12) No 0.96 N/A 1.96% 
US -1188284.587 Yes (0.01) 25111576.32 Yes (0.017) No 0.99 N/A 2.93% 
UT -1591920.602 Yes (0.018) 43390323.26 Yes (0.014) No 0.94 N/A 2.52% 
VA -1905184.169 Yes (0.007) 67016468.36 Yes (0.014) No 0.98 N/A 1.92% 
VT -574567.7856 Yes (0.006) 8256083.177 Yes (0.016) No 0.99 N/A 4.90% 
WA -1375750.126 Yes (0.005) 30184617.02 No (0.217) No 0.94 N/A 2.49% 
WI -2242378.183 Yes (0.032) 38105005.33 Yes (0.014) No 0.98 N/A 3.23% 
WV -26022.32487 No (0.454) 1178861.674 No (0.237) No 0.99 N/A 4.41% 
WY -204461.9319 No (0.132) 5609457.667 No (0.454) No 0.91 N/A 2.03% 
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 Table 8 
Regression Results on Financial Administration Expenditure (1976-2005) 
 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
AK 1165426.325 No (0.335) -73601040.28 No (0.474) No 0.57 N/A 0.57% 
AL -77007.24943 No (0.114) -16335231.51 No (0.382) No 0.99 N/A 0.28% 
AR -1853692.932 Yes (0.023) 141360245.3 Yes (0.035) No 0.99 N/A 0.50% 
AZ 1581918.551 No (0.167) -155452506.1 Yes (0.02) Yes 0.95 0.51% 0.31% 
CA -3575960.489 Yes (0.019) 231810178.5 Yes (0.017) No 0.97 N/A 0.37% 
CO 3405637.643 Yes (0.006) -371589898.5 Yes (0.013) Yes 0.95 0.46% 0.29% 
CT 1102053.753 No (0.184) -97056034.5 No (0.347) No 0.98 N/A 0.28% 
DC -22944.83942 No (0.558) -377026145.6 No (0.297) No 0.98 N/A 0.23% 
DE 1038064.307 No (0.504) -171208167.8 No (0.133) No 0.98 N/A 0.39% 
FL 1688436.049 No (0.51) -153758601.2 Yes (0.018) Yes 0.99 0.55% 0.40% 
GA 860968.2854 No (0.146) -86544665.87 No (0.528) No 0.98 N/A 0.20% 
HI -3642699.343 Yes (0.009) 302104897.4 Yes (< 0.001) No 0.80 N/A 0.24% 
IA 842240.8549 No (0.28) -147897385.4 No (0.283) No 0.96 N/A 0.27% 
ID -4678394.711 Yes (0.024) 299507765.7 Yes (0.027) No 0.97 N/A 0.46% 
IL -3895515.92 Yes (0.027) 396842801.2 Yes (0.02) No 0.99 N/A 0.28% 
IN -5475289.188 Yes (0.021) 500756554.2 Yes (< 0.001) No 0.97 N/A 0.29% 
KS -1263346.357 Yes (0.01) 89686207.96 No (0.284) No 0.97 N/A 0.26% 
KY -23616.43425 No (0.278) -3239412.404 No (0.135) No 0.98 N/A 0.28% 
LA 1039967.425 No (0.554) -120221570.7 No (0.414) No 0.88 N/A 0.31% 
MA 439927.5798 No (0.438) -61384159.64 No (0.202) No 0.98 N/A 0.24% 
MD 914684.9999 No (0.164) -132485373.6 No (0.374) No 0.98 N/A 0.28% 
ME -2019936.628 No (0.407) 148518553.9 No (0.208) No 0.98 N/A 0.42% 
MI 6622883.426 Yes (0.013) -674345409.5 Yes (0.033) Yes 0.96 0.49% 0.25% 
MN 4913083.657 Yes (0.011) -501295887.9 Yes (0.019) Yes 0.99 0.49% 0.25% 
MO -5842285.322 Yes (0.017) 701074151.6 Yes (0.022) No 0.98 N/A 0.24% 
MS 20208.1454 No (0.267) 2567244.633 No (0.38) No 0.99 N/A 0.32% 
MT -3066438.949 Yes (0.024) 143584626.4 Yes (0.033) No 0.93 N/A 0.60% 
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 State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
NC 3784947.487 Yes (0.004) -586667034.9 Yes (0.031) Yes 0.99 0.32% 0.15% 
ND -7191117.658 Yes (0.025) 509824887.1 Yes (0.022) No 0.92 N/A 0.38% 
NE 194480.1384 No (0.264) -49949354.3 No (0.143) No 0.98 N/A 0.26% 
NH 338924.4875 No (0.461) -33991859.79 No (0.331) No 0.99 N/A 0.23% 
NJ 905274.736 No (0.215) -66444686.52 No (0.479) No 0.99 N/A 0.24% 
NM 146629.7737 No (0.578) -36749605.1 No (0.301) No 0.90 N/A 0.42% 
NV -1343312.958 No (0.543) 90802579.05 No (0.174) No 0.90 N/A 0.26% 
NY -392674.3323 No (0.116) 2471331.718 No (0.534) No 0.98 N/A 0.29% 
OH -2184317.306 Yes (0.02) 143050800.9 Yes (0.031) No 0.98 N/A 0.46% 
OK -2749294.659 Yes (0.007) 214920837.9 Yes (0.02) No 0.94 N/A 0.28% 
OR -886978.8648 No (0.342) 18209591.08 No (0.17) No 0.86 N/A 0.47% 
PA -4738579.367 Yes (< 0.001) 465309047 Yes (0.01) No 0.99 N/A 0.26% 
RI -5167002.065 Yes (0.024) 370691603.7 Yes (0.004) No 0.98 N/A 0.41% 
SC -317313.7905 No (0.552) 24570956.38 No (0.202) No 1.00 N/A 0.54% 
SD -2240263.172 No (0.575) 135557633 No (0.472) No 0.96 N/A 0.34% 
TN -1492823.878 No (0.183) 161601542.6 No (0.221) No 0.99 N/A 0.22% 
TX 3283844.414 Yes (0.044) -499221125 Yes (0.02) Yes 0.98 0.33% 0.17% 
US -2323834.615 No (0.143) 189489497.4 No (0.228) No 0.98 N/A 0.30% 
UT -7740440.256 Yes (0.005) 556311440.1 Yes (0.006) No 0.96 N/A 0.42% 
VA 51234.93165 No (0.561) -61339596.06 No (0.18) No 0.98 N/A 0.26% 
VT 445356.2032 No (0.123) -57053699.56 No (0.505) No 0.98 N/A 0.33% 
WA 3781878.211 Yes (< 0.001) -410675950.9 Yes (0.027) Yes 0.98 0.46% 0.24% 
WI 1905959.554 No (0.536) -225070631.7 No (0.29) No 0.96 N/A 0.22% 
WV -82746.05918 No (0.447) 5806349.857 No (0.177) No 0.99 N/A 0.62% 
WY 599147.0987 No (0.335) -48906221.03 No (0.46) No 0.92 N/A 0.32% 
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 Table 9 
Regression Results on Health and Hospital Expenditure (1976-2005) 
 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
AK -4952768.633 No (0.345) 233038488.3 No (0.257) No 0.58 N/A 0.76% 
AL -486125.6865 Yes (0.01) 6989198.638 Yes (0.009) No 1.00 N/A 3.37% 
AR -2154012.21 Yes (0.021) 74634597.19 Yes (0.031) No 0.99 N/A 1.32% 
AZ -6372979.21 Yes (0.002) 382684201.3 Yes (0.021) No 0.93 N/A 1.06% 
CA -2421678.089 No (0.446) 53562097.38 No (0.365) No 0.97 N/A 1.58% 
CO -8105308.587 Yes (0.009) 440934435.3 Yes (0.033) No 0.93 N/A 1.11% 
CT 12388082.33 Yes (0.022) -637530484.2 Yes (0.025) Yes 0.99 0.97% 0.91% 
DC -11629606.1 No (0.365) 572750856 No (0.536) No 0.96 N/A 0.77% 
DE 9793828.099 No (0.105) -785141042.3 No (0.431) No 0.97 N/A 0.65% 
FL 2291274.889 No (0.467) -93565239.97 No (0.111) No 0.99 N/A 1.40% 
GA -937149.8318 No (0.333) 19988914.73 No (0.391) No 0.98 N/A 1.39% 
HI 7190768.913 Yes (0.026) -286619373.4 Yes (0.004) Yes 0.83 1.25% 1.52% 
IA -2581803.716 Yes (0.01) 61674429.16 No (0.201) No 0.98 N/A 1.89% 
ID -6949615.834 Yes (0.015) 220771994.5 Yes (0.011) No 0.97 N/A 1.71% 
IL -5306744.403 Yes (0.033) 325206521.6 Yes (0.012) No 0.99 N/A 0.96% 
IN -5888132.239 Yes (0.016) 182737074.1 Yes (0.021) No 0.99 N/A 1.53% 
KS 1044153.6 No (0.227) -54490677.22 No (0.511) No 0.98 N/A 0.99% 
KY 181675.5854 No (0.321) -30427791.27 No (0.127) No 0.98 N/A 1.19% 
LA 333672.1098 No (0.319) -12373717.63 No (0.435) No 0.86 N/A 2.13% 
MA -329927.0167 No (0.213) 4164015.521 No (0.563) No 0.98 N/A 0.64% 
MD -1145220.102 No (0.145) 62181745.39 No (0.459) No 0.97 N/A 0.77% 
ME -1128650.889 No (0.158) 50522652.57 No (0.297) No 0.98 N/A 1.39% 
MI -2813459.063 Yes (< 0.001) 68782248.88 No (0.433) No 0.97 N/A 1.70% 
MN -384135.9275 No (0.299) -3375840.029 No (0.492) No 1.00 N/A 0.99% 
MO -675822.5508 No (0.199) 37169096.71 No (0.497) No 0.98 N/A 1.49% 
MS 154718.3801 No (0.293) -2802258.577 No (0.162) No 0.99 N/A 3.11% 
MT -2648126.217 Yes (0.022) 97356267.86 Yes (0.036) No 0.91 N/A 1.36% 
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 State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
NC -1823604.705 Yes (0.024) 58290084.98 Yes (0.023) No 0.99 N/A 2.00% 
ND -1693234.447 No (0.191) 47480174.92 No (0.235) No 0.92 N/A 0.40% 
NE 311505.046 No (0.375) -24438627.82 No (0.132) No 0.99 N/A 1.15% 
NH 1195362.759 No (0.106) -50942831.78 No (0.177) No 0.99 N/A 0.33% 
NJ 3404703.36 No (0.5) -267171146.9 No (0.528) No 0.99 N/A 0.73% 
NM -4691476.12 Yes (0.036) 145071826.8 Yes (0.023) No 0.94 N/A 1.49% 
NV -459229.699 No (0.167) 31474186.65 No (0.136) No 0.90 N/A 0.97% 
NY 4746802.049 No (0.177) -140799929 No (0.508) No 0.98 N/A 1.57% 
OH -4901577.967 Yes (0.008) 182341039.5 Yes (0.023) No 0.97 N/A 1.59% 
OK 384380.4049 No (0.157) -24909867.39 No (0.461) No 0.97 N/A 1.07% 
OR -6880554.217 Yes (0.032) 227087514.6 Yes (0.01) No 0.93 N/A 1.33% 
PA -239032.9946 No (0.395) 42524747.72 No (0.477) No 0.99 N/A 1.16% 
RI -129902.843 No (0.381) -1424824.386 No (0.434) No 0.98 N/A 0.61% 
SC 199577.4145 No (0.34) -4818465.242 No (0.233) No 1.00 N/A 3.13% 
SD -11084394 Yes (0.03) 626875343.3 Yes (< 0.001) No 0.98 N/A 0.69% 
TN -3639411.411 No (0.349) 110645928.9 No (0.56) No 0.99 N/A 1.72% 
TX -842568.3565 No (0.442) 19173039.41 No (0.287) No 0.97 N/A 1.10% 
US -4725736.86 No (0.563) 140893046.3 No (0.388) No 0.99 N/A 1.38% 
UT -2230149.766 No (0.47) 51767895.46 No (0.169) No 0.95 N/A 1.27% 
VA -7361156.111 No (0.437) 357430805.6 No (0.101) No 0.98 N/A 1.16% 
VT 1575962.611 Yes (0.011) -95075557.23 No (0.267) No 0.98 N/A 0.58% 
WA -1838751.604 Yes (0.022) 54954920.43 Yes (0.026) No 0.95 N/A 1.82% 
WI -690907.6337 No (0.597) 19119341.98 No (0.14) No 0.96 N/A 1.10% 
WV -1603883.363 No (0.188) 68035353.49 No (0.247) No 0.99 N/A 1.12% 
WY -238815.0676 No (0.11) 3823911.689 No (0.338) No 0.92 N/A 3.04% 
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 Table 10 
Regression Results on Total Highway Expenditure (1976-2005) 
 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
AK -657827.4513 No (0.548) -10731649.44 No (0.55) No 0.77 N/A 3.05% 
AL -1851826.832 Yes (0.018) 68246473.22 Yes (0.018) No 0.99 N/A 1.16% 
AR -64711.44034 No (0.32) 4565423.768 No (0.318) No 0.99 N/A 1.28% 
AZ 545357.0227 No (0.392) -20196689.4 No (0.186) No 0.90 N/A 0.98% 
CA -4512534.642 No (0.173) 360194598.7 No (0.481) No 0.96 N/A 0.75% 
CO -4200957.683 No (0.314) 171863425.4 No (0.113) No 0.91 N/A 1.03% 
CT -1040759.579 No (0.243) 72164036.58 No (0.435) No 0.99 N/A 0.65% 
DC -4454562.814 Yes (0.022) 693504303.5 No (0.205) No 0.97 N/A 0.10% 
DE -9960218.643 Yes (0.018) 409176017.7 Yes (0.027) No 0.98 N/A 1.08% 
FL 190350.8867 No (0.594) -13452043.97 No (0.414) No 0.98 N/A 1.19% 
GA 284824.6552 No (0.352) -16142226.82 No (0.295) No 0.98 N/A 0.53% 
HI 673384.3909 No (0.331) -2557346.092 No (0.185) No 0.85 N/A 0.85% 
IA -5110163.519 Yes (0.025) 127792629.2 Yes (0.028) No 0.97 N/A 1.52% 
ID -3411301.852 Yes (0.02) 91715343.53 No (0.495) No 0.95 N/A 1.49% 
IL -5172723.401 Yes (0.009) 237239390.9 Yes (0.021) No 0.99 N/A 0.95% 
IN -6193766.025 No (0.36) 315413685.5 No (0.186) No 0.96 N/A 0.97% 
KS -183161.1884 No (0.548) 5280385.734 No (0.207) No 0.96 N/A 1.62% 
KY -75186.14622 No (0.447) 2354970.815 No (0.486) No 0.98 N/A 1.18% 
LA -739864.7501 No (0.312) 23469195.75 No (0.273) No 0.83 N/A 0.99% 
MA -4236676.197 Yes (0.018) 228854956.3 Yes (0.006) No 0.98 N/A 0.74% 
MD 1731597.064 Yes (0.004) -52809126 No (0.269) No 0.99 N/A 0.92% 
ME -1184714.614 No (0.428) 32133639 No (0.482) No 0.98 N/A 1.57% 
MI 584036.2149 No (0.395) -9781482.836 No (0.196) No 0.93 N/A 0.98% 
MN -8613152.415 Yes (0.018) 261851552.7 Yes (0.013) No 0.98 N/A 1.23% 
MO -2433201.56 No (0.492) 111768041.1 No (0.206) No 0.98 N/A 1.13% 
MS 7417.109515 No (0.326) 221948.0411 No (0.379) No 0.99 N/A 1.64% 
MT -836393.1799 No (0.289) 15103167.86 No (0.529) No 0.87 N/A 2.16% 
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 State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
NC -3368576.678 Yes (0.028) 163689507.4 Yes (0.019) No 0.99 N/A 1.01% 
ND -1309656.085 No (0.446) 27003901.23 No (0.184) No 0.85 N/A 2.09% 
NE -2594297.841 No (0.212) 84988800.27 No (0.353) No 0.98 N/A 1.42% 
NH -68712.10893 No (0.515) 4069428.486 No (0.376) No 0.99 N/A 0.99% 
NJ -551940.4846 No (0.418) 52883307.64 No (0.233) No 0.99 N/A 0.73% 
NM -718914.1811 No (0.118) 15436358.22 No (0.183) No 0.90 N/A 1.39% 
NV 7581254.761 Yes (0.018) -279599513.3 Yes (0.029) Yes 0.91 1.36% 1.41% 
NY 267123.7469 No (0.367) -51471386.02 No (0.514) No 0.98 N/A 0.92% 
OH -6555306.163 No (0.542) 334162488.8 No (0.246) No 0.97 N/A 1.00% 
OK -3974471.519 Yes (0.012) 144368826.8 Yes (0.012) No 0.92 N/A 1.09% 
OR -14401175.49 Yes (0.019) 524650613.4 Yes (0.025) No 0.91 N/A 1.18% 
PA -1324734.088 No (0.11) 63156384.97 No (0.3) No 0.98 N/A 1.40% 
RI 524808.579 No (0.39) -25642904.32 No (0.379) No 0.98 N/A 0.86% 
SC -1355114.065 No (0.502) 71319397.58 Yes (0.023) No 1.00 N/A 1.18% 
SD 301034.5911 No (0.286) 1183052.16 No (0.141) No 0.96 N/A 2.08% 
TN -2120503.103 Yes (0.035) 71937383.97 Yes (0.029) No 0.99 N/A 0.85% 
TX 386583.6233 No (0.378) -18796741.92 No (0.165) No 0.96 N/A 1.00% 
US -4158344.889 No (0.138) 198217896.8 No (0.247) No 0.98 N/A 1.01% 
UT 1210804.438 No (0.443) -31735101.11 No (0.259) No 0.94 N/A 1.06% 
VA -1500810.52 Yes (0.028) 58024454.97 Yes (0.032) No 0.98 N/A 0.84% 
VT -2146359.521 Yes (0.023) 51631905.85 Yes (0.013) No 0.98 N/A 1.58% 
WA -2745227.656 No (0.103) 103377279.5 No (0.499) No 0.94 N/A 1.02% 
WI 363809.2776 No (0.506) 8667723.287 No (0.368) No 0.97 N/A 1.39% 
WV 124711.9813 No (0.18) -1381014.956 No (0.262) No 0.99 N/A 1.96% 
WY -881035.0336 No (0.395) 17908059.61 No (0.352) No 0.92 N/A 1.92% 
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 Table 11 
Regression Results on Police and Fire Departments Expenditure (1976-2005) 
 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
AK 1177969.148 No (0.41) -96740279.83 No (0.329) No 0.59 N/A 1.29% 
AL -1081069.193 Yes (0.005) 49106332.19 No (0.332) No 0.99 N/A 1.18% 
AR -961890.9924 Yes (0.005) 54371054.58 Yes (0.018) No 0.99 N/A 1.28% 
AZ -3512405.605 No (0.245) 99875372.59 No (0.324) No 0.93 N/A 1.70% 
CA -651959.6537 No (0.362) 1520470.925 No (0.317) No 0.97 N/A 1.73% 
CO -6566389.031 Yes (0.033) 241783224.6 No (0.209) No 0.96 N/A 1.22% 
CT -1540085.138 No (0.483) 73288822.94 No (0.458) No 0.98 N/A 0.95% 
DC -7275049.082 Yes (0.028) 248822210.6 Yes (0.023) No 0.98 N/A 0.93% 
DE -4181171.799 No (0.461) 223995412.5 No (0.262) No 0.97 N/A 0.85% 
FL 98804.35764 No (0.236) -18448031.54 No (0.267) No 0.99 N/A 1.75% 
GA -934508.5917 No (0.588) 1596258.187 No (0.439) No 0.99 N/A 1.21% 
HI 7546375.188 Yes (0.028) -427011969.2 Yes (0.005) Yes 0.81 0.88% 1.02% 
IA -5661133.968 Yes (0.019) 280236361.7 Yes (0.022) No 0.98 N/A 0.88% 
ID -2524849.884 Yes (0.022) 111347088.6 Yes (0.014) No 0.97 N/A 1.34% 
IL -3892920.69 Yes (0.017) 202401881.8 Yes (0.013) No 0.99 N/A 1.25% 
IN -5034710.643 Yes (0.016) 309782957.2 Yes (0.029) No 0.98 N/A 1.10% 
KS -1717291.459 Yes (0.013) 58396032.66 No (0.592) No 0.99 N/A 1.12% 
KY -740894.7631 No (0.476) 19340582.69 No (0.562) No 0.98 N/A 1.13% 
LA 590001.3565 No (0.165) -48165014.82 Yes (0.022) Yes 0.88 0.61% 1.35% 
MA -7238074.913 No (0.102) 300241764.9 No (0.156) No 0.98 N/A 1.10% 
MD 344628.7549 No (0.488) -27603807.87 No (0.227) No 0.97 N/A 1.47% 
ME -4761012.14 Yes (0.022) 265126382.5 Yes (0.04) No 0.99 N/A 1.12% 
MI -903371.3827 No (0.486) -13757806.86 No (0.257) No 0.96 N/A 1.44% 
MN -1575685.646 No (0.175) -10955619.58 No (0.432) No 0.98 N/A 0.95% 
MO -1966838.995 Yes (0.035) 124174500.1 Yes (0.027) No 0.98 N/A 1.19% 
MS 612070.4593 No (0.466) -26442058.05 No (0.314) No 0.99 N/A 1.35% 
MT -1440730.4 Yes (0.003) 71173255.42 Yes (0.018) No 0.89 N/A 1.33% 
97 
 State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
NC -442182.1133 No (0.502) -11950543.83 No (0.514) No 0.99 N/A 1.11% 
ND -9513881.559 Yes (0.022) 617338162.8 Yes (0.007) No 0.91 N/A 0.79% 
NE -2327826.369 Yes (0.04) 150891188.6 Yes (0.03) No 0.99 N/A 0.99% 
NH -5152451.523 Yes (0.013) 256221958.8 Yes (0.017) No 0.99 N/A 1.03% 
NJ -1612812.579 No (0.348) 50674904.75 No (0.129) No 0.99 N/A 1.28% 
NM -2864638.604 Yes (0.018) 80993480.07 Yes (0.019) No 0.96 N/A 1.61% 
NV 4148166.43 No (0.431) -144260921.1 No (0.46) No 0.90 N/A 1.55% 
NY -1654655.803 No (0.233) 45344696.93 No (0.222) No 0.98 N/A 1.53% 
OH -3586166.197 Yes (0.026) 153128179 Yes (0.016) No 0.98 N/A 1.33% 
OK -2281331.444 Yes (0.032) 88893029.08 Yes (0.028) No 0.96 N/A 1.29% 
OR -6816731.647 Yes (0.012) 254113020.1 Yes (0.001) No 0.91 N/A 1.48% 
PA -2833440.748 Yes (0.034) 154679952.1 Yes (0.029) No 0.99 N/A 1.19% 
RI -2269621.242 No (0.224) 69069146.17 No (0.418) No 0.99 N/A 1.64% 
SC -907927.7477 Yes (< 0.001) 44109581.9 Yes (0.017) No 1.00 N/A 1.14% 
SD -6811183.165 Yes (0.018) 362843987 No (0.291) No 0.97 N/A 0.92% 
TN -1017402.018 No (0.584) 29432440.38 No (0.518) No 0.99 N/A 1.11% 
TX -2432759.624 Yes (0.024) 96843012 Yes (0.027) No 0.99 N/A 1.07% 
US -1993932.639 Yes (0.02) 51894855.97 No (0.165) No 0.99 N/A 1.34% 
UT -3746713.292 Yes (0.006) 216263394.8 Yes (0.025) No 0.96 N/A 1.27% 
VA 2304963.192 No (0.572) -187724134 Yes (0.023) Yes 0.99 0.61% 1.15% 
VT -3628540.255 Yes (0.024) 211097900.7 Yes (0.022) No 0.99 N/A 1.19% 
WA -1723606.866 No (0.433) 39440522.8 No (0.13) No 0.95 N/A 1.30% 
WI -3866305.944 Yes (0.009) 160198330.8 Yes (0.016) No 0.98 N/A 1.42% 
WV -228403.9443 No (0.135) 14818633.25 No (0.422) No 0.99 N/A 1.03% 
WY -725809.966 No (0.342) 31116095.91 No (0.177) No 0.92 N/A 1.57% 
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 Table 12 
Regression Results on Interest Expenditure (1976-2005) 
 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
AK 932147.8241 Yes (0.017) -14357180.96 No (0.133) No 0.60 N/A 1.04% 
AL -1427064.068 No (0.565) 87547487.57 No (0.528) No 0.99 N/A 0.64% 
AR -692389.2966 No (0.514) 34045695.62 No (0.221) No 0.99 N/A 0.53% 
AZ -745488.2314 No (0.116) 19206803.36 No (0.409) No 0.96 N/A 0.63% 
CA 2772002.823 Yes (0.039) -255194789.4 Yes (0.022) Yes 0.97 0.54% 0.76% 
CO 55072.93734 No (0.206) -33133518.18 No (0.322) No 0.98 N/A 0.81% 
CT 6800273.706 No (0.336) -374579424.4 No (0.203) No 0.99 N/A 0.76% 
DC -4712774.739 Yes (0.017) 246442687.1 Yes (0.028) No 0.97 N/A 0.37% 
DE -1737274.772 Yes (0.021) 62977838.48 No (0.105) No 0.98 N/A 0.45% 
FL -555878.5009 No (0.116) 23179957.88 No (0.495) No 0.98 N/A 0.81% 
GA 1023062.974 No (0.51) -81470474.42 No (0.187) No 0.98 N/A 0.46% 
HI -1004469.771 No (0.442) 20262987.05 No (0.152) No 0.78 N/A 0.97% 
IA -2909030.455 Yes (0.013) 208858728.2 Yes (0.04) No 0.99 N/A 0.41% 
ID -1976251.496 Yes (0.02) 95010286.03 No (0.448) No 0.99 N/A 0.54% 
IL -1718900.665 Yes (0.027) 75127396.42 No (0.393) No 0.99 N/A 0.85% 
IN -3123484.979 Yes (0.007) 206518752.6 No (0.536) No 0.99 N/A 0.64% 
KS -1781561.563 Yes (0.031) 96733898.54 Yes (0.001) No 0.98 N/A 0.75% 
KY 1241716.851 No (0.365) -62447556.4 No (0.594) No 0.98 N/A 0.92% 
LA -201162.5454 No (0.267) 9511387.023 No (0.194) No 0.82 N/A 0.70% 
MA -896325.0985 No (0.278) 65554202.32 No (0.188) No 0.98 N/A 1.25% 
MD -4714715.843 Yes (0.012) 273804087.8 Yes (0.021) No 0.98 N/A 0.58% 
ME -520474.6502 No (0.422) 29273738.9 No (0.495) No 0.98 N/A 0.77% 
MI -5449715.306 No (0.375) 353967993.6 No (0.459) No 0.94 N/A 0.75% 
MN -2447752.503 Yes (0.038) 108606990.3 Yes (0.025) No 0.98 N/A 0.70% 
MO 127794.885 No (0.557) -37146772.81 No (0.258) No 0.98 N/A 0.66% 
MS 1039254.921 No (0.24) -72421291.4 No (0.129) No 0.99 N/A 0.64% 
MT -834648.1063 Yes (0.017) 27329762.41 Yes (0.016) No 0.96 N/A 0.68% 
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 State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
NC -1082598.876 No (0.47) 72369907.6 No (0.317) No 0.99 N/A 0.45% 
ND -1710700.519 Yes (0.021) 63160878.67 Yes (0.025) No 0.97 N/A 0.65% 
NE -939816.483 Yes (0.014) 30804410.9 No (0.364) No 0.99 N/A 0.54% 
NH 646788.0429 No (0.232) -38291031.97 No (0.11) No 0.99 N/A 0.80% 
NJ -2132871.42 No (0.53) 139726286.4 No (0.449) No 0.99 N/A 0.63% 
NM -506924.7421 No (0.535) 7680196.573 No (0.125) No 0.95 N/A 0.66% 
NV 507953.6276 No (0.357) -37897205.35 No (0.14) No 0.90 N/A 0.78% 
NY -5738939.048 Yes (0.016) 206397746.8 Yes (0.019) No 0.99 N/A 1.06% 
OH -2913470.246 No (0.4) 192648639 No (0.209) No 0.98 N/A 0.68% 
OK -5260.351133 No (0.543) -15973769.48 No (0.36) No 0.93 N/A 0.55% 
OR -1523221.825 No (0.138) 41385632.42 No (0.296) No 0.94 N/A 0.79% 
PA -1395861.807 No (0.363) 47795754.46 No (0.268) No 0.99 N/A 0.92% 
RI -718290.1464 No (0.596) 28013040.03 No (0.369) No 0.98 N/A 0.75% 
SC -134809.6502 No (0.386) 6352179.489 No (0.144) No 0.99 N/A 0.93% 
SD -750775.4641 Yes (0.028) 18843485.23 No (0.235) No 0.99 N/A 0.51% 
TN -979219.4954 No (0.501) 50730712.9 No (0.403) No 0.99 N/A 0.49% 
TX -1074381.479 Yes (0.025) 42149991.55 No (0.454) No 0.98 N/A 0.66% 
US -1098751.744 No (0.305) 47052930.16 No (0.162) No 0.99 N/A 0.74% 
UT -358638.6716 Yes (0.031) 7995998.528 Yes (< 0.001) No 0.97 N/A 0.79% 
VA 1525173.524 No (0.537) -170923231.4 No (0.35) No 0.99 N/A 0.52% 
VT -1088549.909 No (0.506) 47136198.94 No (0.515) No 0.98 N/A 0.74% 
WA -2259385.495 Yes (0.013) 74138864.79 Yes (0.027) No 0.97 N/A 0.84% 
WI -2379349.441 No (0.524) 118629799.1 No (0.383) No 0.98 N/A 0.72% 
WV 77770.13181 No (0.401) -7744032.233 No (0.507) No 0.99 N/A 0.72% 
WY -171222.6038 No (0.355) 10748660.3 No (0.577) No 0.91 N/A 0.31% 
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 Table 13 
Regression Results on Total Expenditure (1976-2000) 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant 
at .05 level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? R-Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as of 
2005 
AK -46734.92709 No (0.441) -259100.9162 No (0.132) No 0.68 N/A 25.45% 
AL -158356.4201 Yes (0.017) 393546.6825 Yes (0.014) No 1.00 N/A 21.96% 
AR -461656.6723 Yes (0.018) 1554652.524 Yes (0.049) No 0.99 N/A 19.80% 
AZ -544170.9832 No (0.398) 1259596.897 No (0.428) No 0.93 N/A 18.51% 
CA 570235.7435 No (0.191) -1662141.305 No (0.421) No 0.96 N/A 21.32% 
CO -166047.6412 No (0.21) 198620.9024 No (0.463) No 0.94 N/A 16.36% 
CT 604719.7784 No (0.581) -1979127.299 No (0.326) No 0.98 N/A 15.32% 
DC -118117.955 No (0.284) 459636.9582 No (0.322) No 0.96 N/A 10.72% 
DE -1695721.783 Yes (0.004) 5715575.653 Yes (0.028) No 0.97 N/A 13.39% 
FL 426503.1793 Yes (0.008) -1304003.459 Yes (0.022) Yes 0.99 16.35% 19.63% 
GA 2353646.63 Yes (0.014) -7857945.669 Yes (0.011) Yes 0.99 14.98% 16.44% 
HI 25262.73121 No (0.429) 198832.5482 No (0.417) No 0.84 N/A 19.23% 
IA -605911.359 No (0.408) 1479631.645 No (0.184) No 0.97 N/A 18.27% 
ID -830047.6995 Yes (0.021) 2482031.959 Yes (0.007) No 0.94 N/A 19.43% 
IL 365164.9653 No (0.582) -1228373.798 No (0.155) No 0.98 N/A 17.59% 
IN -270715.4543 No (0.479) 597208.8379 No (0.288) No 0.97 N/A 17.79% 
KS -193238.5119 No (0.388) 341828.0676 No (0.24) No 0.98 N/A 18.01% 
KY 72860.93827 No (0.199) -267489.0613 No (0.2) No 0.97 N/A 19.45% 
LA 149855.5372 No (0.468) -546761.4571 Yes (0.024) Yes 0.87 13.70% 18.06% 
MA -934450.4465 Yes (0.019) 2608469.667 Yes (0.028) No 0.98 N/A 18.53% 
MD -886020.146 No (0.56) 2503878.902 No (0.372) No 0.98 N/A 16.93% 
ME -172447.3244 No (0.532) 437986.099 No (0.267) No 0.97 N/A 22.73% 
MI 348585.7999 No (0.347) -1147869.57 No (0.529) No 0.93 N/A 20.42% 
MN 792011.754 Yes (0.028) -2296476.696 Yes (0.008) Yes 0.98 17.24% 18.55% 
MO -401281.375 No (0.165) 1473004.752 No (0.223) No 0.97 N/A 17.29% 
MS -46525.48139 No (0.167) 122481.5615 No (0.333) No 0.99 N/A 25.12% 
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 State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant 
at .05 level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? R-Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as of 
2005 
MT -262077.4441 Yes (0.005) 556817.3357 No (0.119) No 0.93 N/A 21.43% 
NC 269272.6196 No (0.146) -983307.2772 No (0.339) No 0.98 N/A 17.32% 
ND -239855.6015 Yes (0.003) 471464.8168 No (0.293) No 0.94 N/A 19.23% 
NE -1267946.9 No (0.147) 3095057.599 No (0.496) No 0.98 N/A 19.84% 
NH -391670.6072 Yes (0.004) 1265318.477 Yes (0.014) No 0.99 N/A 16.04% 
NJ -169583.487 No (0.36) 647963.1754 No (0.499) No 0.98 N/A 18.67% 
NM -563151.5041 Yes (0.019) 1324426.989 No (0.187) No 0.89 N/A 22.38% 
NV -906992.6312 No (0.445) 2645790.887 No (0.358) No 0.87 N/A 15.80% 
NY 645437.4567 Yes (0.028) -1487722.034 Yes (0.026) Yes 0.98 21.69% 23.61% 
OH -8381.494584 No (0.509) -254795.6662 No (0.346) No 0.97 N/A 20.79% 
OK -23669.54817 No (0.191) -83319.94806 No (0.285) No 0.95 N/A 18.10% 
OR -2088637.884 No (0.209) 4658714.844 No (0.372) No 0.83 N/A 20.51% 
PA -138842.6408 No (0.376) 487454.045 No (0.228) No 0.99 N/A 20.88% 
RI -248231.059 No (0.438) 581698.2953 No (0.496) No 0.98 N/A 21.15% 
SC 142044.8623 No (0.106) -412059.8511 No (0.343) No 0.99 N/A 23.56% 
SD -2312312.533 No (0.531) 6709302.953 No (0.336) No 0.97 N/A 16.28% 
TN 75838.96656 No (0.341) -281390.9323 No (0.427) No 0.99 N/A 18.98% 
TX 129094.7298 No (0.522) -572063.2486 No (0.567) No 0.96 N/A 15.36% 
US 863060.1587 Yes (0.007) -2577587.652 Yes (0.022) Yes 0.99 16.74% 19.18% 
UT -900402.9254 Yes (0.034) 2136917.343 Yes (0.012) No 0.94 N/A 19.54% 
VA 732689.8156 No (0.229) -2784063.181 No (0.118) No 0.99 N/A 14.69% 
VT -1328207.257 Yes (0.018) 3273737.164 Yes (0.021) No 0.98 N/A 22.46% 
WA -522350.1933 No (0.579) 1110961.297 No (0.215) No 0.92 N/A 20.56% 
WI -589807.8844 No (0.517) 1381650.892 No (0.536) No 0.96 N/A 19.88% 
WV -193646.7545 Yes (0.014) 506931.7777 Yes (0.005) No 0.98 N/A 22.83% 
WY 15909.90596 No (0.126) -80170.60152 No (0.592) No 0.84 N/A 20.62% 
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 Table 14 
Regression Results on Current Expenditure (1976-2000) 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? R-Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
AK 84101.61885 No (0.258) -618851.8674 No (0.308) No 0.63 N/A 21.80% 
AL -194243.5461 Yes (0.008) 529557.5792 Yes (0.029) No 1.00 N/A 19.27% 
AR -635251.9532 Yes (0.017) 2275991.853 Yes (0.033) No 0.99 N/A 17.86% 
AZ -77870.75952 No (0.25) -37556.96205 No (0.41) No 0.94 N/A 15.70% 
CA 582887.8964 No (0.169) -1896666.777 No (0.505) No 0.96 N/A 18.97% 
CO 646779.5163 No (0.589) -2902357.441 No (0.5) No 0.96 N/A 13.94% 
CT 676881.4841 No (0.426) -2588127.162 No (0.272) No 0.98 N/A 14.02% 
DC -2243436.787 No (0.376) 10104307.92 No (0.376) No 0.96 N/A 9.17% 
DE -2263414.615 Yes (0.009) 8738507.77 Yes (0.029) No 0.97 N/A 11.54% 
FL 492969.1452 Yes (0.02) -1811861.029 Yes (0.022) Yes 0.99 13.60% 16.86% 
GA 1266397.32 No (0.381) -5237280.714 No (0.328) No 0.99 N/A 14.40% 
HI 729312.125 No (0.57) -2487323.342 No (0.226) No 0.77 N/A 17.45% 
IA -634717.5972 No (0.212) 1693482.592 No (0.407) No 0.98 N/A 15.72% 
ID -1029491.948 Yes (0.022) 3523107.644 Yes (0.014) No 0.95 N/A 17.05% 
IL 625229.8205 No (0.116) -2395359.785 No (0.408) No 0.98 N/A 15.66% 
IN -428345.245 No (0.334) 1184790.39 No (0.217) No 0.98 N/A 15.84% 
KS -171543.1143 No (0.418) 248970.8719 No (0.335) No 0.99 N/A 15.77% 
KY -188574.5885 No (0.526) 432686.0804 No (0.211) No 0.97 N/A 17.59% 
LA 139378.9437 No (0.258) -573836.3237 Yes (0.017) Yes 0.87 12.14% 16.13% 
MA -1107165.133 Yes (0.039) 3439876.26 Yes (0.023) No 0.98 N/A 16.85% 
MD -357784.9732 No (0.432) 997933.6396 No (0.338) No 0.98 N/A 15.17% 
ME -307684.1826 No (0.398) 819842.8837 No (0.456) No 0.97 N/A 21.09% 
MI 155575.4004 No (0.349) -843628.8507 No (0.492) No 0.95 N/A 18.49% 
MN 623155.9641 No (0.478) -2195361.778 Yes (0.009) Yes 0.99 14.19% 16.32% 
MO -286822.5609 No (0.126) 1159017.457 No (0.398) No 0.97 N/A 15.43% 
MS -264141.4952 No (0.259) 660888.9863 No (0.555) No 0.99 N/A 22.92% 
MT -173229.3467 No (0.3) 345023.1864 No (0.515) No 0.95 N/A 18.79% 
NC -25450.10005 No (0.586) -145440.5986 No (0.383) No 0.98 N/A 15.25% 
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 State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? R-Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
ND -207123.5274 Yes (0.01) 406919.2988 No (0.193) No 0.96 N/A 16.48% 
NE 123548.6107 No (0.504) -669666.3395 No (0.272) No 0.99 N/A 16.83% 
NH -246677.8866 Yes (0.012) 804526.0564 Yes (0.013) No 0.99 N/A 14.57% 
NJ -405559.213 No (0.197) 1475587.735 No (0.36) No 0.98 N/A 16.82% 
NM -659509.3657 Yes (0.022) 1861121.317 Yes (0.03) No 0.89 N/A 20.04% 
NV -1390953.618 No (0.432) 4886392.83 No (0.43) No 0.89 N/A 12.89% 
NY 711154.2905 Yes (0.024) -1839318.007 Yes (0.033) Yes 0.98 19.33% 20.87% 
OH -159190.4808 No (0.305) 81440.86986 No (0.151) No 0.98 N/A 18.52% 
OK -54572.861 No (0.442) 5602.072567 No (0.168) No 0.96 N/A 16.15% 
OR -1815823.501 Yes (< 0.001) 4477814.229 Yes (0.023) No 0.89 N/A 18.35% 
PA 94328.52953 No (0.557) -197422.2292 No (0.199) No 0.98 N/A 18.81% 
RI -370584.3548 Yes (0.011) 916751.088 Yes (0.009) No 0.99 N/A 19.83% 
SC 201453.3559 No (0.409) -656735.3864 No (0.425) No 0.99 N/A 20.64% 
SD -865212.1534 No (0.138) 2648453.78 No (0.376) No 0.97 N/A 13.67% 
TN -1324936.845 No (0.152) 4198573.676 No (0.479) No 0.99 N/A 17.36% 
TX 161366.8067 No (0.397) -880515.427 No (0.149) No 0.97 N/A 12.97% 
US 828824.649 Yes (0.023) -2835554.437 Yes (0.016) Yes 0.99 14.61% 16.94% 
UT 3309.863022 No (0.506) -252343.4548 No (0.293) No 0.96 N/A 16.93% 
VA 1523541.005 No (0.562) -6650408.27 No (0.146) No 0.99 N/A 13.02% 
VT -1532164.377 Yes (0.013) 4165219.049 Yes (0.002) No 0.98 N/A 20.79% 
WA -282452.9373 No (0.564) 421627.6238 No (0.54) No 0.97 N/A 17.24% 
WI -990405.5836 No (0.191) 2619534.669 No (0.207) No 0.97 N/A 17.90% 
WV -293027.0275 Yes (0.009) 770613.5152 Yes (0.017) No 0.99 N/A 20.55% 
WY 7420.679522 No (0.573) -40920.30415 No (0.59) No 0.83 N/A 17.12% 
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 Table 15 
Regression Results on Capital Outlays (1976-2000) 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? R-Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
AK -3014959.403 Yes (0.025) 32583779.9 Yes (0.027) No 0.53 N/A 3.65% 
AL 98101.20424 No (0.316) -1980112.325 No (0.524) No 0.99 N/A 2.69% 
AR 14902.47798 No (0.297) 838408.87 No (0.577) No 0.99 N/A 1.94% 
AZ 85143.06327 No (0.476) -1762381.762 No (0.323) No 0.85 N/A 2.81% 
CA 524117.3212 No (0.447) -15468639.12 No (0.559) No 0.95 N/A 2.35% 
CO -3023341.018 Yes (0.02) 51510980.25 No (0.295) No 0.92 N/A 2.42% 
CT -439985.0953 No (0.294) 21896328.8 No (0.215) No 0.99 N/A 1.31% 
DC 226323.5935 No (0.475) -2498511.485 No (0.375) No 0.96 N/A 1.56% 
DE -2087736.36 No (0.552) 58599293.27 No (0.432) No 0.96 N/A 1.85% 
FL -252878.2023 No (0.593) 6103122.632 No (0.197) No 0.98 N/A 2.77% 
GA 906512.9953 No (0.124) -18464041.55 No (0.509) No 0.97 N/A 2.04% 
HI 182021.531 No (0.28) -76222.60832 No (0.331) No 0.95 N/A 1.79% 
IA 599335.0511 No (0.586) -8673712.266 No (0.315) No 0.95 N/A 2.54% 
ID -2494922.84 No (0.486) 46036529.5 No (0.15) No 0.94 N/A 2.37% 
IL -2273830.709 No (0.185) 62033199.42 No (0.306) No 0.98 N/A 1.93% 
IN -2799512.774 No (0.265) 84335054.58 No (0.549) No 0.95 N/A 1.95% 
KS 175106.4619 No (0.363) -3378697.04 No (0.286) No 0.96 N/A 2.23% 
KY 183688.6169 No (0.296) -2662976.97 No (0.179) No 0.97 N/A 1.86% 
LA -238880.1156 No (0.538) 5303426.013 No (0.424) No 0.80 N/A 1.94% 
MA -1875643.762 No (0.346) 46537917.17 No (0.252) No 0.97 N/A 1.68% 
MD 514723.1964 No (0.468) -8905633.963 No (0.41) No 0.97 N/A 1.75% 
ME 81914.00514 No (0.425) 665141.8436 No (0.121) No 0.98 N/A 1.64% 
MI -1060358.863 No (0.474) 34144185.86 No (0.155) No 0.93 N/A 1.92% 
MN -1798817.723 No (0.503) 32956031.05 No (0.423) No 0.96 N/A 2.23% 
MO -1637412.756 No (0.202) 46474779.77 No (0.103) No 0.97 N/A 1.86% 
MS -260995.9612 No (0.461) 5904080.626 No (0.472) No 0.99 N/A 2.20% 
MT 696262.3161 No (0.156) -12306669.9 No (0.374) No 0.81 N/A 2.64% 
NC -673414.5798 No (0.451) 17494808.52 No (0.214) No 0.98 N/A 2.07% 
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 State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? R-Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
ND -1678193.064 No (0.56) 28458795.94 No (0.492) No 0.83 N/A 2.75% 
NE 220486.595 No (0.121) -1683541.176 No (0.565) No 0.99 N/A 3.01% 
NH -39878.64925 No (0.336) 2395835.14 No (0.489) No 0.98 N/A 1.47% 
NJ -40772.64148 No (0.428) 7546599.129 No (0.556) No 0.98 N/A 1.85% 
NM 1617150.352 No (0.276) -33974178.51 No (0.347) No 0.86 N/A 2.34% 
NV -1364166.95 No (0.135) 25276226.02 No (0.203) No 0.86 N/A 2.91% 
NY 594565.4538 No (0.254) -9780607.929 No (0.127) No 0.98 N/A 2.73% 
OH -2944093.111 Yes (0.005) 83190241.57 Yes (0.027) No 0.97 N/A 2.27% 
OK 999891.4246 No (0.382) -21479500.64 No (0.574) No 0.88 N/A 1.95% 
OR 1936091.837 No (0.591) -30272334.3 No (0.559) No 0.87 N/A 2.15% 
PA -151485.4332 No (0.246) 7119613.326 No (0.116) No 0.99 N/A 2.07% 
RI 86709.21249 No (0.415) 399033.3996 No (0.239) No 0.98 N/A 1.32% 
SC 50602.53777 No (0.163) -810482.6951 No (0.522) No 0.99 N/A 2.93% 
SD 543303.4176 No (0.338) -7321265.191 No (0.437) No 0.97 N/A 2.61% 
TN -459111.5024 No (0.356) 9616515.1 No (0.314) No 0.99 N/A 1.62% 
TX 310778.2158 No (0.167) -5732890.473 No (0.417) No 0.96 N/A 2.38% 
US -1752691.601 No (0.129) 42168408.6 No (0.128) No 0.99 N/A 2.24% 
UT 409390.3604 Yes (0.003) -3897316.581 Yes (< 0.001) Yes 0.91 5.25% 2.62% 
VA -173439.8636 No (0.288) 4393995.634 No (0.465) No 0.98 N/A 1.67% 
VT -9661.060008 No (0.347) -1776407.03 No (0.586) No 0.97 N/A 1.67% 
WA -134876.7282 No (0.157) 2376683.12 No (0.487) No 0.90 N/A 3.33% 
WI -820678.9368 No (0.342) 24224171.75 No (0.482) No 0.95 N/A 1.99% 
WV 69575.00284 No (0.234) 60843.07549 No (0.138) No 0.98 N/A 2.28% 
WY -565060.553 No (0.1) 6508072.785 No (0.397) No 0.88 N/A 3.51% 
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 Table 16 
Regression Results on Total Education Expenditure (1976-2000) 
 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
AK -935984.7951 No (0.256) 1403359.473 No (0.183) No 0.84 N/A 5.99% 
AL -381153.7462 No (0.514) 3330037.174 No (0.146) No 0.99 N/A 6.53% 
AR -709212.287 No (0.18) 6636893.661 No (0.45) No 0.99 N/A 6.76% 
AZ -2352712.624 Yes (0.008) 18479725.43 Yes (0.029) No 0.94 N/A 5.12% 
CA -1307727.545 No (0.512) 14005007.86 No (0.245) No 0.96 N/A 5.48% 
CO -4081584.314 Yes (0.015) 35547328.13 Yes (0.02) No 0.96 N/A 4.72% 
CT -1444426.377 No (0.439) 19016211.38 No (0.244) No 0.98 N/A 4.72% 
DC 2576050.399 No (0.214) -51221035.49 No (0.207) No 0.96 N/A 1.70% 
DE -3885236.243 Yes (0.019) 37562699.48 Yes (0.016) No 0.98 N/A 4.29% 
FL -1149233.353 No (0.577) 11806981.68 No (0.35) No 0.98 N/A 4.81% 
GA -809233.0085 No (0.544) 8368901.465 No (0.328) No 0.97 N/A 5.56% 
HI -1345473.213 No (0.323) 15645344.68 No (0.434) No 0.74 N/A 4.84% 
IA -2619589.811 No (0.423) 20149083.78 No (0.514) No 0.96 N/A 6.17% 
ID -1826599.67 No (0.175) 15792798.48 No (0.226) No 0.93 N/A 6.05% 
IL -2656500.362 No (0.255) 30997619.25 No (0.255) No 0.99 N/A 5.14% 
IN -598323.6207 No (0.179) 3607363.893 No (0.349) No 0.96 N/A 6.18% 
KS 186045.9136 No (0.332) -3084776.992 No (0.519) No 0.98 N/A 5.98% 
KY 534651.3663 No (0.414) -5997675.311 No (0.415) No 0.97 N/A 5.95% 
LA 555407.7578 No (0.15) -7397428.49 No (0.201) No 0.85 N/A 4.98% 
MA -1677992.256 Yes (0.005) 18538074.25 Yes (0.031) No 0.97 N/A 5.01% 
MD -988288.301 No (0.458) 8257187.534 No (0.203) No 0.98 N/A 5.54% 
ME -761990.38 No (0.161) 7295324.794 No (0.557) No 0.98 N/A 6.38% 
MI -301259.7228 No (0.294) 1768196.305 No (0.472) No 0.92 N/A 7.30% 
MN -2717120.722 No (0.31) 22175989.28 No (0.223) No 0.97 N/A 5.27% 
MO -1862349.858 No (0.231) 20993111.77 No (0.291) No 0.97 N/A 5.24% 
MS -199190.8912 No (0.219) 1363624.03 No (0.367) No 0.99 N/A 7.35% 
MT -358343.6009 No (0.549) 1948695.463 No (0.53) No 0.87 N/A 6.65% 
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 State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
NC -6719552.506 No (0.471) 65173638.22 No (0.225) No 0.98 N/A 5.33% 
ND -44663.51621 No (0.357) -1243923.78 No (0.587) No 0.97 N/A 6.42% 
NE 513137.5379 No (0.515) -6861173.165 No (0.483) No 0.98 N/A 5.72% 
NH -1274554.134 Yes (0.018) 13756466.09 Yes (0.005) No 0.99 N/A 5.35% 
NJ -1310766.116 No (0.252) 13121838.87 No (0.29) No 0.98 N/A 6.22% 
NM -204706.5153 No (0.32) 434567.69 No (0.463) No 0.83 N/A 7.00% 
NV 2835174.892 No (0.56) -38611309.06 Yes (0.021) Yes 0.90 3.67% 4.07% 
NY -303501.5291 No (0.513) 3249555.276 No (0.496) No 0.98 N/A 5.60% 
OH -595389.2933 No (0.321) 4970233.582 No (0.321) No 0.95 N/A 6.22% 
OK -889167.3914 Yes (0.024) 7280257.476 Yes (0.027) No 0.94 N/A 6.22% 
OR -5311473.566 No (0.133) 38320110.15 No (0.187) No 0.89 N/A 5.56% 
PA -1115248.85 Yes (0.027) 11659345.62 Yes (0.027) No 0.99 N/A 6.21% 
RI -1942179.968 No (0.564) 17393417.52 No (0.25) No 0.98 N/A 5.77% 
SC -513875.624 No (0.184) 4679422.457 No (0.106) No 0.99 N/A 6.97% 
SD -564580.5504 No (0.369) 4799416.536 No (0.565) No 0.97 N/A 4.98% 
TN -2395321.32 No (0.284) 27384754.56 No (0.186) No 0.99 N/A 4.60% 
TX -589865.3088 No (0.212) 6900672.577 No (0.288) No 0.96 N/A 5.34% 
US -4302038.01 Yes (0.029) 42987048.87 Yes (0.009) No 0.99 N/A 5.57% 
UT -8575513.5 Yes (0.023) 61920379.53 Yes (0.022) No 0.93 N/A 6.25% 
VA -5382588.095 Yes (0.029) 54934714.05 Yes (0.022) No 0.99 N/A 5.01% 
VT -101304.8516 No (0.404) 1147172.951 No (0.193) No 0.97 N/A 8.26% 
WA 2494245.273 No (0.424) -23427172.48 No (0.284) No 0.91 N/A 5.35% 
WI -737337.0833 No (0.428) 4843323.545 No (0.295) No 0.95 N/A 6.36% 
WV -880321.3111 Yes (0.02) 6681557.413 Yes (0.032) No 0.99 N/A 7.38% 
WY -98224.15771 No (0.508) 639860.3904 No (0.472) No 0.84 N/A 5.77% 
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 Table 17 
Regression Results on Secondary Education Expenditure (1976-2000) 
 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
AK -1051071.432 No (0.333) 1427835.065 No (0.589) No 0.82 N/A 4.39% 
AL -521084.8817 Yes (0.026) 7538909.272 Yes (0.026) No 1.00 N/A 3.84% 
AR -809527.253 No (0.378) 11616651.69 No (0.167) No 0.99 N/A 4.42% 
AZ -3813898.94 Yes (< 0.001) 46868879.36 Yes (0.035) No 0.93 N/A 3.27% 
CA -1976720.004 Yes (0.02) 31290863.1 Yes (0.021) No 0.96 N/A 3.82% 
CO -6636655.269 Yes (0.021) 87044074.78 Yes (0.002) No 0.96 N/A 3.23% 
CT -1056027.834 No (0.416) 18795175.02 No (0.384) No 0.98 N/A 3.50% 
DC 3527275.771 No (0.503) -93970289.79 No (0.569) No 0.96 N/A 1.58% 
DE -5457194.382 Yes (0.027) 90556918.93 Yes (0.025) No 0.98 N/A 2.56% 
FL -531700.5804 No (0.191) 7335884.366 No (0.426) No 0.98 N/A 3.50% 
GA 1435022.836 No (0.566) -24045685.35 No (0.521) No 0.97 N/A 3.96% 
HI -1298534.31 No (0.519) 24342697.6 No (0.588) No 0.73 N/A 3.16% 
IA -4766934.688 No (0.578) 61205089.59 No (0.537) No 0.95 N/A 3.72% 
ID -2099132.843 No (0.55) 27985371.48 No (0.438) No 0.93 N/A 3.88% 
IL -3280974.585 Yes (0.013) 54725948.62 Yes (0.026) No 0.99 N/A 3.57% 
IN -788308.4775 No (0.251) 6604476.647 No (0.128) No 0.96 N/A 4.08% 
KS 324459.1856 No (0.541) -7826175.455 No (0.536) No 0.98 N/A 3.61% 
KY 40569.17508 No (0.551) -934401.8609 No (0.155) No 0.97 N/A 3.57% 
LA 1003560.605 No (0.38) -19077996.95 Yes (0.027) Yes 0.86 2.63% 3.26% 
MA -1535627.716 Yes (0.015) 21391495.65 Yes (< 0.001) No 0.97 N/A 3.44% 
MD -653763.0025 No (0.266) 7268016.267 No (0.27) No 0.98 N/A 3.67% 
ME -859998.3933 No (0.138) 11076724.2 No (0.534) No 0.98 N/A 4.57% 
MI -825672.1788 No (0.424) 8969007.751 No (0.355) No 0.91 N/A 4.98% 
MN -891518.2795 No (0.405) 8421954.482 No (0.481) No 0.97 N/A 3.62% 
MO -415650.1532 No (0.518) 4740371.636 No (0.599) No 0.97 N/A 3.65% 
MS -117485.9728 No (0.137) 993296.2653 No (0.414) No 0.99 N/A 4.44% 
MT 158941.8463 No (0.437) -3310528.455 No (0.238) No 0.91 N/A 4.18% 
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 State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
NC -1683314.324 No (0.409) 25206378.49 No (0.355) No 0.98 N/A 3.06% 
ND -72376.78558 No (0.146) -3317845.742 No (0.593) No 0.95 N/A 3.67% 
NE -1683420.105 No (0.207) 19361482.14 No (0.191) No 0.98 N/A 3.60% 
NH -2026763.696 Yes (0.005) 30660745.53 Yes (0.026) No 0.98 N/A 3.94% 
NJ -1593763.315 No (0.217) 20401807.98 No (0.336) No 0.98 N/A 4.90% 
NM 2383080.549 No (0.105) -33219155.24 No (0.411) No 0.84 N/A 4.26% 
NV 896045.9316 No (0.389) -18955012.48 No (0.563) No 0.88 N/A 2.99% 
NY 1019079.065 No (0.596) -12263349.31 No (0.411) No 0.98 N/A 4.41% 
OH -324737.7545 No (0.543) 2469488.173 No (0.175) No 0.95 N/A 4.32% 
OK -625916.5913 No (0.482) 5898357.695 No (0.533) No 0.95 N/A 3.87% 
OR -5294082.693 No (0.299) 54926616.97 No (0.457) No 0.93 N/A 3.45% 
PA -1215209.759 No (0.181) 16839650.06 No (0.229) No 0.98 N/A 4.27% 
RI -116177.4434 No (0.264) 948794.2066 No (0.154) No 0.98 N/A 4.22% 
SC -82679.06227 No (0.565) 1848592.296 No (0.253) No 0.99 N/A 4.56% 
SD -3413537.901 No (0.535) 41873975.96 No (0.234) No 0.97 N/A 3.34% 
TN -2651711.631 No (0.155) 47628128.04 No (0.586) No 0.99 N/A 3.11% 
TX -792524.7087 No (0.491) 13304341.39 No (0.313) No 0.96 N/A 3.66% 
US -5326562.233 Yes (0.014) 76639516.78 Yes (0.006) No 0.99 N/A 3.83% 
UT -7614300.512 Yes (0.004) 88432215.37 Yes (0.028) No 0.96 N/A 3.52% 
VA -5888653.125 Yes (0.021) 88557099.11 Yes (0.03) No 0.99 N/A 3.44% 
VT 738134.0587 No (0.352) -7480616.985 No (0.21) No 0.97 N/A 5.22% 
WA 1870466.304 No (0.505) -27354708.45 No (0.266) No 0.91 N/A 3.33% 
WI -4451766.824 No (0.166) 52182817.74 No (0.595) No 0.95 N/A 4.13% 
WV -1370891.106 Yes (0.017) 14832408.3 Yes (0.013) No 0.98 N/A 4.60% 
WY -113767.1519 No (0.199) 713231.6 No (0.224) No 0.84 N/A 3.76% 
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 Table 18 
Regression Results on Higher Education Expenditure (1976-2000) 
 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
AK -16320425.4 No (0.197) 546084633.9 No (0.436) No 0.71 N/A 1.39% 
AL -439091.6788 No (0.148) 8647597.14 No (0.25) No 1.00 N/A 2.31% 
AR 37526.26799 No (0.478) -104861.195 No (0.57) No 0.98 N/A 1.96% 
AZ -2473710.487 No (0.321) 56508318.4 No (0.544) No 0.89 N/A 1.62% 
CA 4614371.788 Yes (0.026) -148288504 Yes (0.02) Yes 0.97 1.56% 1.44% 
CO -6145996.356 No (0.428) 172358911.9 No (0.207) No 0.92 N/A 1.36% 
CT -33121088.06 No (0.566) 2316263167 No (0.259) No 0.98 N/A 1.01% 
DC 1601568.299 No (0.203) 479861163.6 No (0.469) No 0.97 N/A 0.12% 
DE -4553767.542 No (0.181) 103531776.8 No (0.582) No 0.97 N/A 1.44% 
FL -1041468.976 No (0.356) 45631884.04 No (0.381) No 0.98 N/A 1.07% 
GA -6114275.126 No (0.187) 296544137.4 No (0.129) No 0.97 N/A 1.24% 
HI -2501563.783 No (0.528) 81622528.92 No (0.288) No 0.74 N/A 1.61% 
IA -4739580.645 Yes (0.028) 103180991.8 Yes (0.01) No 0.97 N/A 2.15% 
ID -659355.5175 No (0.309) 10694030.27 No (0.2) No 0.93 N/A 1.88% 
IL -3698317.716 No (0.587) 167136031.6 No (0.208) No 0.98 N/A 1.33% 
IN -5385076.383 Yes (0.028) 156901715.3 No (0.164) No 0.96 N/A 1.79% 
KS -1654249.315 No (0.511) 39442482.93 No (0.342) No 0.97 N/A 2.17% 
KY 1646902.96 No (0.196) -57877029.78 No (0.137) No 0.97 N/A 1.85% 
LA 2049890.257 No (0.225) -101594783.1 No (0.51) No 0.84 N/A 1.32% 
MA -8816443.061 No (0.567) 738173506.9 No (0.181) No 0.98 N/A 0.97% 
MD -9134860.232 Yes (0.011) 311132842.2 Yes (0.01) No 0.99 N/A 1.58% 
ME 2966262.867 No (0.359) -99834368.35 No (0.589) No 0.97 N/A 1.49% 
MI -4100438.661 No (0.294) 104768941.1 No (0.243) No 0.93 N/A 2.12% 
MN -5934393.604 No (0.242) 188634743.6 No (0.257) No 0.96 N/A 1.35% 
MO -2796286.892 No (0.404) 147846603.8 No (0.235) No 0.98 N/A 1.35% 
MS -357228.9738 No (0.294) 8417964.488 No (0.517) No 0.99 N/A 2.54% 
MT -1138472.25 Yes (0.032) 34325043.74 Yes (0.023) No 0.86 N/A 2.05% 
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 State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
NC -30458700.15 Yes (< 0.001) 904731523.4 Yes (0.037) No 0.98 N/A 2.11% 
ND -670413.7538 No (0.139) 4831750.523 No (0.273) No 0.96 N/A 2.54% 
NE -5978255.939 Yes (0.016) 163410212 Yes (0.038) No 0.98 N/A 1.91% 
NH -2318209.663 Yes (0.012) 97846471.73 Yes (0.013) No 0.99 N/A 1.24% 
NJ 22008329.86 No (0.505) -1197907558 No (0.305) No 0.98 N/A 1.12% 
NM -2545472.043 No (0.58) 50625779.71 No (0.206) No 0.85 N/A 2.45% 
NV 18384801.86 Yes (0.02) -1007038255 Yes (0.032) Yes 0.95 0.91% 0.96% 
NY -7647432.554 No (0.525) 404203088.9 No (0.5) No 0.98 N/A 0.98% 
OH -4254883.786 No (0.417) 142051637.4 No (0.485) No 0.96 N/A 1.53% 
OK -4972662.879 Yes (< 0.001) 150220105.8 Yes (0.024) No 0.93 N/A 2.06% 
OR -18901066.69 No (0.397) 529990867.8 No (0.143) No 0.78 N/A 1.92% 
PA 5094.550753 No (0.349) 7301416.254 No (0.472) No 0.98 N/A 1.35% 
RI -4399566.563 No (0.102) 156150964.4 No (0.443) No 0.98 N/A 1.18% 
SC 1498209.806 No (0.418) -50949485.75 No (0.329) No 0.99 N/A 1.86% 
SD 1710055.39 No (0.351) -42458631.03 No (0.325) No 0.98 N/A 1.39% 
TN 6504286.149 Yes (0.029) -266095315.5 Yes (0.011) Yes 0.99 1.22% 1.22% 
TX -570539.3159 No (0.392) 25119457.82 No (0.284) No 0.96 N/A 1.51% 
US -6943771.38 No (0.498) 275951658.1 No (0.502) No 0.98 N/A 1.47% 
UT -1765027.282 No (0.35) 36533406.97 No (0.133) No 0.88 N/A 2.47% 
VA 14911738.62 No (0.519) -562910845.1 No (0.188) No 0.98 N/A 1.39% 
VT -8494651.647 No (0.303) 195685703.8 No (0.294) No 0.97 N/A 2.54% 
WA -13097659.71 Yes (0.036) 397043442.4 Yes (0.025) No 0.92 N/A 1.67% 
WI -15244487.41 Yes (0.037) 393897333.5 No (0.115) No 0.96 N/A 2.02% 
WV -913515.6233 Yes (0.005) 30212624.43 Yes (0.008) No 0.98 N/A 2.07% 
WY -790206.6002 No (0.179) 26619458.53 No (0.296) No 0.84 N/A 1.74% 
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 Table 19 
Regression Results on Public Welfare Expenditure (1976-2000) 
 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
AK -3334665.225 Yes (0.021) 34868352.23 No (0.183) No 0.80 N/A 3.50% 
AL -199422.593 Yes (0.024) 4594576.011 Yes (0.021) No 1.00 N/A 3.33% 
AR -751003.8687 Yes (0.007) 16927711.96 Yes (0.007) No 0.99 N/A 3.80% 
AZ -713590.3584 Yes (0.029) 12451387.76 Yes (0.016) No 0.95 N/A 2.78% 
CA 1557974.674 No (0.383) -40523021.84 No (0.21) No 0.97 N/A 2.74% 
CO 129052.2676 No (0.181) -15842180.04 No (0.375) No 0.92 N/A 1.51% 
CT -902921.7257 No (0.259) 11528719.54 No (0.393) No 0.99 N/A 2.25% 
DC 5332947.19 No (0.596) -137247708.7 No (0.164) No 0.96 N/A 2.13% 
DE 1260796.891 No (0.506) -54156036.35 No (0.34) No 0.96 N/A 1.98% 
FL 64169.90821 No (0.545) -6810496.925 No (0.224) No 0.99 N/A 2.65% 
GA -248351.6788 No (0.575) 1941998.514 No (0.481) No 0.98 N/A 2.46% 
HI 1607079.991 No (0.476) -48245817.95 No (0.355) No 0.79 N/A 2.63% 
IA -2775741.477 Yes (0.017) 56511713.48 Yes (0.024) No 0.97 N/A 2.75% 
ID -1862094.851 Yes (0.004) 64513789.87 Yes (0.029) No 0.98 N/A 3.06% 
IL 2720315.096 Yes (0.024) -71780514.02 Yes (0.008) Yes 0.99 1.89% 2.37% 
IN -2080003.227 Yes (0.017) 43576627.1 Yes (0.002) No 0.99 N/A 2.54% 
KS 619280.9574 No (0.549) -27139326.24 No (0.164) No 0.98 N/A 2.63% 
KY -156928.9023 No (0.134) 2594563.085 No (0.213) No 0.97 N/A 3.91% 
LA -329373.7956 No (0.457) 5455834.668 No (0.186) No 0.84 N/A 2.49% 
MA -1614707.246 No (0.165) 26355581.28 No (0.406) No 0.97 N/A 3.37% 
MD -1914897.457 No (0.508) 41903613.16 No (0.101) No 0.98 N/A 2.44% 
ME -824404.511 Yes (0.012) 8613654.834 Yes (0.027) No 0.99 N/A 5.20% 
MI -2283115.637 No (0.186) 40248444.85 No (0.104) No 0.93 N/A 2.70% 
MN -383277.9742 No (0.218) 1483555.311 No (0.3) No 0.97 N/A 3.93% 
MO -482985.4052 No (0.215) 10889777.83 No (0.456) No 0.97 N/A 2.95% 
MS -196296.6765 No (0.158) 3808017.082 No (0.569) No 0.99 N/A 5.10% 
MT -1050120.887 Yes (0.04) 19195320.69 Yes (0.015) No 0.94 N/A 2.69% 
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 State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
NC -844989.8132 Yes (0.012) 25471613.5 Yes (0.017) No 0.98 N/A 2.75% 
ND -919009.1706 Yes (0.036) 14049765.42 Yes (0.024) No 0.94 N/A 2.86% 
NE -1438139.452 Yes (0.009) 34954128.77 Yes (0.024) No 0.99 N/A 2.80% 
NH -224429.6297 Yes (< 0.001) 3245647.268 No (0.365) No 0.98 N/A 3.00% 
NJ 196586.3104 No (0.169) -3920246.312 No (0.129) No 0.98 N/A 2.62% 
NM -620717.455 No (0.473) 25294348.69 Yes (0.02) No 0.94 N/A 4.53% 
NV -3196808.943 No (0.42) 154581154.7 No (0.397) No 0.87 N/A 1.49% 
NY 1352580.724 Yes (0.004) -20659489.45 Yes (0.014) Yes 0.99 3.27% 4.44% 
OH -688901.3065 No (0.466) 7235369.524 No (0.236) No 0.98 N/A 3.46% 
OK -142542.8698 No (0.504) 555797.6307 No (0.593) No 0.92 N/A 3.10% 
OR -1178570.439 No (0.231) 42012204.41 No (0.384) No 0.86 N/A 2.68% 
PA 704569.4723 Yes (0.008) -11800679.44 No (0.513) No 0.99 N/A 4.20% 
RI -1454619.967 Yes (0.028) 21420095.24 Yes (0.019) No 0.99 N/A 4.77% 
SC -76427.137 No (0.437) 1614249.163 No (0.187) No 0.99 N/A 3.71% 
SD -494103.5578 No (0.592) 16925541.2 No (0.305) No 0.97 N/A 2.44% 
TN -4185.292504 No (0.534) 1517836.273 No (0.224) No 0.99 N/A 3.84% 
TX -11335.5254 No (0.251) -2262084.953 No (0.55) No 0.96 N/A 1.96% 
US 1611861.062 Yes (0.023) -39299364.61 Yes (0.027) Yes 0.99 2.05% 2.93% 
UT -3058260.946 Yes (0.018) 87352381.06 Yes (0.031) No 0.91 N/A 2.52% 
VA 540461.2749 No (0.52) -29190222.98 No (0.247) No 0.99 N/A 1.92% 
VT -221640.0482 No (0.24) 2051050.514 No (0.477) No 0.98 N/A 4.90% 
WA -902405.2537 No (0.476) 17933285.74 No (0.334) No 0.91 N/A 2.49% 
WI 331129.4193 No (0.472) -13592014.98 No (0.125) No 0.98 N/A 3.23% 
WV -136597.1127 No (0.189) 2863570.465 Yes (0.006) No 0.99 N/A 4.41% 
WY 490145.5706 No (0.515) -23723531.16 No (0.254) No 0.85 N/A 2.03% 
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 Table 20 
Regression Results on Financial Administration Expenditure (1976-2000) 
 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
AK -5398156.218 No (0.133) 95944290.07 No (0.116) No 0.69 N/A 0.57% 
AL -522780.9071 No (0.4) 64354139.68 No (0.346) No 0.99 N/A 0.28% 
AR -2635548.261 No (0.332) 250950750.5 Yes (0.008) No 0.99 N/A 0.50% 
AZ 2002897.566 No (0.333) -167848641.1 No (0.518) No 0.91 N/A 0.31% 
CA -222303.193 No (0.502) 44365603.94 No (0.11) No 0.95 N/A 0.37% 
CO -8068534.161 No (0.124) 458214969.9 No (0.446) No 0.93 N/A 0.29% 
CT 11132711.35 Yes (0.044) -731624940 Yes (0.018) Yes 0.98 0.76% 0.28% 
DC 5939499.584 No (0.357) -895551186.7 No (0.388) No 0.97 N/A 0.23% 
DE -15453031.39 No (0.372) 902460849.6 No (0.251) No 0.97 N/A 0.39% 
FL 4152231.091 Yes (0.026) -286185436.5 Yes (0.012) Yes 0.98 0.73% 0.40% 
GA -10779958.82 No (0.158) 1088678006 No (0.152) No 0.97 N/A 0.20% 
HI -11512672.68 No (0.36) 772756562 No (0.453) No 0.81 N/A 0.24% 
IA -15683167.33 Yes (0.016) 1051263116 Yes (0.014) No 0.98 N/A 0.27% 
ID -4434312.241 No (0.164) 295358662.2 No (0.554) No 0.96 N/A 0.46% 
IL -6943486.199 No (0.522) 668822695.5 Yes (0.012) No 0.99 N/A 0.28% 
IN -8914479.534 Yes (0.018) 634787494 Yes (0.026) No 0.99 N/A 0.29% 
KS -3513498.405 Yes (< 0.001) 211259617.3 Yes (0.017) No 0.97 N/A 0.26% 
KY -2481854.54 No (0.113) 183069018 No (0.189) No 0.97 N/A 0.28% 
LA 884886.4916 No (0.118) -126798258.4 No (0.14) No 0.84 N/A 0.31% 
MA -9004672.36 No (0.307) 752485677.2 No (0.3) No 0.97 N/A 0.24% 
MD 14147743.23 Yes (0.008) -1136723260 Yes (0.01) Yes 0.98 0.62% 0.28% 
ME -2823985.589 No (0.466) 191335604.8 No (0.366) No 0.97 N/A 0.42% 
MI -2291820.747 No (0.396) -21137401.63 No (0.237) No 0.95 N/A 0.25% 
MN -1694470.299 No (0.458) -49925554.91 No (0.439) No 0.99 N/A 0.25% 
MO -4978843.189 No (0.159) 575887091.1 No (0.517) No 0.97 N/A 0.24% 
MS -1535508.911 No (0.277) 122412033.1 No (0.257) No 0.99 N/A 0.32% 
MT -4784207.302 Yes (0.013) 225110348.4 Yes (0.003) No 0.92 N/A 0.60% 
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 State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
NC 11500773.52 No (0.174) -1372215571 No (0.229) No 0.99 N/A 0.15% 
ND -6660577.577 Yes (0.029) 427431699.9 Yes (0.037) No 0.88 N/A 0.38% 
NE -22316777.54 No (0.526) 1898239503 No (0.581) No 0.98 N/A 0.26% 
NH -5129782.188 No (0.344) 396031676.5 No (0.52) No 0.98 N/A 0.23% 
NJ 18507454.08 No (0.413) -1418751317 No (0.377) No 0.98 N/A 0.24% 
NM -10438657.48 No (0.347) 532288323 No (0.242) No 0.87 N/A 0.42% 
NV 8718844.378 No (0.293) -470210288 No (0.416) No 0.85 N/A 0.26% 
NY -1616716.733 No (0.389) 115857984.9 No (0.505) No 0.98 N/A 0.29% 
OH -9984570.655 Yes (0.013) 663475618.1 Yes (0.023) No 0.98 N/A 0.46% 
OK -2022155.211 Yes (< 0.001) 64570151.07 No (0.141) No 0.97 N/A 0.28% 
OR -20177648.62 No (0.551) 898709310.1 No (0.123) No 0.82 N/A 0.47% 
PA -11831793.84 Yes (0.028) 959424571.7 Yes (0.013) No 0.99 N/A 0.26% 
RI 3077194.701 No (0.566) -149093003.9 No (0.191) No 0.98 N/A 0.41% 
SC -1683082.508 No (0.401) 122719589.1 No (0.286) No 0.99 N/A 0.54% 
SD 2280862.641 No (0.158) -100072015.5 No (0.11) No 0.97 N/A 0.34% 
TN -7826406.215 No (0.322) 784683853.6 No (0.317) No 0.99 N/A 0.22% 
TX 340987.4681 No (0.224) -153450121.8 No (0.133) No 0.97 N/A 0.17% 
US -3865767.838 No (0.264) 212746224.5 No (0.372) No 0.99 N/A 0.30% 
UT -12537011.44 Yes (0.011) 772023589.9 Yes (0.011) No 0.95 N/A 0.42% 
VA 1641666.011 No (0.207) -89651811.52 No (0.141) No 0.98 N/A 0.26% 
VT -7557862.713 No (0.573) 398760653.9 No (0.105) No 0.98 N/A 0.33% 
WA -8594997.819 No (0.171) 450065959.3 No (0.139) No 0.98 N/A 0.24% 
WI -11902046.75 No (0.147) 928312318.8 No (0.434) No 0.95 N/A 0.22% 
WV -1437065.446 Yes (0.014) 87276923.58 Yes (0.029) No 0.98 N/A 0.62% 
WY 425118.8254 No (0.183) -39348519.54 No (0.168) No 0.84 N/A 0.32% 
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 Table 21 
Regression Results on Health and Hospital Expenditure (1976-2000) 
 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
AK -4779686.873 No (0.551) 97812875.69 No (0.265) No 0.59 N/A 0.76% 
AL -110385.0533 No (0.372) 316000.142 No (0.3) No 1.00 N/A 3.37% 
AR -2489705.693 Yes (0.025) 91591659.84 Yes (0.018) No 0.99 N/A 1.32% 
AZ -6894091.471 Yes (0.035) 391620150.1 Yes (0.03) No 0.90 N/A 1.06% 
CA 2770219.343 No (0.179) -114867546.8 No (0.344) No 0.97 N/A 1.58% 
CO -4405347.383 No (0.226) 157092387.4 No (0.479) No 0.96 N/A 1.11% 
CT 15668398.61 Yes (0.003) -816557802.2 Yes (0.006) Yes 0.99 0.96% 0.91% 
DC -6871759.695 No (0.591) 364648049.6 No (0.464) No 0.97 N/A 0.77% 
DE 7341279.943 No (0.505) -562506699.5 No (0.492) No 0.96 N/A 0.65% 
FL 1843405.917 No (0.402) -74328052.03 No (0.163) No 0.99 N/A 1.40% 
GA -811056.3135 No (0.261) 14438544.99 No (0.536) No 0.98 N/A 1.39% 
HI 7691881.2 Yes (0.019) -310203766 Yes (0.019) Yes 0.84 1.24% 1.52% 
IA -1536471.341 No (0.416) 32969901.15 No (0.397) No 0.96 N/A 1.89% 
ID -6346934.445 Yes (0.016) 201727806.6 Yes (0.034) No 0.95 N/A 1.71% 
IL -6868274.591 No (0.12) 422022618.1 No (0.38) No 0.98 N/A 0.96% 
IN -6463343.457 Yes (0.032) 202880281.4 Yes (0.006) No 0.98 N/A 1.53% 
KS -10290.94988 No (0.101) -10208024.51 No (0.477) No 0.97 N/A 0.99% 
KY 4058590.402 No (0.22) -244634665.3 No (0.145) No 0.98 N/A 1.19% 
LA -239794.7191 No (0.215) 978519.2415 No (0.274) No 0.83 N/A 2.13% 
MA -5055520.468 No (0.392) 216666256.5 No (0.293) No 0.97 N/A 0.64% 
MD -850287.5269 No (0.213) 33402663.31 No (0.355) No 0.98 N/A 0.77% 
ME -818725.1025 No (0.261) 33840459.7 No (0.138) No 0.97 N/A 1.39% 
MI 235351.9924 No (0.212) -34454777.5 No (0.4) No 0.97 N/A 1.70% 
MN -235005.5982 No (0.121) -8466149.47 No (0.467) No 1.00 N/A 0.99% 
MO -2672218.239 No (0.246) 117941938.2 No (0.313) No 0.97 N/A 1.49% 
MS -515114.1757 No (0.462) 8786253.957 No (0.12) No 0.99 N/A 3.11% 
MT -2346830.344 Yes (0.014) 101649908.6 Yes (0.025) No 0.90 N/A 1.36% 
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 State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
NC -1580664.724 Yes (0.01) 52261706.58 Yes (0.03) No 0.98 N/A 2.00% 
ND -1229297.006 No (0.525) 41980665.77 No (0.558) No 0.86 N/A 0.40% 
NE -250341.088 No (0.13) -2076709.387 No (0.595) No 0.99 N/A 1.15% 
NH 1224018.445 No (0.223) -55605196.74 No (0.284) No 0.98 N/A 0.33% 
NJ 4076978.584 No (0.247) -303620624.3 No (0.456) No 0.98 N/A 0.73% 
NM -4741178.907 Yes (0.034) 146960730.8 Yes (0.016) No 0.87 N/A 1.49% 
NV 212131.1479 No (0.192) 4423298.791 No (0.245) No 0.86 N/A 0.97% 
NY 3116928.617 No (0.371) -88672111.02 No (0.513) No 0.98 N/A 1.57% 
OH -4163088.314 No (0.562) 150617101 No (0.553) No 0.96 N/A 1.59% 
OK 416895.1865 No (0.409) -25005879.7 No (0.588) No 0.92 N/A 1.07% 
OR -8505789.095 Yes (0.026) 310568001 Yes (0.025) No 0.89 N/A 1.33% 
PA 4621946.227 No (0.464) -237504721.1 No (0.455) No 0.99 N/A 1.16% 
RI 1219586.927 No (0.182) -59770257.55 No (0.282) No 0.98 N/A 0.61% 
SC 119292.5474 No (0.346) -3059626.904 No (0.332) No 0.99 N/A 3.13% 
SD -5631164.288 Yes (0.015) 301204533.5 Yes (0.029) No 0.99 N/A 0.69% 
TN -2883905.313 No (0.346) 87910829.74 No (0.459) No 0.99 N/A 1.72% 
TX 336287.3226 No (0.299) -24189574.81 No (0.505) No 0.96 N/A 1.10% 
US 1020506.459 No (0.173) -63731960.74 No (0.398) No 0.99 N/A 1.38% 
UT 5839508.264 No (0.317) -328143251 No (0.348) No 0.94 N/A 1.27% 
VA -9851484.821 No (0.581) 469449845.2 No (0.269) No 0.98 N/A 1.16% 
VT -45500.92983 No (0.454) -37230747.48 No (0.307) No 0.98 N/A 0.58% 
WA -2762876.635 Yes (< 0.001) 91532492.97 Yes (0.021) No 0.92 N/A 1.82% 
WI -3242377.629 No (0.477) 130404836.3 No (0.412) No 0.96 N/A 1.10% 
WV -2516037.532 Yes (0.006) 101449335.5 Yes (0.036) No 0.98 N/A 1.12% 
WY 90289.56783 No (0.132) -4097130.033 No (0.457) No 0.84 N/A 3.04% 
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 Table 22 
Regression Results on Total Highway Expenditure (1976-2000) 
 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
AK -527939.6332 No (0.325) -15187603.99 No (0.153) No 0.72 N/A 3.05% 
AL -741118.5286 No (0.549) 25001556.87 No (0.129) No 0.99 N/A 1.16% 
AR 123158.2471 No (0.424) -1621026.329 No (0.486) No 0.99 N/A 1.28% 
AZ 366728.7977 No (0.491) -14213914.48 No (0.53) No 0.86 N/A 0.98% 
CA -6489827.442 No (0.21) 480024633 No (0.206) No 0.95 N/A 0.75% 
CO -4032315.864 No (0.371) 148375642.6 No (0.503) No 0.90 N/A 1.03% 
CT -1187082.164 No (0.27) 78402226.86 No (0.202) No 0.99 N/A 0.65% 
DC -207143.7819 No (0.362) 96490938.96 No (0.489) No 0.96 N/A 0.10% 
DE -10681413.04 Yes (0.013) 439722075.5 Yes (0.022) No 0.98 N/A 1.08% 
FL 913831.1963 No (0.192) -46786570.02 No (0.555) No 0.98 N/A 1.19% 
GA -643609.0483 No (0.508) 22895004.09 No (0.359) No 0.97 N/A 0.53% 
HI 560230.6149 No (0.379) 3323285.084 No (0.542) No 0.88 N/A 0.85% 
IA -4607427.027 No (0.174) 115010027.7 No (0.372) No 0.95 N/A 1.52% 
ID -2540623.031 No (0.44) 65557382.97 No (0.235) No 0.93 N/A 1.49% 
IL -5679997.922 Yes (0.002) 253013885.1 Yes (0.028) No 0.99 N/A 0.95% 
IN -5229626.397 No (0.593) 256463083.8 No (0.263) No 0.95 N/A 0.97% 
KS -974934.8228 No (0.171) 30104762.42 No (0.14) No 0.96 N/A 1.62% 
KY 143700.8643 No (0.416) -2618919.806 No (0.126) No 0.97 N/A 1.18% 
LA -401946.5723 No (0.465) 12182586.96 No (0.483) No 0.81 N/A 0.99% 
MA -3834694.378 No (0.122) 204167001.8 No (0.471) No 0.97 N/A 0.74% 
MD 1449785.233 Yes (0.015) -44399658.7 No (0.491) No 0.99 N/A 0.92% 
ME -1099501.653 No (0.45) 28481203.11 No (0.156) No 0.97 N/A 1.57% 
MI -3776153.1 No (0.276) 182692294.8 No (0.559) No 0.91 N/A 0.98% 
MN -7133099.487 Yes (0.025) 214021952.2 Yes (0.025) No 0.97 N/A 1.23% 
MO -2334001.75 No (0.295) 101551509.8 No (0.532) No 0.97 N/A 1.13% 
MS 62023.20587 No (0.573) -132148.6986 No (0.158) No 0.99 N/A 1.64% 
MT -149139.6207 No (0.331) 1399971.712 No (0.482) No 0.80 N/A 2.16% 
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 State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
NC -4045997.964 Yes (0.022) 185284561.8 Yes (0.026) No 0.98 N/A 1.01% 
ND -1059970.127 No (0.189) 20211497.44 No (0.476) No 0.83 N/A 2.09% 
NE -2192746.874 No (0.556) 70974365.99 No (0.139) No 0.98 N/A 1.42% 
NH -228003.9053 No (0.58) 7531739.357 No (0.338) No 0.98 N/A 0.99% 
NJ -699443.1095 No (0.324) 60713301.5 No (0.574) No 0.99 N/A 0.73% 
NM -306480.0112 No (0.161) 7160125.607 No (0.519) No 0.80 N/A 1.39% 
NV 9621217.065 Yes (0.013) -361991819.7 Yes (0.005) Yes 0.88 1.33% 1.41% 
NY -310196.6892 No (0.469) 482984.8777 No (0.307) No 0.98 N/A 0.92% 
OH -7197417.382 No (0.408) 365883677.6 No (0.497) No 0.95 N/A 1.00% 
OK -3181970.159 Yes (0.021) 115882920.2 Yes (0.015) No 0.91 N/A 1.09% 
OR -17150091.57 Yes (0.018) 621468236.4 Yes (0.026) No 0.84 N/A 1.18% 
PA -1471227.18 No (0.414) 64723942.27 No (0.374) No 0.98 N/A 1.40% 
RI 467420.5487 No (0.412) -13960626.73 No (0.454) No 0.98 N/A 0.86% 
SC -1294504.283 No (0.583) 69654591.68 No (0.518) No 0.99 N/A 1.18% 
SD 1417853.296 No (0.283) -23242918.36 No (0.154) No 0.98 N/A 2.08% 
TN -2105226.493 Yes (0.018) 71967073.5 Yes (0.031) No 0.99 N/A 0.85% 
TX -1247062.522 No (0.409) 57902984.47 No (0.116) No 0.96 N/A 1.00% 
US -6789284.191 Yes (0.015) 293575342 Yes (0.003) No 0.99 N/A 1.01% 
UT 1050192.695 No (0.518) -25437701.79 No (0.516) No 0.92 N/A 1.06% 
VA 1489711.014 No (0.146) -58881410.61 No (0.304) No 0.98 N/A 0.84% 
VT -1026188.545 No (0.384) 24204326.05 No (0.552) No 0.97 N/A 1.58% 
WA -1989061.045 No (0.191) 75075289.35 No (0.147) No 0.90 N/A 1.02% 
WI 1436663.802 No (0.57) -29661211.79 No (0.532) No 0.96 N/A 1.39% 
WV 180305.7376 No (0.244) -2132203.511 No (0.572) No 0.98 N/A 1.96% 
WY -817548.4322 No (0.483) 16492529.65 No (0.218) No 0.85 N/A 1.92% 
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 Table 23 
Regression Results on Police and Fire Departments Expenditure (1976-2000) 
 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
AK 1131742.524 No (0.468) -183971863.1 No (0.319) No 0.62 N/A 1.29% 
AL -449545.0624 No (0.21) 24506625.97 No (0.355) No 0.99 N/A 1.18% 
AR -1509894.237 Yes (0.028) 92818650.75 Yes (0.034) No 0.99 N/A 1.28% 
AZ -1713882.998 No (0.327) 42002943.77 No (0.313) No 0.88 N/A 1.70% 
CA 1973473.707 No (0.396) -87358639.78 Yes (0.01) Yes 0.97 1.13% 1.73% 
CO -2749440.215 No (0.372) 74512149.42 No (0.306) No 0.93 N/A 1.22% 
CT 210879.2648 No (0.267) -31970557.32 No (0.38) No 0.98 N/A 0.95% 
DC -3303647.873 No (0.48) 119658698.3 No (0.572) No 0.96 N/A 0.93% 
DE -4897777.701 No (0.181) 282609798.3 No (0.496) No 0.96 N/A 0.85% 
FL 122301.319 No (0.299) -14732449.61 No (0.304) No 0.99 N/A 1.75% 
GA -1409881.619 No (0.185) 22198653.96 No (0.343) No 0.99 N/A 1.21% 
HI 8546276.671 Yes (0.01) -499877010.8 Yes (0.025) Yes 0.82 0.85% 1.02% 
IA -4922464.022 Yes (0.018) 260040274.7 No (0.242) No 0.96 N/A 0.88% 
ID -2269609.728 Yes (0.028) 119690854.8 Yes (0.01) No 0.97 N/A 1.34% 
IL -3974128.048 Yes (0.018) 214926714.4 Yes (0.019) No 0.99 N/A 1.25% 
IN -6080289.647 Yes (0.007) 412664281 Yes (0.01) No 0.97 N/A 1.10% 
KS -1082822.878 No (0.216) 28298538.22 No (0.425) No 0.98 N/A 1.12% 
KY -864417.8048 No (0.231) 26620964.35 No (0.495) No 0.97 N/A 1.13% 
LA 423720.7842 No (0.504) -36129687.43 No (0.375) No 0.84 N/A 1.35% 
MA -5715495.998 No (0.329) 236231246.6 No (0.226) No 0.97 N/A 1.10% 
MD 672033.0034 No (0.455) -32147084.48 No (0.444) No 0.97 N/A 1.47% 
ME -4856087.686 Yes (0.036) 271487374.8 Yes (0.01) No 0.98 N/A 1.12% 
MI 1186962.008 No (0.327) -100257646.8 No (0.46) No 0.96 N/A 1.44% 
MN 148918.148 No (0.299) -86873655.75 No (0.469) No 0.97 N/A 0.95% 
MO -2725745.75 No (0.399) 170748853.7 Yes (0.019) No 0.98 N/A 1.19% 
MS -384911.8362 No (0.567) 23759260.36 No (0.282) No 0.99 N/A 1.35% 
MT -937886.5008 No (0.151) 55238167.59 Yes (0.029) No 0.85 N/A 1.33% 
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 State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
NC -446959.8476 No (0.365) -6497368.636 No (0.495) No 0.99 N/A 1.11% 
ND -6936065.65 Yes (0.036) 480125640.8 Yes (0.013) No 0.88 N/A 0.79% 
NE -2508627.939 Yes (0.029) 178869883.9 Yes (< 0.001) No 0.98 N/A 0.99% 
NH -5475591.741 Yes (0.016) 275713911.3 Yes (0.025) No 0.99 N/A 1.03% 
NJ -3152582.066 No (0.192) 113974144.5 No (0.238) No 0.98 N/A 1.28% 
NM -2865342.453 Yes (0.016) 80658446.93 No (0.313) No 0.92 N/A 1.61% 
NV 5517895.904 No (0.432) -188351325.5 No (0.542) No 0.86 N/A 1.55% 
NY -1820197.602 No (0.482) 69317086.35 No (0.173) No 0.98 N/A 1.53% 
OH -4564062.66 Yes (0.025) 204569432 Yes (0.023) No 0.97 N/A 1.33% 
OK -1747703.792 Yes (0.012) 72669641.73 Yes (0.031) No 0.93 N/A 1.29% 
OR -8063352.543 Yes (0.015) 349953563.8 Yes (0.015) No 0.91 N/A 1.48% 
PA -1930766.859 Yes (0.018) 115640336.4 Yes (0.019) No 0.99 N/A 1.19% 
RI -821368.048 No (0.565) 17985495.36 No (0.417) No 0.98 N/A 1.64% 
SC -813642.4502 Yes (0.01) 32903640.41 No (0.444) No 1.00 N/A 1.14% 
SD -4153850.128 No (0.437) 263424741.1 No (0.192) No 0.97 N/A 0.92% 
TN -784773.3294 No (0.124) 20549335.19 No (0.526) No 0.99 N/A 1.11% 
TX -2091036.869 Yes (0.014) 74166398.87 Yes (0.029) No 0.98 N/A 1.07% 
US -835082.3286 No (0.119) 3159301.123 No (0.176) No 0.99 N/A 1.34% 
UT -3791101.605 Yes (0.012) 221437359.8 Yes (0.013) No 0.94 N/A 1.27% 
VA 1463481.651 No (0.444) -114738128.6 No (0.423) No 0.99 N/A 1.15% 
VT -1825059.726 No (0.426) 91767223.61 No (0.575) No 0.98 N/A 1.19% 
WA -1675587.041 No (0.244) 38011859.13 No (0.344) No 0.92 N/A 1.30% 
WI -4081867.384 Yes (0.011) 179627939.7 Yes (0.025) No 0.97 N/A 1.42% 
WV -1087103.054 No (0.473) 79136423.18 No (0.467) No 0.98 N/A 1.03% 
WY -154431.3237 No (0.312) 617773.0675 No (0.24) No 0.84 N/A 1.57% 
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 Table 24 
Regression Results on Interest Expenditure (1976-2000) 
 
State 
Beta for 
Expenditure/GSP 
Significant at .05 
level? 
Beta for 
(Expenditure/GSP)^2 
Significant at .05 
level? Armey Curve? 
R-
Squared 
Optimal 
Expenditure 
Expenditure/GSP as 
of 2005 
AK 1297488.065 Yes (0.029) -19326110.59 Yes (0.016) Yes 0.52 3.36% 1.04% 
AL -239426.1869 No (0.172) 16364411.6 No (0.157) No 0.99 N/A 0.64% 
AR -520530.4488 No (0.174) 22202596.42 No (0.15) No 0.99 N/A 0.53% 
AZ -344132.5773 No (0.244) 4792333.749 No (0.53) No 0.92 N/A 0.63% 
CA 3128353.261 Yes (0.034) -255253626.2 Yes (0.026) Yes 0.97 0.61% 0.76% 
CO -60175.45028 No (0.366) -28447962.59 No (0.523) No 0.96 N/A 0.81% 
CT 8332089.997 No (0.408) -462433663.1 No (0.307) No 0.98 N/A 0.76% 
DC -473064.6535 No (0.362) -41485188.75 No (0.347) No 0.96 N/A 0.37% 
DE -2547628.752 No (0.557) 100276575.2 No (0.229) No 0.97 N/A 0.45% 
FL 99199.54164 No (0.416) -2612793.224 No (0.533) No 0.98 N/A 0.81% 
GA -1875307.056 No (0.434) 114661850.8 No (0.36) No 0.97 N/A 0.46% 
HI -1843155.369 No (0.132) 25353930.31 No (0.227) No 0.91 N/A 0.97% 
IA -2502173.267 Yes (0.014) 172661928.6 Yes (0.014) No 0.99 N/A 0.41% 
ID -2063923.261 Yes (0.021) 104842971 No (0.146) No 0.98 N/A 0.54% 
IL -440795.8951 No (0.459) -31287337.94 No (0.473) No 0.99 N/A 0.85% 
IN -138234.1138 No (0.296) -88295144.1 No (0.556) No 0.98 N/A 0.64% 
KS -1133813.729 No (0.489) 62355040.87 No (0.391) No 0.97 N/A 0.75% 
KY 107873.8394 No (0.493) -22842851.82 No (0.157) No 0.98 N/A 0.92% 
LA -174036.3879 No (0.312) 7882137.329 No (0.473) No 0.80 N/A 0.70% 
MA 1832597.909 No (0.498) -55700745.66 No (0.225) No 0.97 N/A 1.25% 
MD 368265.5339 No (0.328) -9618995.085 No (0.413) No 0.97 N/A 0.58% 
ME -493649.4999 No (0.295) 32598396.4 No (0.318) No 0.97 N/A 0.77% 
MI 4039495.565 No (0.498) -345235434.6 No (0.177) No 0.92 N/A 0.75% 
MN -1740256.451 No (0.361) 76541006.55 No (0.308) No 0.96 N/A 0.70% 
MO 2438163.686 No (0.432) -234011552.4 No (0.315) No 0.97 N/A 0.66% 
MS 632860.0601 No (0.144) -46913881.82 No (0.515) No 0.99 N/A 0.64% 
MT -604829.789 Yes (0.018) 18846074.15 Yes (0.022) No 0.91 N/A 0.68% 
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NC -420103.3052 No (0.309) 19729070.55 No (0.202) No 0.98 N/A 0.45% 
ND -636471.1518 No (0.13) 7595912.05 No (0.34) No 0.94 N/A 0.65% 
NE -925525.4377 Yes (0.023) 30725296.67 No (0.318) No 0.99 N/A 0.54% 
NH 599587.1561 No (0.409) -40413571.93 No (0.427) No 0.98 N/A 0.80% 
NJ -5276824.295 Yes (0.014) 315790652.7 Yes (0.016) No 0.99 N/A 0.63% 
NM -339168.5538 No (0.574) 232475.8758 No (0.161) No 0.91 N/A 0.66% 
NV 336398.124 No (0.564) -27520644.64 No (0.305) No 0.86 N/A 0.78% 
NY -3570240.169 No (0.376) 132376378.3 No (0.377) No 0.98 N/A 1.06% 
OH 3861099 No (0.563) -367457921.3 No (0.586) No 0.97 N/A 0.68% 
OK 515547.0363 No (0.462) -40365660.17 No (0.46) No 0.89 N/A 0.55% 
OR -1876959.211 Yes (0.03) 59117379.55 No (0.141) No 0.90 N/A 0.79% 
PA -1483135.372 No (0.11) 54984866.37 No (0.343) No 0.99 N/A 0.92% 
RI 34775.13855 No (0.349) -1133246.627 No (0.331) No 0.98 N/A 0.75% 
SC 75716.59038 No (0.365) -6040601.133 No (0.144) No 0.99 N/A 0.93% 
SD 141134.1385 No (0.525) -19740579.98 No (0.469) No 0.99 N/A 0.51% 
TN 1796833.767 No (0.125) -140432196.9 No (0.129) No 0.99 N/A 0.49% 
TX -553295.0502 No (0.489) 19707867.92 No (0.174) No 0.97 N/A 0.66% 
US 1477327.457 No (0.203) -90586541.42 No (0.397) No 0.98 N/A 0.74% 
UT -750057.5754 Yes (0.009) 18776584.42 Yes (0.003) No 0.97 N/A 0.79% 
VA 2469033.891 No (0.306) -151219799.1 No (0.261) No 0.99 N/A 0.52% 
VT 3102148.19 No (0.446) -146241797.2 No (0.334) No 0.97 N/A 0.74% 
WA -2310793.456 Yes (0.023) 76309101.31 Yes (0.003) No 0.96 N/A 0.84% 
WI -2211315.582 No (0.503) 102560767.4 No (0.241) No 0.97 N/A 0.72% 
WV -661490.9635 Yes (0.002) 20158881.68 No (0.583) No 0.99 N/A 0.72% 
WY 426605.7577 No (0.411) -12388922.73 No (0.387) No 0.85 N/A 0.31% 
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